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Revitalizing Romanticism: Novalis' Fichte Studien  
and the Philosophy of Organic Nonclosure 
 
Abstract 
 
  This dissertation offers a re-interpretation of Novalis' Fichte Studien.  I argue that 
several recent scholarly readings of this text unnecessarily exclude "organicism," or a 
panentheistic notion of the Absolute, in favor of "nonclosure," or the endless, because 
impossibly completed search for knowledge of the Absolute.  My reading instead shows 
that, in his earliest philosophical text, Novalis makes the case for a Kantian discursive 
consciousness that can know itself, on Jacobian grounds, to be the byproduct (or 
accident) of a self-conditioning being or organism, and even more specifically a 
byproduct of God's panentheistic organism, at the same time that Novalis does not allow 
the possibility of discursive immediacy with that absolute standpoint; the epistemic 
consequence is that, while empirical science can proceed in the good faith that it makes 
valid reference to being, nonetheless it can never know its description of being to be final 
or complete.  I call this position "organic nonclosure," and argue that Novalis holds it 
consistently throughout his very brief philosophical career.  The keys to understanding 
Novalis' reconciliation of organicism and nonclosure are contextual and textual.  
Contextually, Novalis appreciates the inadvertent organicism in Jacobi's metacritique of 
Kant and also applies Jacobi's organicist metacritique to Fichte as well, with the result 
that Novalis' position in the Fichte Studien bears much resemblance to Herder's 
panentheistic ontology and modest epistemology.  Textually, Novalis engages in a 
polysemy in the fragments of his Fichte Studien that performs the dependence of the 
sphere of empirical consciousness on a higher, intellectually intuitive being (a being that ! "#!
could only be a divinely creative intellection), and, simultaneously, the impossibility of 
presenting that identity in discursive terms.  In other words, for Novalis, human 
knowledge of the existence of the organicist Absolute is enabled by, but also limited to, 
the merely contingent, empirical, and private experience of the dependence of the human 
subjective standpoint on an objectivity simply given to it.   
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Introduction 
 
 
„Mein Lieblingstudium heißt im Grunde, wie meine Braut.  Sofie heißt sie – Filosofie ist 
die Seele meines Lebens und der Schlüssel zu meinem eigensten Selbst.“ 
  Novalis an Friedrich Schlegel, Juli 1796 
 
 
  Novalis’ eminent standing at the heart of literary German Romanticism has gone 
essentially unchallenged for more than 200 years, but his status as a reputable 
philosopher is much younger.  The first recognition of his uniquely early-Romantic 
contribution to the philosophy of his day arrived only at the beginning of the 20
th century 
in Germany with Walter Benjamin, and in France only in 1978 with L’Absolu Litteraire 
by Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy; then, in the English language, the first blossoming of 
scholarly notice began as late as the 1990s.  Yet even a brief glance at Novalis’ works 
and letters reveals copious professions of love for philosophy and the insistence on its 
centrality to his creative project, so this tardy acknowledgment can only come as a 
surprise.  Philosophy was clearly an intellectual priority for Novalis, and also a beloved 
pursuit.  While working as an Akzessist for the saltworks in Weißenfels in 1795, Novalis 
said he had “ohngefähr 3 Stunden des Tages frey, wo ich für mich zu arbeiten wollen 
kann,” which he filled with “dringende Einleitungsstudien auf mein ganzes künftiges 
Leben, wesentliche Lücken meiner Erkenntniß und notwhendige Uebungen meiner 
Denkkräfte”
1 – all exercises that eventually grew into the 500 handwritten pages of the 
Fichte Studien, his first major philosophical work.  On several occasions, he describes the 
joy of philosophy as like an embrace, or a first kiss: “Im eigentlichsten Sinn ist 
philosophiren – ein Liebkosen – eine Bezeugung der innigsten Liebe zum Nachdenken, 
der absoluten Lust an der Weisheit,” and he writes that he wishes readers could see “daß 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Novalis, Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe/Novalis Bd 1 (München, Wien: Hanser, 2005) 574. ! #!
der Anfang der Philosophie ein erster Kuß ist, in einem Augenblick... wo sie Mozarts 
Composition ‘Wenn die Liebe in Deinen blauen Augen’ recht seelenvoll vortragen hörten 
– wenn sie nicht gar in der Ahndungsvollen Nähe eines ersten Kusses seyn sollten.”
2  For 
all the historical tendency to see Novalis solely as a poet, or as a dreamy mystic at best, in 
fact his discussion of the very relationship between poetry and philosophy was steeped in 
the epistemological and aesthetic concerns of his day.  Novalis was quite aware of the 
strength and originality of his philosophical insights, too.  In his diary, he wrote without 
modesty: “Philosophie: Schiller, Herder, Lessing, Ich selbst, Kant.”
3  Why, then, did 
scholarly recognition of his philosophical import arrive so late? 
There are several possible reasons for scholars’ neglect of Novalis as a 
philosopher.  The first is more a function of historical accident than any deficiency of 
merit: his philosophical work was not reliably compiled until very late.  In 1929, Paul 
Kluckhohn attempted to order the utter disarray of Novalis’ philosophical notes; but only 
in 1960, after Hans-Joachim Mähl put these materials into chronological order according 
to a painstaking handwriting analysis, did a more reliably clear train of thought emerge 
from Novalis’ jottings.  Their publication in English did not begin until 1996.  Prior to 
1960, from those German-language fragments that were available to the public, Walter 
Benjamin wrote his 1919 dissertation on the philosophical foundations of early Romantic 
Kunstkritik; in a fairly scathing review of it, Winfried Menninghaus said it made “a 
forced usage of textual sources” which “set the course for significant limitations to and 
falsifications within his exposition,” though he granted that certain insights were 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Novalis, Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe/Novalis Bd 2 (München, Wien: Hanser 2005) 331. 
3 Novalis (Bd 1) 434 ! $!
surprisingly accurate given Benjamin’s lack of access to correctly ordered fragments.
4  In 
general, before handwriting analyses brought Novalis’ notes any kind of coherence, 
scholars’ decontextualized quotation of them made Novalis’ philosophy sound like 
"something akin to anarchy and magic,"
5 and moreover, an artist’s retouching of his 
dewy-eyed portrait only fanned flames of the myth of his irrational and "effeminate" 
mind.  So the second reason is that what knowledge scholars did have of Novalis’ 
philosophy did not inspire great interest in it.  Third, even once his philosophical notes 
were properly collected, the influence of certain individual scholars drew attention away 
from their explicitly philosophical content and towards an almost exclusively literary 
interpretation.  Ernst Behler is a crucial example; as Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert writes: 
"Behler was a leading authority… and a case in point regarding the exaggerated literary 
interpretation of early German Romanticism…To be sure, Behler gives a detailed account 
of the philosophers who influenced [the Romantics] and refers, here and there, to [them] 
as philosophers.  But this is insufficient..."
6 
 
Finally, perhaps largely because of Behler’s influence but certainly also because of 
traditional disciplinary boundaries in the university, Romanticism is most often 
understood as a literary and critical movement, making Novalis a figure to be studied not 
by philosophers but by scholars of literature; meanwhile, most philosophy departments 
have shifted away from continental in favor of analytic philosophy, which has reduced 
the potential audience for Novalis’ philosophical work. 
However, while scholarly recognition of Novalis as a philosopher and not solely a 
poet was late coming, it has finally arrived.  His prominence as a scrupulous thinker is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Winfried Menninghaus, "Walter Benjamin's Exposition of the Romantic Theory of Reflection," in Walter 
Benjamin and Romanticism, Beatrice Hanssen and Andrew Benjamin, eds., (New York: Continuum 2002) 
19 and 22.   
5 Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism (Albany: SUNY 2004) 
156 
6 Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert, Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence of Romantic Philosophy (Albany: SUNY 
2007) 5-6 ! %!
undisputed among those familiar with his works, the most extensive of which is his 500 
pages of handwritten notes, the Fichte Studien.  Today few philosophical studies of 
Novalis forego the (almost obligatory) opening remark, quoting Manfred Frank, that his 
Fichte Studien are “the most important contribution of early German Romanticism to the 
philosophical discussion of these years.”
7  Manfred Frank has done more than any other 
scholar to banish the “stereotypes and ignorance of some of the most fundamental texts of 
[early German Romanticism],” the reputation of which he says “is easily redeemed when 
one examines these texts with depth and care.”
8  In the Fichte Studien and in his later 
works, Novalis offered original responses to the leading debates of his time “in 
epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics,” and with greater detail and rigor than 
any other Romantic, Allison Stone has written.
9  Frederick Beiser has called the 
flowering of interest in early Romantic philosophy “long overdue,” especially in light of 
its “historical significance” and the “vitality” of its relevance today.
10  Jane Kneller 
translated Novalis’ Fichte Studien into English, and her most recent book “brings the two 
most important German philosophers of the Enlightenment and Romanticism, Kant and 
Novalis, into dialogue.”
11  In her book on Schlegel, Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert announces 
“there is currently a renaissance of interest in the philosophical dimensions of early 
German Romanticism.”
12  Novalis’ long period of philosophical obsolescence is over. 
  With Novalis’ status as a rigorous thinker now an established fact, new obstacles 
confront the contemporary scholar of his philosophical work.  The most important is that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Frank 151  
8 Frank 151 
9 Allison Stone, "Being, Knowledge and Nature in Novalis," in Journal of the History of Philosophy (Vol 
46, Nr 1: 2008) 141 
10 Frederick Beiser, The Romantic Imperative (Cambridge: Harvard 2003) 1 
11 Jane Kneller, Kant and the Power of Imagination (Cambridge: Cambridge 2007), dedication page 
12 Millán-Zaibert 1 ! &!
scholars are still considerably at odds with each other on even the basic elements of his 
thought.  According to Theodor Haering, Novalis was proto-Hegelian; for Walter 
Benjamin, he embraced a filled infinity of reflection not unlike Leibnizian monads; for 
Lacoue-Labarthe, his most important influence was Kant’s third Critique, though he 
supported a discursive equivocity that puts him in the company of Blanchot and Derrida; 
for Frederick Beiser, he offered a Platonic argument for vitalist organicism; and for 
Manfred Frank, Novalis’ Kantian anti-foundationalism anticipated aspects of post-
modern theories of the subject and of knowledge.  This kaleidoscope of accounts of 
Novalis’ thought and the influences on him is countered, at the other end, by Ernst 
Behler’s characterization of the Fichte Studien as “surprisingly difficult to understand, 
because of the almost complete lack of an orientation to points of reference in traditional 
philosophy.”
13  Disagreements can be explained, in part, by the fact that some scholars 
did not have access to the correct orderings of Novalis’ texts, and in part because of the 
obscurity of his work: even in their current form, many writings are really just unfinished 
notes never meant for publication (though it would be a mistake to overlook them for that 
reason).  But above all, the scholarly terrain is still fresh, and there is much progress yet 
to be made. 
  This dissertation examines a conceptual tension in Novalis' thought that became 
especially noticeable in the conflicting readings of contemporary scholars Manfred Frank 
and Frederick Beiser: the problem of "nonclosure" versus "organicism" in Novalis' 
philosophy.  These terms are not Novalis' own, but rather scholars' descriptions of his 
early epistemology and later ontology, respectively.  "Nonclosure" is the open-ended or 
ever-hypothetical quality of any possible system of knowledge because the absolute 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Ernst Behler, German Romantic Literary Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 1993) 184. Emphasis mine. ! '!
ground of knowledge cannot be known, and more specifically, because the condition of 
the relationship between knower and known cannot itself be incorporated into the system.  
Nonclosure thus expresses the endlessness, because the impossibility, of the search for 
such an Archimedean perspective.  The term "nonclosure" was first applied to Novalis by 
Alice Kuzniar, who wished to demonstrate the proximity of early Romantic and post-
structuralist theories of writing in Novalis' literature, rather than in his philosophy.
14  But 
the term is appropriate to his philosophical thought as well, and it captures an entire 
category of Novalis scholarship that has compared the Frühromantik to post-
structuralism for their shared interest in the philosophical problem of the lost origin of 
human knowing, or logos that purports to underlie knowledge, yet is eternally 
irretrievable.  This interpretation of Novalis' philosophy was popularized in the first place 
by Manfred Frank, whose 1989 reading of Novalis' Fichte Studien revolutionized Novalis 
scholarship for its demonstration of Novalis' anti-foundationalism and his attenuating 
characterization of the Absolute as an "Unding... an 'absurdity' or 'impossible thing'."
15 
  In contrast, "organicism" refers to any ontology that positively characterizes the 
nature of the being of the Absolute as a "living organism."  That is, the ontological 
ground of all things — the very nature of the sum of existence — is a living being, or a 
self-conditioning totality whose whole is greater than the sum of the immanent parts that 
constitute it as a whole.  In this ontology, living being conditions both the difference and 
the union between knower and known by the very activity of its maintaining itself as 
itself; thus the Absolute organism quite literally comes to know itself in human 
consciousness.  Organicism is a traditional reading of Novalis with fewer and fewer 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Alice Kuzniar, Delayed Endings: Nonclosure in Novalis and Hölderlin (Athens: University of George 
Press, 1987) 
15 Frank 51 ! (!
contemporary supporters; indeed, there has been a direct tradeoff in the emphasis of 
"organicism" with the growth in support for "nonclosure" and Frank's anti-foundationalist 
reading.  Today, Frederick Beiser is the scholar who most energetically trumpets Novalis' 
commitment to organicism, and wishes to "restore the organic concept to its rightful 
place" in Novalis scholarship.
16  The tension between "nonclosure" and "organicism" 
should be clear, then: the former claims that we cannot know that which conditions the 
relationship between knower and known, while the latter actively claims that the 
ontological unity underlying this relationship is the Absolute as organism.  And how 
could we both not know the Absolute, and know it as organism?  Presently Novalis 
scholarship has essentially concluded that Novalis' opinion changes over time: 
nonclosure seems to be the position of his Fichte Studien starting in 1795 (and ending in 
1797), but by the Allgemeine Brouillon in 1798, he seems to support organicism.  Yet 
prima facie it is doubtful that Novalis' opinion would change so diametrically in such 
short time.  The question thus suggests itself: Must we see the unknowability of being and 
the organic organization of being as opposed stances in Novalis' thought, explicable only 
as a change in heart? 
  In the following introduction, we situate the debate between nonclosure and 
organicism in its historical context.  "Knowledge," "systematicity," "(non)closure," 
"being," and "organicism" must be defined and elucidated against the complex 
philosophical backdrop of Kantianism and the many responses to the epistemological 
project of transcendental idealism in post-Kantian idealism and realism.  Ultimately this 
debate is about the relationship of Novalis to Kant, and the question of whether Novalis 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Frederick Beiser, "The Paradox of Romantic Metaphysics," in Philosophical Romanticism (New York: 
Routledge 2006) 219 ! )!
stands with Kant in a strict adherence to Kantian limits on valid knowledge, or else 
sacrifices the letter of Kant for the sake of his "spirit," by seeking a knowable ground to 
Kant's system in the unity of subject and object in the absolute organism.  Though many 
scholars have participated in this debate, in the following pages we introduce the conflict 
over Novalis' role in this post-Kantian environment by examining, in particular, Frank's 
and Beiser's competing readings of him.  Unlike their present, effective conclusion that 
Novalis changes his mind over time, this dissertation argues that "nonclosure" and 
"organicism" are not actually competing, inconsistent elements of his thought.  On the 
contrary, Novalis' philosophy can be profitably characterized as "organic nonclosure," 
which is not a contradiction after all, and which he holds throughout his career.  For 
Novalis, we argue, the nonclosure of our knowledge of being is a function of the organic 
organization of being: the Kantian synthesis of sensibility and understanding that both 
conditions human consciousness, and that bars consciousness of the thing in itself, is the 
living activity of the absolute organic being in the human mind.  Just as Heinrich von 
Ofterdingen's blaue Blume is both symbol of the ever-receding knowledge of the absolute 
and a botanical object, so too is Novalis' organicism a consistent philosophy of the 
unknowability of the Absolute and the nature of the Absolute's being as an organism.  
But to understand this conclusion, we must first be clearer about the intellectual history 
behind Novalis' stance.  
 
 
 
 ! *!
I.  Organicism as the Closure of Kant's Transcendental Idealism 
 
  Echoing Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy's broader assertion that "Kant opens up the 
possibility of Romanticism,"
17 the present study of the problem of organicism and 
nonclosure in the philosophy of Novalis also locates its context in Kant's Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft.  It begins with what has been called the "discursivity thesis,"
18 or Kant's 
claim that human cognition requires both concepts and sensible intuition and is produced 
by a synthesis of the faculties of sensibility and understanding.  With this faculty dualism, 
Kant attempted to reconcile the two most influential competing philosophies that he 
inherited, empiricism and rationalism.  The challenge Kant faced was that these two 
positions favored seemingly exclusive arenas as the guarantors of human knowledge: 
either knowledge stems from objects radically in the world (empiricism), or else 
knowledge rests a priori on concepts that have access beyond the physical realm to the 
ideal dimension (rationalism).  Kant harmonized this historical dualism by bringing both 
positions into the confines of the human being, arguing that their seemingly competing 
notions of "real" and "ideal" were in fact both posterior to his own philosophical 
contribution: that the conditions for the possibility of knowledge are within the human 
mind.  This is his famous "Kopernikanische Wende": "Bisher nahm man an, alle unsere 
Erkenntnis müsse sich nach den Gegenständen richten," when in fact objects must 
conform to our cognition.
19  There can be no object for the mind without the mind’s own 
conditions for knowing that object, and ipso facto there is no valid knowledge that is not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, c1988) 29 
18 Henry Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale, 2004) 12-13 
19 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Hamburg: Meiner 1998) B xvi/Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage, 
p. 21 ! "+!
a possible knowledge for the given structures of human cognition.  Thus empiricism’s 
"object" is actually only the object post-cognition, or the object as we enable it to be 
represented to ourselves, while the a priori reasoning of rationalism’s "subject," in turn, is 
the formal structuring power of cognition used towards its possible object.  Kant achieved 
this masterful balance by re-positioning dualism at the very act of reflection itself: the 
object of empiricism and the subject of rationalism are now viewed as coordinated sides 
of the same human being, on the one hand as passively receptive sense perception, 
structured in space and time, and on the other as the spontaneously structuring 
understanding, which forms its object in Kant’s categories of the understanding.  The 
objectivity of knowledge, Kant says, is grounded in the synthesis of these irreducibly 
distinct faculties of sensibility and understanding; they work together, and the product of 
their harmony is cognition.   
  While solving some problems, the faculty dualism of Kant's Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft invited a host of others in the minds of his readers.  One was the famous 
disappointment at the main consequence of this dualism: barred access to answers to 
theological questions about the nature of God, freedom, and immortality.  In Über das 
Marionettentheater, Kleist captured this disillusionment with Herr C.'s lament that "das 
Paradies ist verriegelt und der Cherub hinter uns."
20  Of course, for Kant, such 
disappointment was the necessary collateral damage of his securing a foundation for the 
natural sciences and, if not knowledge of, then at least a rational faith in a divinity or in 
life after death; that this consequence was unpleasant to readers like Kleist was not, 
ultimately, an argument against Kant's system.  The more pressing criticisms of the 
critical project were immanent ones (or at least claimed to be immanent).  One of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Heinrich von Kleist, Werke/Kleist Bd 3 (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 2005) 559  ! ""!
most insightful came from Salomon Maimon.  Maimon wondered how sensibility and 
understanding could actually synthesize with each other, if one is passive matter in space 
and time, and the other active form outside space and time.  His concern was a variant of 
the basic puzzle of Cartesian mind-body dualism, or the problem that, if we have sense 
perception insofar as we are embodied and rational powers insofar as we have a non-
physical soul, then the interaction of the two sides is difficult to explain.  Maimon 
restates the Cartesian problem in the Kantian context (here in English translation):  
"The question of the explanation of the unification of soul and body is... reduced to the 
following question: how is it conceivable that forms a priori should agree with things 
given a posteriori?  And... how is the coming-to-be of matter, as something merely given 
but not thought, conceivable through the assumption of an intelligence, since they are 
indeed so heterogenous?"
21 
 
For present purposes, the most important thing to note about Maimon's statement is that it 
questioned how one could make ontological sense of the requirements of Kant's 
epistemology.  That is, Maimon wondered what the nature of the being of this synthesis 
in the subject was, that it could form a mental representation from passive empirical 
sense and active, non-empirical understanding.  And in light of the difficulty explaining 
the nature of the relationship between these two disparate faculties, Maimon asked: with 
what right did Kant trace knowledge back to this synthetic origin? 
  Kant's critical deduction of knowledge from sensibility and understanding did not, 
in the first place, purport to be an ontology, or theory about the nature in itself of these 
faculties and of their relation.  The "right" to trace knowledge back to these two faculties 
was based on a very particular notion of "deduction," the provenance — and modesty — 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Salomon Maimon, Essay on Transcendental Philosophy (London; New York: Continuum, 2010) 37. ! "#!
of which was famously described by Dieter Henrich.
22  Though today we tend to assume 
that a "deduction" is a logical process of drawing a conclusion from stated premises, the 
source of Kant's usage is actually medieval German juridical discourse.  Kant modeled 
his sourcing of the faculties on the court process of claiming a legal right.  In law, for 
example in the authentication of a last will, the methodology for proving the legitimacy 
of a claim is "to focus on those aspects of the acquisition of an allegedly rightful 
possession by virtue of which a right has been bestowed, such that the possession has 
become a property."
23  In other words, one has to tell a story about how one came to 
acquire a property, and the rightfulness of one's claim to that property will be judged on 
the plausibility of the story — but there is no hard and fast science for making the case.  
"The very notion of a deduction is compatible with any kind of argumentation suitable 
for reaching the goal,"
24 and the case is built up using as many different arguments as it 
can to point to a claim.  Kant appealed to the same holistic method when he justified the 
origins of our right to knowledge.  First Kant assumed all humans have an instinctive, 
immediate awareness of the operations involved in certain rational functions, such as our 
ability to distinguish "counting from calculation, analysis from composition, and so 
forth."
25  His deduction of the sources of knowledge to particular faculties starts with 
those nonreducible instincts, and then builds its case by reconstructing a plausible system 
of relationships between those functions.  The system thus created is unavoidably 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Dieter Henrich.  "Kant's Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Background of the First 
Critique," in Kant's Transcendental Deductions, Eckhart Förster (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University 
Press, 1989) 
23 Henrich 34 
24 Henrich 39 
25 Henrich 42 ! "$!
hypothetical.  It does not follow from a syllogistic relationship of claims stemming from 
a single foundation, but rather is only as strong as the relations cohere in a whole story. 
   Even more importantly, a central goal of Kant's transcendental idealism is to 
preclude answers to precisely such ontological questions.  As Kant said, "der stolze 
Name der Ontologie... muß dem bescheidenen, einer bloßen Analytik des reinen 
Verstandes, Platz machen."
26  Again, the basic consequence of Kant's deduction of the 
forms of intuition and categories of understanding, which was also his critical rejoinder to 
rationalism, was that concepts by themselves cannot entail the necessary existence of the 
objects of which they are concepts; instead, statements about the existence of something 
can only claim validity as knowledge if they follow from the application of concepts, by 
the faculty of understanding, to objects contingently given in the senses.  And since the 
consciousness of objects in which we find ourselves situated — or "thrown," to borrow 
Heidegger's term — is conditioned by this synthesis, that synthesis cannot itself become 
an object of our consciousness.  By the stipulations of Kant's own system, then, we 
cannot claim to know that which does the reflecting that results in our immediate 
consciousness of objects.  Synthesis is what gives rise to our taking something as an 
object in the first place; thus consciousness so conditioned cannot then "turn around" to 
take that condition as an object, and must remain "[ein] für uns unbegreiflich[er]... 
Wurzel."
27  In short, we live in a reality always already conditioned by the act of 
reflection of reality.  Another way of formulating the same problem, now from the 
perspective of consciousness itself or the "I," is that we experience the self as immediate 
both with itself and with the contents of its consciousness, but we cannot become 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Hamburg: Meiner 1998) A 247/B 303/p. 354, 355.  
27 Kant A 15/B29/ p. 86, 87.  ! "%!
conscious of the self as an object among other objects; whatever its nature is, and 
whatever ontological role it plays in conditioning the relationship between objects outside 
the self and objects as they appear to the self, thus simply cannot be known because it 
cannot become a valid object.  Kant said that the "I think" must be able to accompany 
representations so that representations may be of a piece, but this stipulation remains 
circumspect as to whether the self is the subject of reflection or a product of some other 
reflecting being.  As we will see below, Fichte attempts to ground Kant's system in the 
subject by claiming that the self is such that subject and object are unified in its self-
knowledge, i.e., Fichte equates the subject of self-consciousness with Kantian synthesis.  
But for Kant, Fichte's move is not permissible.  Maimon's question begged, and Fichte's 
philosophy made, an ontological commitment about the nature of the being of the unity 
of sensibility and understanding in itself; but contrary to both, Kant's critical move was to 
conceal its being beyond the sphere of valid consciousness and thus knowledge of it.   
  We can rephrase this concealment in words that throw its contemporary — and 
even post-structuralist — resonance into stark relief: the very synthesis that brings 
consciousness into being also veils the source of consciousness from consciousness itself.  
That is, the basic Kantian claim is that we live always already beyond the point of our 
conscious origin, in a world of objects already structured spontaneously, yet 
involuntarily, by our particularly human manner of conceptualization; the nature of the 
thing in itself, i.e., considered apart from our cognition of it, must then remain a 
permanent unknown even while it conditions our knowing.  In a contemporary but still 
apposite term, this ultimate result of Kant's Copernican turn is philosophical 
"nonclosure," or epistemological open-endedness rendered by the unknowability of the ! "&!
ground of knowledge.  Alice Kuzniar, who studied nonclosure as a specifically literary 
problem of narrative open-endedness, also noted its philosophical expression in post-
Kantian discourse both Romantic and contemporary: "[A]ll of us have inescapably 
inherited Kantian divisions: all are barred from transcendent certitudes and, with them, 
from the reassurance of any resounding closure."
28  Derrida cautions that this nonclosure 
is in fact inevitable, because all grounds necessarily unground themselves in their 
dependence on what they exclude; we cannot know the singular, originary logos, yet it 
haunts knowledge as the condition of its possibility — its "opening" in Derrida's 
formulation.  This "problème de clôture ou d'ouverture" suspends all knowing in the 
nonclosure of a ground permanently lost, but never forgotten: "The transcendentality of 
the opening is at once the origin and the undoing, the condition of possibility and a 
certain impossibility of every structure."
29  In Kant's own system, Derrida's wisdom took 
the form of the injunction that philosophy become self-criticism.  The proper role of 
philosophy is the delineation of its own limits, a process by which philosophy 
simultaneously enables and impedes itself. 
  When so phrased, Kant's redirection of philosophy to the scrutiny of its own 
limits makes evident the extent to which he was engaged in a radical intellectual venture 
that reverberates even in contemporary thought.  Yet Derrida's words also suggest where 
Kant's project collapses even in its own terms.  For isn't the attempt to draw the limits of 
reason on the basis of the demands of reason itself subject to scrutiny, and to the same 
consequences of ungrounding?  Kant fundamentally sought to show that the involuntary 
spontaneity of our knowing — the a priori conditioning of our consciousness that cannot 
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become an object of that same consciousness — is still a rational process, grounded in 
the autonomy of the interests of the subject's reason from sense.  That is, the subject's 
reason should legislate the form of its contents to itself on its own terms.  Yet Kant's 
deduction of the proper exercise of reason, as we've seen in Dieter Henrich's reading of 
him, did nothing to illuminate a method that would finally and conclusively ensure that 
this self-criticism of reason also legitimates itself.  In other words, in the end Kant still 
faces a metacritical problem: while the basic critical claim is that the subject's reason 
legislates the formal aspect of consciousness, on a meta level Kant does not explain or 
justify how reason can have this knowledge of its own laws.  How, especially, can reason 
know itself when Kant forbids that whatever it is that does the very reflecting that gives 
rise to our consciousness can become an object for that same consciousness?  Derrida's 
comment about the simultaneity of "origin and undoing" in philosophy now takes on a 
more insidious tone for Kant.  It seems Kant's system of knowledge itself falls prey to 
nonclosure. 
  We have now arrived at the crux of the matter.  This specific notion of nonclosure 
— the open-endedness of Kant's system of transcendental idealism that follows from its 
dependence on an unknowable ground, the concealed origin of consciousness — is the 
context of the contemporary scholarly debate about Novalis' standing in post-Kantian 
philosophy.  According to Manfred Frank, in the Fichte Studien Novalis adheres to a 
Kantian synthetic model of judgment, and then, in answer to the problem of system 
grounding, acknowledges that the search for a foundation of philosophy can only ever be 
an endless process; in short, Novalis embraces nonclosure.  In contrast, according to 
Beiser, by the time Novalis starts writing his fragments a year after he finishes the Fichte ! "(!
Studien, he has abandoned this more philosophically modest path in favor of the closure 
of Kantian idealism through a commitment to organic ontology, a move that also means 
he joins Schelling and Hegel in the ranks of absolute idealism; in short, Novalis turns to 
organicism, and this position is counter to his prior nonclosure.  Again, this dissertation 
holds that organicism and nonclosure are not opposed in Novalis' thought, either 
temporally or logically: Novalis holds "organic nonclosure" for his whole career.  But 
before this independent position is defended, precisely what an "organic ontology" is, and 
how post-Kantian idealism, especially in Fichte, attempt to reach closure of Kantianism 
by means of it, are examined in the following sections. 
 
*** 
  An organic ontology is a theory of being as innately self-organizing.  An 
"organism" or "living" being distinguishes itself from inert existing things by locating the 
principle of its maintenance as itself wholly internally to itself.  Unlike a table, which 
only becomes and remains a table thanks to the purposive creation and ongoing repair by 
someone like a carpenter, the carpenter distinguishes himself as "living" or "organic" for 
containing the guidelines for his being himself only within himself.  The carpenter is a 
true unity, or Leibniz's unum per se, whereas the table is merely inessentially a table.  
Only the tree from which the table's wood was cut was at one point — while it was 
"alive" — a self-organizing being rather than a merely dependent collection.  Of course, 
all organic beings must be born of parents, so in a sense they too have precedents for their 
self-organization outside themselves; but the peculiar quality of a living thing, to which 
any parent could reverently (if exhaustedly) bear witness, is that as soon as that decision ! ")!
to have a child is made, the child then takes on a "life of its own," and though the parents 
must support its self-organization with food and proper care, that parental role is merely 
attendant to the child's own essential, internal ordering, and not creative of it.  The 
definitional self-organization of an organic being is often specified philosophically as a 
unique relationship between "form and matter," or relatedly, between "parts" and "the 
whole that is greater than the sum of those parts."  According to Aristotle, all existing 
things are the union of a matter and a form, but a living thing in particular is matter that 
has a form called a "!"#$," psyche or soul, which is a formal agency wholly internal to 
the being and responsible for the ongoing, purposeful maintenance of the being as that 
being.  In the 18th century, Kant brought further specificity to this Aristotelian definition 
of the organism.  He affirmed Aristotle's notion of internal purposiveness, calling the 
organism a Naturzweck, and added that an organism is matter continually maintained in a 
particular form specifically by the reciprocally causal relationship of a thing's parts to 
produce a greater whole: "so wird zweitens dazu erfordert, daß die Teile [des 
Naturzwecks] sich zur Einheit eines Ganzen verbinden, daß sie von einander 
wechselseitig Ursache und Wirkung ihrer Form sind."
30  The whole organism is the goal 
of its parts, acting like an antecedent Bauplan that the parts actualize empirically by 
being reciprocally cause and effect of each other; so causality is made internal to the 
being and intentionality is made to inhere in substance.  This internal causality and 
internal intentionality is unlike the notions of external cause and ontologically separate 
mind in the paradigm of Cartesian, mechanistic explanation.  The organism unifies 
intentionality and materiality, collapsing mechanism's dualistic substances of being and 
thought into the ontologically singular substance of "life," or thinking matter. 
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  Organic beings have certain definitional properties that follow from the self-
organized nature of their existence.  For example, an organism is active (its parts are 
constantly cycling into and out of its whole, because the whole, rather than any individual 
part, is what defines it); appetitive (the being must take its parts into itself from outside 
itself in order to maintain itself); homeostatic (the being is in a constant state of self-
regulation to maintain its unity); and responsive to the world.  For our purposes, the most 
important property is "responsiveness," for this is also a "philosophy of mind."  This 
dissertation is interested in the "organic" nature of being first and foremost for its 
implication of what a "mind" is, and how the mind relates to, and represents, the world 
outside the organism.  According to organic theory, in an organic being, the mind is the 
internal aspect of the organism that is actualized as soon as the organism comes into 
being.  The mind is the immediate internalization of the outward aspect of the organism, 
the body — or better still, because it is a more inclusive description, the subject is the 
immediate internalization of the object.  There is no subject apart from the object, 
because both only come into existence as themselves as the internal and external aspects, 
sides, or "halves" of the organism; we can say that subject and object inhere, 
dependently, in the being of the organism.  That is, subject and object are mutually or 
reciprocally determined, but ultimately dependent for their own existence on the coming-
into-being of the organism of which they are byproducts or accidental aspects.  Whatever 
that original principle of the creation of the being is — call it the "soul," for example, but 
the point is that it is the agency of organismic self-organization — it is not itself 
perceptible; only the consequence of its actualization (i.e., of its realization or 
instantiation) as itself, as the organism, is perceptible.  The definitional quality of a ! #+!
"representation" as a mental image, in a subject, of a world of objects given to the subject 
but as outside the subject, is explained in the theory of the organism as a function of this 
dual-aspect theory of mind: subject and object are distinct from each other insofar as they 
are internal and external aspects of being, but because they are aspects of being, they are 
also experienced in inextricable connection.  The philosophical foil to any organic 
philosophy of mind is Cartesian dualism (though the dual-aspect theory of mind is indeed 
a "dualism" in the general sense of a theory of the nonreducibility, and so distinctness, of 
mind and matter).  In the organism, mind and body form a reciprocity that is itself 
dependent on the creative principle that grounds that reciprocity in its own self-creation, 
rather than forming, as in Cartesianism, a mechanistic body and an only mysteriously 
simultaneous free mind.  In the organism, the mystery is deferred to the inception of the 
being as a being, but the interaction of mind and body, subject and object, is 
unproblematic if that mystery has been assumed. 
  For our purposes, there were two precedents for organic ontologies that were 
important to Novalis: Johann Gottfried Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte.  The reader 
might be surprised to call Fichte organicist; after all, he did not theorize about the beings 
of plants and animals.  But again, the definitional commitment in an "organic" notion of 
being is to being as self-organizing, and so is consistent with a wholly mental version in 
which "subject" and "object" are the mutually fulfilling parts of the Absolute subject that 
brings them into that relation by its own self-organization.  This is Fichte's theory of the 
Tathandlung or absolute ego, and is described in detail below.  Herder's organicism is a 
divinized, panentheistic version of Fichte's.  God is the Logos whose creative self-
reflection instantiates himself as all of creation, so that created things are the very parts ! #"!
that constitute his existence.  Creation constitutes God's being in an ascending hierarchy 
of more and more developed beings, a chain of being.  Created beings, who are like God 
because they are instantiations of him, are organisms or Kräfte, and though these parts 
must die and be continually replaced, that process of organic continuation of the whole is 
the maintenance of God as himself. 
  Though Kant's definition of the organism as a Naturzweck gave his generation 
good reason to believe that organic life cannot be explained away as, or reduced to, a 
mere mechanism, as might be expected Kant himself did not actually countenance 
knowledge of the purposiveness of organisms in themselves.  According to his Kritik der 
Urteilskraft, the teleology of life is only a regulatively necessary concept, meaning that, 
while we can only make sense of living things by considering them to be self-
instantiating purposes rather than mechanisms, we cannot validly claim to know that their 
inherent nature is purposive.  Once again, the justification for this limitation is the 
defining move of Kantianism.  We can only claim to know experience that is given in our 
senses and enabled by our human conditions of knowing, and according to Kant, those 
conditions do not enable the experience of telic causes, which are supersensuous.  The 
organizing Bauplan of the organism is not itself intuitable, but merely an assumption that 
makes sense of the confluence of empirical elements that we can intuit.  For instance, in 
biology, scientists conjecture as if the beetle's wing is designed for flight, but since the 
notion of "design" or "purpose" implies an antecedent intentionality that conditions the 
wing, while the empirically existing wing is the only actual object of experience, 
scientists are not entitled to knowledge of this purposiveness.  (For Kant, this limitation 
had the radical consequence of making biology a permanently imperfect science.) ! ##!
  Herder's philosophy did indeed extend the concept of the organism to the very 
nature of being in itself.  Of course, Herder never claimed in the first place to follow the 
critical Kant when he speculated beyond Kantian limits about the nature of being in itself 
as "Kraft."  And Kant, in turn, famously called Herder's Ideen "so monstrous that reason 
shudders before them," because they leapt to unjustified supersensuous claims; though 
formerly teacher and student, Kant and Herder considered themselves to be at 
philosophical odds.
31  Organicism is not Kantian, according to Kant.  In light of Kant's 
regulative limitation of organic ontology, it is all the more noteworthy that Fichte, as a 
self-proclaimed Kantian, would see organicism as an important part of the fulfillment of 
the Kantian project even on its own terms: that organic ontology is necessitated by 
Kantian commitments.  Again, Fichte's claim is important for the debate on Novalis, 
because if Novalis indeed stood strictly with Kant (as Manfred Frank believes), where 
that means that Novalis agrees with Kant that knowledge of being is invalid, then any 
reasons Novalis gives for rejecting Fichte's solution could also be construed as his 
disavowal of organicism.  We turn now to Fichte's argument in favor of closing Kant's 
system in the organic Tathandlung. 
 
*** 
  To review, Kant's philosophy was explicit in its claim that, in consciousness, we 
live always already beyond the synthetic act that conditions the emergence of that 
consciousness.  The Ding an sich — a notion that conceptualizes both whatever it is in us 
that enables consciousness but that we do not ourselves perceive, and whatever it is in the 
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object that we do not produce — is completely unknowable.  But his philosophy was also 
the attempt to prove that the involuntary spontaneity of synthesis occurs in the interest of 
human freedom and can be validly known to be the process by which our rational, 
subjective conditions objectively enable our awareness of the world; so the activity of the 
subject in itself had to be at least somewhat self-transparent to empirical consciousness.  
These two goals were at odds.  We have already suggested a Derridean reading of the 
problem, which we are calling Kant's outstanding issue of "nonclosure": Kant 
inadvertently found himself validating a sphere of the knowable (the sphere of empirical 
consciousness) by excluding the sphere of the unknowable thing in itself, such that the 
unmoored act of exclusion by itself, rather than some Archimedian meta-perspective, is 
responsible for marking what we know, and so marks precisely the point at which Kant's 
system undoes itself.  By now exploring the historical context in which this accusation 
was made — Kant's transcendental argument, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's rejection of that 
argument, and K. L. Reinhold's call to foundationalism — we can better understand how 
Fichte would believe that the rubble of Kant's nonclosed edifice could be rebuilt as an 
organic closure. 
  Kant uses "transcendental" arguments to determine the right to know his idealist 
premise that understanding and sensibility synthesize to produce consciousness.  The 
basic transcendental claim is that we could not be self-consciously conscious if the a 
priori categories of the understanding did not apply to a posteriori sensations, and so we 
have a right to accept that they do.  The actual deduction is the complicated heart of 
Kant's first Critique, but for our purposes, we need only introduce its notion of "warrant."  
Here there are two key points to be made.  First, Kant believes that, by starting with a ! #%!
standpoint that even the skeptic cannot deny, namely the existence of apperceptive 
consciousness (after all, it is the world-orientation of precisely this consciousness of 
which the skeptic is skeptical), one should also be able to command assent to the 
necessary conditions of this minimal standpoint.  The skeptic must grant the right to 
knowledge of the conditions of his own minimal stance, because they are the necessary 
commitments entailed by his own position.  In turn, any knowledge that remains within 
those limits should be knowable with the same degree of certitude as the starting point.  
Second, Kant believes that seeking the conditions of this minimal standpoint will also 
justify reference to an objective world outside of that consciousness, because the 
activities that give rise to consciousness must be directed to an object that is distinct from 
those activities, if there even is to be a consciousness of objects.  Part of what it means, in 
other words, that consciousness is "conditioned," is that its constitutive activities are 
directed to an independent object.  So the conditions of the minimal standpoint of the 
skeptic, self-conscious consciousness or the realm of thought alone, justify knowledge of 
the world outside that realm, because that realm is traced in outline by these conditions. 
  In other words, according to Kant we can be as sure that understanding and 
sensibility synthesize to condition our valid knowledge of objects, as we are sure that 
there exists a self-conscious consciousness, and even the skeptic would grant that much.  
Whatever the ground of ontological commonality between these two very heterogenous 
faculties might be, we can know that they relate, by dint of inference from the existence 
of our own apperceptive standpoint.  But another thinker, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, 
noted that this deduction illicitly (on Kant's own terms) presupposed ontological 
knowledge of the thing in itself.  More specifically, by believing that he can rise by ! #&!
means of inference from apperceptive consciousness to the conditions of that 
consciousness, he is presupposing that the thing in itself causes self-conscious 
consciousness.  But cause is a category of the understanding that only validly applies to 
sensation and cannot be employed outside of it, as Kant is doing here in an abstraction 
away from experience to its causes.  So Kant has effectively transitioned, against his own 
rules, from a merely epistemological project to an ontological one, by implying that the 
synthesis of understanding and sensibility is a being, and our consciousness is an 
expression of its being.  Yet it's hard to imagine how Kant could retain the very world-
orientation of thinking that he is seeking by means of this deduction, if he doesn't allow 
that the thing in itself causes our consciousness.  Hence Jacobi's famous statement, "ich 
kann ohne das Ding an sich nicht in die Transzendental-philosophie hineinkommen, mit 
dem Ding an sich aber nicht darin bleiben."
32  Certainly Jacobi did not characterize his 
reading of Kant as a "deconstruction," but in retrospect, we can see that it is effectively 
just that. 
  Fichte, though, believed that Jacobi hat hit upon the very solution to Kant's 
problem, if only Kant acknowledges that this solution is what he already "means."  The 
experience that consciousness has of itself — the self-consciousness of consciousness — 
is itself the very orientation of understanding in sensation that validates, in still-Kantian 
terms, Kant's inference to the ground in a synthetic being.  That synthetic being is the I, 
and more specifically, the "I think" that Kant himself said must be able to accompany all 
representations, but that he had not explicitly acknowledged was the common root of 
understanding and sensibility that his system needed.  Kant's transcendental reflection has 
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not, after all, illicitly operated outside the boundaries of a possible experience, and the 
common root is in fact knowable, precisely by means of the empirical experience that the 
self has of itself as the stable point in all knowing.   
  Now, in order to make sure that this ground in being also secures the closure of 
Kant's system — i.e., in order to demonstrate that the "I" acts as the metacritical 
standpoint that it must be to delineate conditioning from conditioned spheres validly — 
we need to deduce consciousness from the ego as foundation: that way, the warrant of 
self-consciousness can confer, via that deduction, to the critical act of judgment that 
requires metacritical justification.  By insisting on this foundationalist, systematic 
securing of the metacritical validity of Kant's edifice, Fichte showed the influence of K. 
L. Reinhold.  K. L. Reinhold was responsible not only for familiarizing the general public 
with Kant in the first place, but also for convincing many that Kant's system was unstable 
until its propositions derived deductively from a single starting proposition, which would 
be the system's grounding foundation.  His concern was that if philosophy is not a true 
"science," or a set of propositions formally derived from a single, self-evident starting 
point, then there could be no solid reason to believe that its propositions aren't merely 
casual and unrelated observations, or potentially even contradictory statements.  Its 
claims would have a merely hypothetical and ungrounded status until anchored by a 
foundation from which they derive and which would confer geometric surety to the 
whole structure.  Kant had not yet achieved this systematicity, Reinhold claimed, because 
his system had not yet been derived from its "common root."  But Fichte believed he had 
this common root, after all: the being of the ego.  We can make sense of the being of the 
ego as the ground of consciousness, a ground that can also form a foundation from which ! #(!
Kant's system can be deduced, if we understand that the I is an organic being, Fichte 
says.  Fichte's Tathandlung is fundamentally an organism.  "Ich und in sich 
zurückkehrendes Handeln [sind] völlig identische Begriffe," Fichte writes.
33  Self-as-
subject and self-as-object constitute each other reciprocally in the "I think," a living 
activity.   
  The closure of Kant's system can be secured by articulating the grounding 
connection between this organic ego and the sphere of empirical consciousness that it 
conditions.  That is, if Kant's transcendental inference to the conditions of consciousness 
can be stated in an intuitively self-evident propositional judgment, then his inference will 
also have the metacritical power of a deduction from the ground of consciousness to the 
act of judgment.  Fichte believes he achieves this balance in the propositional 
characterization of the grounding organic being, "I am I."  The proposition "I am I" 
captures the very act of judgment by which the I becomes self-intuited in self-
consciousness.  Fichte believes the I transitions from absolute creativity to finite, 
empirical self through self-creating self-reflection, which is also the taking of itself as 
object and the setting up of the "I" as an "eye," capable of registering the being outside it 
as an affection of its own being.  The "I" is an "intellectual intuition," a thinking that 
thinks itself.  Thus Fichte believes himself to have integrated the problematically 
noumenal or "outside" status of the I's being into reflection itself.  Of course, Fichte knew 
well that Kant forbade intellectual intuition; for Kant, this was only possible (and only 
hypothetically so) in God, whose thought alone could be creative.  But Fichte also 
believed that Kant had presupposed — as Jacobi pointed out — that the base of his 
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system was indeed the subject as the original point of unity of activity and passivity, so 
that Kant did in fact allow at least this instance of intellectual intuition, in spite of 
himself, and indeed could, because the self-consciousness of consciousness is based in 
this being. 
  Scholars fairly universally agree that Novalis rejects Fichte's grounding of 
Kantian consciousness in the Absolute ego.  The question now is, what precisely do they 
think Novalis rejects in Fichte's thought — and why — and must it also follow that he 
rejects all organic ontology?  We now turn to the Novalis debate. 
 
II.  The Novalis Debate: Nonclosure versus Organicism? 
 
  Before Paul Kluckhohn provided the first critical edition of Novalis' philosophical 
fragments in 1929 — the arrangement that Géza von Molnár said initiated "the phase of 
modern Novalis scholarship,"
34 not least of all because it demarcated the Fichte Studien 
as a text — most scholars believed that Novalis' philosophy was organicist, and more 
specifically that Novalis was a mystic who believed in direct experience of subject-object 
unity in the divine organism that underlies all things.  This view of his philosophy was 
not especially charitable to the strength of his philosophical mind, though, and studies of 
the less rigorous "Novalis as philosopher" were usually first and foremost attempts to 
elucidate "Novalis as poet," who was indeed held in high regard.
35  It seemed that, by 
holding sheerly mystical beliefs about our embeddedness in God's organismic being, 
Novalis was simply operating amateurishly at the periphery of post-Kantian discourse 
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(under the influence instead of thinkers like Jacob Böhme and Plotinus), and that he 
philosophically discredited himself by the way his "pyrotechnical metaphysics jettisoned 
Kantian limits on knowledge," as Jane Kneller summarized the typical indictment.
36   
  But an extraordinary thing happened after a second rearrangement of Novalis' 
philosophical fragments by Hans Joachim Mähl in 1960: a new reading of the Fichte 
Studien by the German philosopher Manfred Frank convinced the academic 
establishment that Novalis had in fact been a Kantian all along, and that the traditional 
opinion of his philosophy had not only been unfairly dismissive, but also completely off 
the mark.  After Frank, scholarly consensus transitioned from seeing Novalis as engaged 
in a mystical and even irrational organicism, to denying the knowability of God's being in 
proper Kantian fashion.  "Novalis concluded that the unconditioned in human knowledge 
is a non-sens, literally a 'non-thing' (Unding), an 'absurdity' or an 'impossible thing'," 
Frank writes, "[yet] nothing of note regarding this daring conclusion is to be found in the 
[existing] literature on Novalis."
37  Frank showed that Novalis was in fact intimately 
involved in the discussions that followed Kant's first Kritik, and that he disagreed with 
Fichte's argument for the closure of Kant precisely in the name of Kantian moderation.  
As will be explored further below, Frank's reading of Novalis' Fichte Studien understands 
him to reject two central elements of idealist closure: first, Novalis denies that reflection 
can articulate being, and second (and relatedly), he denies that the ontological ground of 
knowledge can be brought into a Kantian system (for example as a foundation).  Novalis' 
rejection of these two points, we are told, stems from his strict adherence to Kant's 
discursivity thesis and to the accompanying nonclosure that strict Kantian epistemology 
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entails.  Frank even calls Novalis' thought "a return to Kant before idealism could spread 
its wings."
38 
  For Novalis in Frank's reading of him, the givenness of the self to itself cannot 
result from the turning-back of the self upon itself in reflection, as Fichte had claimed 
was possible in the "Tathandlung."  Instead, the undeniable familiarity that the self has 
with its own being and with being in general is a non-discursive, merely sensuous 
immediacy that Novalis calls "Gefühl," or feeling.  Kant stipulated that reflection 
("Reflexion"), or the act of division and relation of conscious matter by the mind, 
operates in the medium of feeling; only feeling, in other words, can be the matter for the 
application of concepts in reflection.  This application produces the consciousness of 
objects that is our ordinary experience of our conscious selves and our consciousness of 
the world.  Thus reflection cannot be its own matter; reflection by itself can no more 
produce content (apperceptive being) than two mirrors turned against each other can 
reflect something rather than an endless regress of empty reflection.  The prefix "re-" in 
the English word "representation" nicely captures Novalis' concern in Frank's reading of 
him: reflection does not present its object immediately, but rather is the presenting-again, 
in the terms of its own conceptualizing structure, of the mere givenness or unmediated 
thereness of feeling (which, alone, is not yet "for itself" because it has not been reflected). 
As Novalis writes in his Fichte Studien, and Frank quotes: "Wir verlassen das Identische, 
um es darzustellen."  The immediacy of the self with existence in feeling is the material 
of conceptual organization in representation, but representation is precisely not the 
immediacy of reflection and being, as Fichte would have it, but rather a deferral of 
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immediacy that, for its even being such a deferral, produces our experience as a 
conscious subject over and against a world of objects. 
  Novalis' objection to Fichte is textbook adherence to Kant, according to Frank.  
Fichte Studien translator Jane Kneller writes in agreement: "In essence Novalis refuses to 
grant Fichte's very un-Kantian starting point — he refuses, as Kant certainly refused, to 
allow the conflation of intuition and thought, even in the guise of a 'thought-act.'"
39  
Knowledge, for Kant as for Novalis, must be the discursive product of the synthesis of 
sensibility and understanding (for Novalis, "feeling" and "reflection"), and so we cannot 
ever hope to know the common root that relates them.  We cannot know that which 
knows itself in us.  Thus the system-closure that Fichte's conflation was meant to achieve 
must also be refused: if a system of knowledge must be grounded in its root and 
systematically deduced from it, then it must remain an endless task, because such closure 
is an impossible goal, according to this reading of Novalis.  Hence the "nonclosure" of 
knowledge, its infinite approximation towards the impossible consciousness of its own 
ground.  Here Frank eagerly draws the parallel with Hölderlin's wordplay that judgment 
is always an Ur-Teilung, or an original separation, of reflection from being.  Reflection is 
the separation of the subject from a merely felt identity that is fundamentally irretrievable 
in consciousness.  Because reflection structures and constitutes the consciousness in 
which we always already find ourselves in the terms of an insurmountable difference 
between subject and object, there is no possibility of philosophy ever exiting its "Sfäre," 
as Novalis writes in the first fragments of the Fichte Studien, to grasp the "Muttersfäre" 
of original identity that would ground and close philosophy: "Bewußtseyn ist ein Seyn 
außer dem Seyn im Seyn" (emphasis mine).  "Could there be a more striking difference 
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to Hegel?"
40 Frank asks, highlighting the unique path that Novalis (and early Romantic 
philosophy in general) carved away from German idealist closure.  The pre-echo of 
Derridean post-structuralism has also been clear to many readers of Frank's explication of 
Novalis' notions of the fragmented subject, conceptual equivocity, and anti-systematism.  
  Thanks to the strength of Frank's reading, Novalis scholarship has widely 
retreated from its traditional assumption that Novalis is organicist at all.  In light of this 
curtailment of reflection as the mere deferral of knowledge of being, the more 
metaphysically audacious notion of reality as God's self-positing organism that becomes 
conscious of itself in human consciousness seems simply at odds.  In its stead, Novalis' 
Romantic concern with the inevitability of our remove from our ground in being has 
piqued scholarly enthusiasm for the similarity between early Romanticism and post-
structuralism.  In other words, after Frank, scholarship has tended to assume a direct 
tradeoff between readings of "organicism" and "nonclosure" in Novalis' thought.  For 
example, Alice Kuzniar writes that Novalis "anticipates Poststructuralist concerns, which 
his writings strikingly exemplify... [Novalis] advocates a proliferation or a redundancy of 
structures, rather than the organic, unitary form often attributed to him... The oft-cited, 
supposedly Romantic metaphors of organicism — cycles and embryonic development — 
must be challenged."
41  In his deconstructive reading, Paul de Man claims that Novalis' 
Romantic irony "reveals the existence of a temporality that is definitely not organic, in 
that it relates to its source only in terms of distance and difference and allows for no end, 
for no totality."
42  The most outspoken exception to the trend of comparing the 
Frühromantik to contemporary theories of nonclosure only affirms the 'rule of tradeoff' 
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between nonclosure and organicism: Frederick Beiser has energetically repeated the 
traditional reading of Novalis' organicism, and in doing so has explicitly pitted himself 
against interpretations of nonclosure in Novalis' thought.  Since Beiser explicitly opposes 
Frank's reading in particular, we introduce his position here. 
  To be clear, Frederick Beiser largely agrees with Frank's reading of the Fichte 
Studien.
43  His objection is not to the interpretation of Novalis outlined above, but rather 
that Frank's reading — of this earliest text by Novalis — has unjustly dominated the 
overall image of Novalis as a philosopher.  Beiser claims that Novalis in fact turns away 
in his later years from this epistemologically modest program of "nonclosure" to the 
traditionally recognized, ontological commitment to organicism; that this organic turn 
places him in the company of the idealists described above; and that it is even the more 
mature and representative stance of his philosophical career as a whole.  Thus Beiser 
writes: "Arguments for placing Novalis outside the idealist tradition draw invalid 
generalizations from his early notebooks, failing to consider his later philosophical 
development... [The Fichte Studien are] an early and immature work, riddled with doubt, 
hesitation, ambivalence, and inconsistency"
44; and later: "Romantic Naturphilosophie and 
its organic concept of nature... [are] a domain completely ignored by Frank."
45   
  Beiser claims that Novalis' transition from "nonclosure" to "organic closure" is 
both a historical and logical division in his thought.  While, in the Fichte Studien, the 
ground of knowledge in being is indeed unknowable thanks to Novalis' rejection of 
Fichte's intellectual intuition, by the start of the Allgemeine Brouillon in 1798, Beiser 
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says, Novalis has revived a Platonic, intuitive model of the intellect and does argue for 
direct knowledge of the nature of being, or of subject-object unity, as a totalizing 
organism that comes to know itself in the consciousness of human beings.  Basically 
Beiser reiterates the traditional image of Novalis.  His stance is against the recent flood of 
comparisons between Novalis and post-structuralism: "The main thrust of [my 
scholarship] is directed against postmodernist interpretations of Frühromantik... I believe 
their interpretation is one-sided and anachronistic."
46  His insistence on organicism in 
Novalis makes him see the emphasis on nonclosure as simply at odds with his own 
reading, and he wishes to "vindicate the older scholarly tradition and to restore the 
rightful place of the organic in romantic thinking," contrary to "the most recent trend of 
Romantikforschung, which has questioned the old emphasis on the organic concept, and 
which has stressed instead the lack of completeness and closure in romantic thought."
47 
  The two portrayals of Novalis' thought by Frank and Beiser are philosophically 
incompatible.  In Frank's reading, consciousness defers our knowledge of being, because 
reflection structures being in its own discursive terms rather than granting being as it is in 
itself.  In Beiser's interpretation, the ideas of reason are in fact immediate knowledge of 
being in itself, which for Novalis is organic; consciousness and reality are simply two 
manifestations, internal and external, of the same underlying identity — being as living 
force — and the knowing mind is an immediately integral part of this force.  Another 
way of stating this difference is that, while Frank maintains, for Novalis, a Kantian model 
of knowing whereby there is no valid knowledge that is not the sensible manifold always 
already reflected by human cognitive conditions and thus forever removed from the Ding 
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an sich, Beiser claims that Novalis denies this Kantian barrier with his commitment to an 
organic thing-in-itself that knows itself in the ideas of reason in the human mind.  The 
underlying epistemologies in these two readings are thus fundamentally opposed: being is 
the unknowable, only infinitely deferrable object in Frank's reading, while for Beiser, 
being is knowable precisely as organically organized, thanks to the Romantic revival of 
an ancient notion of intellectual intuition as the mind's direct seeing of wholes that are 
greater than the sum of their parts.  Frank's nonclosure places Novalis in closer company 
to contemporary post-structuralists, while Beiser's vitalized, intentionalized notion of 
being places Novalis with his German Idealist contemporaries. 
  As it stands, Romantic philosophical scholarship has effectively reached a detente 
between these positions in the conclusion that Novalis changes his mind over time.  The 
question now seems to be merely which stage one should "prefer": Beiser insists we take 
the later development more seriously, while Frank trumpets the significance of the earlier 
Fichte Studien and dismisses the later fragments as "wirklich fragmentarisch, auch im 
schlechten Sinne."
48  In a recent article, Allison Stone affirms the turn in Novalis' opinion 
and attempts to explain his motivation for the change in heart.  "The evolution in 
Novalis’ thinking becomes apparent," she writes, "once we appreciate that he has a 
central aim of showing how we could reacquire a (presently lost) experience of natural 
phenomena as 'enchanted' — meaningful, mysterious, and animated by spirit."
49  That is 
to say, essentially, that Beiser's organicism remedies Frank's nonclosure.  But again, the 
two stances are seen as opposed poles of Novalis' thought.   
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III.  Novalis' "Organic Nonclosure" 
 
  The position taken by this dissertation is a different kind of reconciliation than 
that presently offered by the secondary literature.  Here it will be argued that the seeming 
conceptual tension, even mutual exclusivity between the epistemology of "nonclosure" 
and the ontology of "organicism" in Novalis' thought is itself mistaken, both historically 
and logically.  Instead, these two philosophical notions are harmonious facets of a single, 
consistent viewpoint that Novalis maintains throughout his short career — a combined 
theory of epistemology and metaphysics that can be helpfully summarized as "organic 
nonclosure."  Not a paradox, the phrase "organic nonclosure" rather expresses the utter 
interdependence for Novalis of the reflective deferral of knowledge of being with the 
organic organization of being.  More to the point, the ungraspability of being by 
reflection is in fact a function of its organic ontology and the mind's organic relationship 
to it.  Ironically it is a synthesis of Beiser's and Frank's conflicting positions that brings us 
to this more accurate characterization of Novalis' overall philosophical project.  The 
scholarly debate on "organicism" versus "nonclosure" in Novalis' thought has essentially 
fallen into a false dilemma (to which it was easy to fall prey, due to the highly complex 
intellectual history of the problem): while it is true that organicism for the idealists is the 
attempt to secure the closure of Kant, it is false that nonclosure therefore has to be a 
stance against organicism by the Romantics.  The alternative is precisely what we are 
calling "organic nonclosure," and detailing this position as Novalis holds it in the Fichte 
Studien is the goal of this dissertation. ! $(!
  While we must agree with Beiser that an organic ontology is indeed central to 
Novalis' philosophy in a way that has been under-developed by Frank's reading, we must 
square organicism not with Beiser's Platonic and intellectually intuitive model of 
knowledge of being on at a later stage of his thought, but with Frank's insistence that 
Novalis accepts Kant's discursive or synthetic judgment.  However, while we agree with 
Frank that Novalis' stance is indeed an appropriation of Kant, we hold that Novalis 
develops Kant in a much more daring metaphysical direction than suggested by Frank's 
mere "return to Kant before idealism can spread its wings."  Novalis in fact agrees this 
much with Fichte: the self-experience of consciousness — its self-consciousness, or 
privacy, or its quality as a lived perspective in the here and now, a Dasein — is what 
allows a Kantian consciousness validly to know that its condition in an organic being.  
That is, for Novalis, reflection inheres organically in the medium of feeling, a position 
that he believes retains what is respectable about Kantian strictures, the limitation of 
knowledge to sensuous experience, but also indicates our organic embeddedness being, 
just as Fichte argued.  The difference between Fichte and Novalis is that Novalis believes 
the relationship between ground and empirical consciousness cannot be discursively 
articulated.  Our conscious relationship to the ground is only a private perspective, an 
immediacy, an incommunicable witnessing in Dasein, of the dependence of 
consciousness on something higher.  Frank's reading that we are immediate with being in 
feeling but estranged from it in reflection becomes the right to knowledge of organic 
being — not as a dialectical sublation, but as the individual's wholly subjective, and 
therefore inarticulable, experience of being "thrown" from an absolute creativity.  So the 
very inability of our consciousness to perform a deduction from ground to subjectivity ! $)!
points — ex negativo, but not merely regulatively — to what this organic being must be: 
it is God, the living or panentheistic God of Herder.  Kant's critique drew the outlines of 
the scientist's objective world through a transcendental inference to the conditions of 
consciousness; Novalis' metacritique draws the outlines of the Absolute through a 
transcendental inference to the conditions of our self-experience as an empirically limited 
consciousness.  The very synthesis by which human consciousness is simultaneously 
immediate with being through feeling, and estranged from being in the divisive activity 
of reflection that gives rise to consciousness of subject-object separation in the first place, 
is the organic striving of God's being to be itself.  Thus at all points of his philosophical 
career, Novalis argues that human beings are constitutive parts of God's whole organism, 
and that God's being becomes "for itself" in our consciousness.  In short, Novalis' Fichte 
Studien agree with Herder's organicism. 
  Because of its stance on the impossibility of the discursive articulation of our 
consciousness relationship to our ground in the organic God, Novalis' position is still a 
"nonclosure," or the claim that human empirical knowledge must remain hypothetical for 
lack of the possibility of its systematization.  We can know, transcendentally, that the 
organic God is ground of our consciousness, because it is the condition of our self-
conscious consciousness; but that private experience cannot be translated into discursive 
terms that would secure, in a proposition that could become the immanent ground of a 
system of knowledge, the deductive relationship between that ground and our experience.  
The dependence of consciousness on its organic condition in God's panentheistic being 
cannot be retraced by human reflection.  Whereas Hegel would say that thought can 
dialectically overcome the (only apparent) division between thought and being, and so ! $*!
reach systematic closure, Novalis insists in reverse that, because thought always depends 
on the brute fact of the basic givenness of being (and the point is: a givenness to us from 
God), thought cannot reach behind it or ascend beyond it.  Nonclosure — as the 
permanent deferral, yet dependence, of thought on its ontological ground, whereby the 
ground cannot be made a metacritical standpoint in a system of philosophy — is the 
unavoidable conclusion.  While the subjective, wholly perspectival revelation of being in 
the Kantian reflection of feeling does indeed transcendentally indicate our organic 
inherence in God's being, still the private character of consciousness, or its nature for us 
as a lived and personal experience, cannot be or become a system foundation, because its 
subjectivity is not conceptual or universalizable in character.  For Novalis as for Fichte, 
consciousness is indeed a species of the life of being; but the idealists affirm, while 
Novalis denies, the possibility of grounding a Kantian system of knowledge in this 
organic interdependence of thought and being.  Hence we say Novalis' is a philosophy of 
"organic nonclosure."  
  Our argument spans three chapters.  Chapter One closely examines eight of the 
most influential scholars of early Romantic philosophy for their relevance in this debate: 
Walter Benjamin, Theodor Haering, Géza von Molnár, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Jean-Paul Nancy, Manfred Frank, Clare Kennedy, and Frederick Beiser.  Not only is such 
a survey of the secondary literature presently absent and sorely needed in Novalis 
scholarship, it will also demonstrate that the fluctuating history of interpretation — 
readings that also evolved alongside ever-improving primary sources of Novalis' thought 
— can itself help account for the present, seeming tension between epistemological 
nonclosure and organic ontology.  The false dilemma that "nonclosure" must exclude ! %+!
"organicism" is traced to the changing role of reflection in these various readings of 
Novalis: arguments began in favor of the inherence of human thought in God's organic 
being, but abandoned organicism as they abandoned reflective immediacy in favor of 
reflective deferral.  
  Chapter Two examines the relevant intellectual background of the alternative of 
organic nonclosure overlooked by this interpretive tradeoff, by looking more closely at 
the influence that Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi had on his generation.  In particular, we 
examine his role in the Pantheismusstreit for its simultaneous introduction of 
phenomenological arguments for ontology, and a metacritique of reason.  The ontology 
that Jacobi himself explicitly proffered was organic.  The fact that his metacritique of 
Kant implied, by way of phenomenology, that the synthesis at the root of consciousness 
is an organic being, at the same time that his anti-philosophy rejected the vain attempts of 
philosophers to articulate that being, shows that panentheism was born out of an 
epistemological modesty that would much sooner suggest nonclosure than the grand 
idealist systems more commonly associated with organic being.  Herder's thought will 
also be more deeply explored in Chapter Two for its precedent of combining panentheism 
with anti-foundationalism and anti-systematism. 
  Chapter Three provides a close reading of the organic nonclosure of Novalis' 
earliest, largest, and most difficult text, the Fichte Studien.  Where relevant, later 
fragments are discussed as well, in order to show that Novalis holds this position 
consistently throughout his (after all, quite brief) philosophical career.  Our argument 
begins with a re-reading of the very same fragment that helped initiate the current 
enthusiasm for Novalis' remarkably contemporary-sounding thoughts.  Novalis writes in ! %"!
fragment two of the Fichte Studien: "Das Bewußtseyn ist ein Seyn außer dem Seyn im 
Seyn.  Was ist aber das?  Das Außer dem Seyn muß kein rechtes Seyn seyn."  This 
fragment would seem a poetic restatement of the limitations enacted by Kant's 
discursivity thesis, and the affirmation of nonclosure in light of the impossibility of 
Fichte's attempt at systematic grounding.  And it is that, at least in part.  While feeling is 
immediate with being — it is our "Seyn im Seyn" — nonetheless our consciousness is 
always already beyond the subject-object division of reflection, which permanently casts 
us outside of immediacy with being: it is "ein Seyn außer dem Seyn im Seyn."  Thus 
consciousness can no more reflectively retrieve its origin prior to the separation that 
constitutes it than a dog, when chasing its own tail, can truly catch itself.  Fichte wanted 
to call the "Seyn außer dem Seyn" the system-grounding being of self-consciousness, but 
Novalis cautions that this is "kein rechtes Seyn."  Since Fichte's ego is an organismic 
being, it might seem that Novalis' denial of it is also a rejection of organicism entirely.  
However, Novalis' statement can also be parsed in the following manner: "Das 
Bewußtseyn ist [ein Seyn außer dem Seyn] [im Seyn]."  In other words, unitary being — 
God's being, as will become clear later — is the medium of conscious separation of 
subject and object.  And this is an organic structure.  More specifically, Novalis here 
argues for the immanence of reflection in being, as the relating of parts within a substrate 
or whole that also unifies them.  Not an idealist conflation of reflection and being in the 
human subject, Novalis' point is instead that the subject-object difference that is our 
nonreducible, wholly private conscious reality, and that bars us from the experience of 
subject-object unity in being in itself, is a function of, or conditioned by God's living 
being.  We are dependent not on ourselves, but on His absolute self-conditioning to be ! %#!
conscious at all; the human subject is "kein rechtes Seyn" — a mere "eddy" in what is 
really God's absoluteness — and this insurmountable dependence is also philosophical 
nonclosure.  Thus the further layer of organicism in our interpretation of this fragment 
does not conflict with the nonclosure in the first layer.  Far from it: the duality, yet 
harmony, of these two layers of this fragment performs the fact that philosophy cannot 
sublate its own dependence on the organic Absolute.  Only this reading appreciates the 
unique and rich philosophy of "organic nonclosure" in Novalis' Fichte Studien. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ! %$!
Chapter One 
! 
From Organicism to Post-Structuralist Nonclosure in Readings of Novalis: 
A History of an Interpretive Tradeoff 
  
  This chapter reviews seven interpretations of Novalis' philosophy by the most 
prominent scholars of early Romanticism.  These readings span more than ninety years 
and display a remarkable lack of consensus about even basic aspects of Novalis' thought, 
thanks in part to ever-evolving primary sources, but certainly also due to the intellectual 
challenge of Novalis' texts: Manfred Frank has called the Fichte Studien "the most 
difficult [texts] in German philosophy."
50  Yet in spite of their diversity, these seven 
readings can still be grouped into two categories that demonstrate one significant 
interpretive shift.  Walter Benjamin, Theodor Haering and Frederick Beiser form the first 
group, while the second is comprised of Géza von Molnár, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Jean-Luc Nancy, Manfred Frank, and Clare Kennedy.  The former argue that Novalis 
supports a knowably organic notion of the Absolute and of our inherence as thinkers in it 
(the stance we are calling "organicism"), while the second argue that there is no Absolute 
— it is a merely regulative notion for Novalis — and that philosophy must operate at an 
irremediable remove from its ground (the stance we are calling "nonclosure").  Indeed, a 
direct tradeoff between readings of organicism and nonclosure is quite evident.  
  This review of the secondary literature locates the source of that tradeoff in 
changing interpretations of the role of "reflection," or the human subject's taking of 
objects of consciousness, in Novalis' philosophy.  Benjamin, Haering and Beiser all argue 
that, for Novalis, human reflection inheres in the being of the Absolute, which is 
understood, though in different ways between them, as an equation of reflection with 
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being.  That is, the Absolute exists by means of its own self-reflecting, and in turn, the 
reflection upon objects by humans, who are constitutive parts of the Absolute's whole, is 
knowably grounded in the self-conditioning of the Absolute.  This relationship between 
human thinking and Absolute being is organic.  In contrast, von Molnár, the two French 
authors, Frank, and Kennedy variously argue that reflection for Novalis is the separation 
of thinking from being — where "being" is now conceived merely as mind-independent 
reality, and not as a self-conditioning Absolute — and so philosophy is insuperably 
deferred from its ground.  The former group outlines organicism in essentially idealist 
terms for Novalis, while the latter group sees Novalis as carving a path away from 
idealism because he limits the knowledge that can be granted by reflection. 
 
I.  Walter Benjamin 
 
  Walter Benjamin's account of Novalis' thought was a bold and unique reading of 
this early Romantic's philosophy, and one that held scholarly sway for quite some time 
until the more recent, disabling critiques of Winfried Menninghaus and Manfred Frank 
consigned it to disrepute.  Menninghaus, for example, speaks scathingly of Benjamin's 
"extremely 'free' treatments of quoted material" and the "significant limitations to and 
falsifications within his exposition," which have "astounding repercussions."
51  But in 
Benjamin's defense, we must note that his 1919 dissertation, Der Begriff der Kunstkritik 
in der deutschen Romantik, was also the first significant scholarly attempt to understand 
Novalis as a philosopher seriously engaged in the early stages of German Idealism, and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 Winfried Menninghaus, "Walter Benjamin's Exposition of the Romantic Theory of Reflection," in Walter 
Benjamin and Romanticism, Beatrice Hanssen and Andrew Benjamin, eds., (New York: Continuum 2002) 
19 and 22.   ! %&!
so Benjamin's important reading must be credited with putting Novalis on the academic 
map as an earnest participant in the philosophical discussions of his day at all.  Moreover, 
Benjamin had no choice but to work with the 1901 Ernst Heilborn edition of Novalis' 
philosophical work, which presented Novalis' fragments in one continuous stream and 
did not contain many of the fragments with the most explicit formulations on which 
Menninghaus and Frank base their now very popular, quite different interpretations. 
  According to Benjamin, Novalis utilizes Fichte's notion of reflection in order to 
allow the Absolute to be an immediate object of reflection, yet he also radicalizes Fichte's 
notion of the "I" by extending it to all of reality, beyond the confines of the finite ego.  
Benjamin believes Novalis supports a notion of the "Absolute" that, in the end, bears 
resemblance less to Fichte's self-conditioning ego than to Leibniz's organic monadology: 
the Absolute is a network of interconnected reflections of which any individual I's 
reflection is just one integral act in its larger "medium of reflection."  However, though 
the human ego is directly integrated within this Absolute like a stitch in mental fabric, 
any given act of reflection by the I can know the Absolute only incompletely, because, 
much like Leibniz's monadology, each I is merely one finite perspective on a whole that 
is infinitely greater than it.  Thus Benjamin attempts to reconcile the organic relationship 
of human knowing to the Absolute — i.e., that each act of reflection is a constitutive part 
of the being of the Absolute's larger whole — with the open-endedness or nonclosure of 
that very relationship, by arguing that human reflection can only penetrate finitely into 
the Absolute's infinite medium.  Benjamin reads Novalis, with us, as supporting "organic 
nonclosure" (though ultimately in quite different terms than this dissertation holds).  His 
reading proceeds as follows. ! %'!
  For Fichte, as we saw in our introduction, reflection comprises the being of the 
self: the self is a turning-upon-itself and taking-of-itself as its own content, a self 
immediately given to itself in self-constituting self-reflection.  More specifically, 
Benjamin notes, reflection for Fichte is the free ability of the self to take the form-giving 
function of itself as its object, and thereby to become immediacy with itself as the “form 
of form.”  Benjamin quotes Fichte here: “Die Handlung der Freiheit, durch welche die 
Form zur Form der Form als ihres Gehaltes wird und in sich selbst zurückkehrt, heißt 
Reflexion.”
52  Fichte's conflation of reflection and being in this Tathandlung is also his 
attempt to curb an infinite regress that he understands to threaten the very immediacy of 
self to itself that this notion of self-reflection is meant to achieve: in reflection, the 
thinking self is distinguished from the thought self, and so in order for the thinking self to 
become that self’s thinking self, it too would have to be thought by a higher thinking self, 
and so on ad infinitum, preventing the assumption of any actual self-consciousness.  For 
this reason, Benjamin reminds us, Fichte insists that the Kantian philosopher must 
countenance the Tathandlung as the single valid instance of intellectual intuition, or a 
thinking that produces the object of which it thinks, in order to ground the transcendental 
idealist system finally and without regress.  
  The central claim of Benjamin’s dissertation is that, unlike Fichte, Novalis 
embraces this capacity of reflection for infinite regress, and rejects that it be curbed by 
intellectual intuition in the I.  While Fichte shies away from the possibility of an empty 
series of reflections that, because of its infinite deferral, never arrives at the immediacy of 
what is reflected, Novalis believes that this regress is not in fact empty, but rather gives 
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rise to a filled, because interconnected network of reflections.  A "network effect" of 
reflection noticeably takes hold at the third level of reflection, as Benjamin writes here: 
"Die Unendlichkeit der Reflexion ist für Schlegel und Novalis in erster Linie nicht eine 
Unendlichkeit des Fortgangs, sondern eine Unendlichkeit des Zusammenhanges... Das 
Denken des Denkens des Denkens kann auf zweifache Art aufgefaßt und vollzogen 
werden.  Wenn man von dem Ausdruck "Denken des Denkens" ausgeht, so ist dieser auf 
der dritten Stufe entweder das gedachte Objekt: Denken (des Denkens des Denkens), 
oder aber das denkende Subjekt (Denken des Denkens) des Denkens.  Die strenge Urform 
der Reflexion des zweiten Grades ist durch die Doppeldeutigkeit im dritten erschüttert 
und angegriffen.  Diese aber würde zu einer immer vielfacheren Mehrdeutigkeit auf jeder 
folgenden Stufe sich entfalten."
53   
 
Structural ambiguity on ever-higher levels of reflection means that these reflections, 
though endless, actually "hang together" and so fill each other in a system of infinite 
interpenetration; where Fichte only sees an empty Fortgang, the Romantics see a filled 
Zusammenhang.  The immediacy that Fichte sought in the privileged act of intellectual 
intuition is actually secured, even into infinity, by the web-like inter-connections of 
reflections at higher and higher levels. 
  The full ontological impact of this Romantic re-evaluation of reflection really 
becomes apparent with Novalis’ next move (in Benjamin’s reading of him), which is also 
the incorporation of a version of "organicism" into this theory of infinitely filled 
reflection.  After restricting the regress of self-reflection in intellectual intuition, Fichte 
redirected the infinitizing aspects of reflection to practice, or to the realm of continuous 
ethical striving; but Novalis extends infinite reflection to all of reality, not just the I, thus 
removing Fichte’s limits within the human mind in a redefinition of the Absolute as the 
"medium of reflection."  Hence Benjamin quotes Novalis calling this philosophy a 
"Fichtismus, ohne Anstoß, ohne Nicht-Ich in seinem Sinn."
54  Benjamin explains that, for 
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the early Romantics, "die Reflexion konstituiert das Absolute, und sie konstituiert es als 
ein Medium... Seine Substanz ist überall dieselbe."
55  That is, the "substance" of the 
Absolute is this very interpenetrating network of infinite mental reflections, or the filled 
Zusammenhang of thinking thinking thought.  As this medium of reflection, the Absolute 
is not material, strictly speaking; instead, it is only "objective" insofar as it becomes 
object to itself in its reflexive turn upon itself, thereby connecting reflections to each 
other as subject to object within its web-like network.  "Objects" in our common-sensical 
understanding of them are more aptly described as "subjects," or really "centers of 
reflection": "Die Romantiker gehen vom bloßen Sich-Selbst-Denken als Phänomen aus; 
es eignet allem, denn alles ist Selbst."
56  Hence Novalis’ claim that our knowledge of 
nature is really the "self-knowledge of nature," as Benjamin explains here: "Alles, was 
sich dem Menschen als sein Erkennen von einem [natürlichen] Wesen darstellt, ist in ihm 
der Reflex der Selbsterkenntnis des Denkens in demselbigen… Jede Erkenntnis ist ein 
immanenter Zusammenhang im Absoluten."
57  Early Romantic philosophy is thus similar 
to Leibniz’s organic monadology, but with the important difference that "thinking 
centers" connect to each other through the network of reflections and are "nicht ein 
Aggregat in sich abgeschlossener Monaden," as Benjamin qualifies.
58  Since all of reality 
is composed of thinking "selves" that are integral parts of an underlying, self-reflexive 
whole.  So Benjamin's reading of Novalis is "organic" insofar as the Absolute is the 
immanent whole that directs, and in turn is constituted by, its parts, which include the 
human mind.  Reflective penetration into this organic Absolute is precisely what Novalis 
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means by "Romantisieren" as a "qualitative Potenzierung," according to Benjamin.
59 
  In Benjamin’s reading, then, reflection gives each thinking center immediate 
access to the organic being of the Absolute; but importantly, this knowledge is also only 
finite, restricted, and unavoidably incomplete.  On the one hand, because interpenetrating 
reflections compose the Absolute as medium, "mittelbar kann dieser Zusammenhang von 
unendlich vielen Stufen der Reflexion aus erfaßt werden, indem gradweise die sämtlichen 
übrigen Reflexionen nach allen Seiten durchlaufen werden."
60  Winfried Menninghaus 
explains Benjamin’s interpretation clearly here: "The whole 'being' of infinite reflection 
consists, as a totality of relation, in the mirrorings of all its parts – that is, as a decentred 
continuum of centres of reflection."
61  So, contrary to the philosophy of Fichte and other 
self-described finishers of the Kantian project, knowledge for the Romantics does not 
have to be built from a single foundation into a deductively closed system, but can start 
"anywhere" and still penetrate, via reflection, into the Absolute.  But on the other hand, 
because of the very same structural ambiguity that links all reflections to each other in the 
filled infinity of the Absolute, reflection that attempts to take the Absolute, in its whole, 
as an object of knowledge necessarily falls short of completing this goal.  Benjamin 
writes:  
"In diesem Sachverhalt beruht das Eigentümliche der von den Romantikern in Anspruch 
genommen Unendlichkeit der Reflexion: die Auflösung der eigentlichen Reflexionsform 
gegen das Absolutum.  Die Reflexion erweitert sich schrankenlos, und das in der 
Reflexion geformte Denken wird zum formlosen Denken, welches sich auf das 
Absolutum richtet."
62 
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Novalis’ metaphysics of the Absolute as the "medium of reflection" accounts for the 
nonclosure of the knowledge that follows from reflection, according to Benjamin: each 
finite "thinking center" in the Absolute knows this Absolute directly, but only 
incompletely, because totalizing knowledge of the infinite is not available to this 
restricted perspective.  Reflection merely dissolves into formlessness at this impossibly 
infinite, structurally ambiguous object.  Hence Benjamin's quotation of Novalis' 
characterization of philosophy as "der Anfang einer wahrhaften Selbstdurchdringung des 
Geistes, die nie endigt."
63  In summary, Benjamin's reading reconciles three potentially 
incongruous strands of Novalis' thought — a theory of human reflection; an organic 
ontology of the Absolute; and the open-endedness of our knowledge of that Absolute — 
by arguing that the Absolute is an organically interconnected network of immaterial 
reflections, to which human reflection has immediate access but nonetheless cannot 
achieve a totalizing perspective on the Absolute, thanks to its finite position as mere part 
within the "erfüllte Unendlichkeit des Zusammenhangs," or the whole of the Absolute. 
 
II.  Theodor Haering 
 
  In the thirty-five years between Benjamin's dissertation and the next most 
important interpretation of Novalis as a philosopher — Theodor Haering's voluminous 
Novalis als Philosoph of 1954
64 — important progress in the collection and ordering of 
Novalis' original texts was made.  In the 1920's, the Germanist Paul Kluckhohn 
recognized the inadequacies of existing manuscripts of Novalis' work, which had been 
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organized into subject groups by friends and family members of Novalis after his death 
often according to arbitrary selection criteria.  Through analysis of content as well as of 
changes in Novalis' handwriting, Kluckhohn created the first "critical" edition of his 
philosophy, the Novalis Schriften of 1929.  Most importantly, Kluckhohn's collection 
distinguished the Fichte Studien as its own, separate set of notes (actually given this title 
by Kluckhohn, not by Novalis), with a coherent, though by no means systematically 
presented philosophical content.  Later scholars would even consider these notes to 
comprise a unique phase of his intellectual development as well.  However, Haering — 
like Benjamin, who simply did not have access to these notes — does not treat the Fichte 
Studien separately from the later fragments, and portrays Novalis as a consistent thinker 
over time, referring to his "einheitliche und frühreife Natur."
65 
  In two important ways, Haering's interpretation of Novalis agrees with that of 
Benjamin.  Both men argue that, for Novalis, human reflection inheres in the self-
conditioning of the Absolute, or in other words, reflection by the "I" is a reflex of the 
Absolute in the "I."  The ego is merely a dependent, integral part of the Absolute whole, 
which underlies and conditions it, and so the ego is not the absolute origin of its own free 
act of reflection, as Fichte had argued.  Thus Haering and Benjamin agree that Fichte's 
influence was positive insofar as Novalis accepted that reflection entailed ontological 
identity with its object, while Novalis diverged from Fichte in his belief that the "I" 
should be dethroned from its seat as the Absolute itself.  Moreover, the dependence of the 
I, not on itself, but on an Absolute that conditions it, is understood by both scholars as 
"organic" in nature, in the sense that this dependence is the relationship of a part to a 
whole that it helps to constitute as part, and to a whole on which it is simultaneously 
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reliant as mere part.  But the similarities between these two scholars end here.  If we 
provide a more precise definition of this "organic" relationship for Novalis according to 
Haering, we see that his and Benjamin's interpretations diverge: above all, Haering's 
integration of Novalis' Naturphilosophie into the general picture of his philosophy 
materialized his notion of the Absolute.  While Benjamin argued that the Absolute is 
composed of interpenetrating minds, Haering physicalized or substantialized the Absolute 
organism, conceiving of it in more Herderian terms as a hybrid of mind and matter.  
Haering's reading of the systematicity of Novalis' epistemology further distinguishes him 
from Benjamin; the most important difference, for our purposes, is that Haering 
propounds a more thorough form of epistemic closure. 
  One of Haering's most central claims is that Novalis' equally "material" 
understanding of objects has been ignored by readings that overemphasize the 
introspective elements of his philosophy and so falsely insist that his philosophical stance 
is essentially idealist-panpsychist.  Haering writes: 
"Einer der Hauptfehler in der bisherigen Beurteilung des Novalis ist die Einseitigkeit, mit 
welcher man einzelne Stellen der philosophischen Meditationen des Nachlasses 
herauszuklauben pflegt, ohne zu beachten, daß das scheinbare Gegenteil, in Wahrheit 
aber nur die erst den ganzen Gedanken ergebende 'Ergänzung', in einer oft ebenso 
prägnanten Zuspitzung sich an einer anderen Stelle findet... Immer und immer wieder 
wird in allen Darstellungen des Novalis das Wort zitiert: 'Nach innen führt der 
geheimnisvolle Pfad', wobei man ganz zu bemerken unterläßt, daß sich ebensoviele 
Stellen finden, an denen die Notwendigkeit eines 'Äußeren' für jedes 'Innere' mit 
gleichem Nachdruck betont wird."
66  
 
To Haering, only an imperfect reading of Novalis would argue that thought alone 
constitutes the Absolute as medium.  Of course, Benjamin does indeed argue that Novalis 
places "equal emphasis" on "the outer" as the correlate of every "inner" experience, since 
the Absolute is the "medium of reflection" that appears immediately to itself as an object 
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because it bends back upon itself in the interpenetrating network of reflections that is the 
Absolute; but Haering's point is that a better understanding of Novalis' notion of the 
"Absolute" must consider his numerous writings on Naturphilosophie, which is every bit 
as much a philosophy of physically extended, materially substantial existence outside the 
I's capacity to cognize it, as it is a philosophy of reflection.   
  In Haering's different reading, the Absolute is an organism that comprises a 
continuum of levels of development and organization of a single "life force" or 
"Lebenskraft," which in itself is neither purely "mental" nor "material," but rather both.  
Herder is clearly the intellectual influence here.  For him as for Novalis, the interior 
manifestation of life force is mentality, and its exterior manifestation of the same life 
force is physical extension.  More specifically, all existing things have both an 
"psychische, innere, ideelle Seite" as well as an "äußere, reelle Seite," such that the 
differences between, for example, anorganic, organic, appetitive, and even spiritual 
beings is merely a matter of different degrees or "Potenzen" of the same life force in an 
"Entwicklungsreihe," rather than a matter of the simple binary of physical extension or 
mental freedom, such as one might find in the mechanistic paradigm of Cartesian 
dualism.
67  Thus Haering quotes Novalis: "Es gibt eine mineralische, vegetabilische, 
animalische Chemie, Mechanik, Kalorik, Magnetism, Elektrizität" — that is, the same 
activity of life force may realize itself differently at higher and higher levels of self-
constituting organization, but it is fundamentally the same ontological force.
68  At its 
apex is human consciousness and creativity, every bit an expression of this force as the 
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lower levels, just at a higher degree of organization.  The Absolute, in turn, is the sum 
total of this rising spectrum of development.   
  How are we able to know that the Absolute is this sort of organically organized 
being, in which our own act of reflection is an integral, indeed the highest part, according 
to Haering's reading of Novalis?  Here Haering also diverges from Benjamin in his 
different interpretation of precisely how Novalis rejects Fichtean "intellectual intuition," 
and of precisely how Novalis radicalizes the relationship of the human subject to its 
object.  Recall that, for Benjamin, Novalis rejects Fichte's intellectual intuition because 
he supposedly thought it was unnecessary to curb its infinite penetration into the 
Absolute.  In Haering's reading, too, Novalis does not think that reflection on the 
Absolute should be checked within the "I," but for a different reason: Fichte's Absolute, 
and his explanation of our knowledge of this Absolute, are too one-sidedly subjectivist.  
The identity of the ideal and the real cannot be explained by appeal to the ideal alone; 
rather, the real and ideal must be seen as parts of a higher unity that contains both 
subjectivity and objectivity in its single sublated substance, life force.  To reach that 
higher unity, reflection must conceive of the more unifying concept that negates the 
perceived opposition.  In other words, according to Haering, Novalis favors a dialectical 
account both of the I and of the Absolute, which is the totalizing "Real-Ideale" that 
relates subject and object in the I, and composes all of reality as medium: 
"Novalis hat sich... recht kritisch nicht nur gegenüber diesem nach seiner Meinung allzu 
einseitigen Namen [des Absolutes] ('Ich'), sondern auch zu Fichtes allzu einseitig 
idealistischer Stellung geäußert, der er die seinige als einen 'Real-idealismus' 
gegenüberstellt wissen will; also als einen Standpunkt, der auch die 'reele' Seite wirklich 
erst ganz zu ihrem Recht kommen zu lassen glaubt und damit dies Absolute, mindestens 
in höherem Grade als Fichte, auch wirklich zum 'Grunde' aller Phänomene der 
Wirklichkeit, auch der 'reellen' Seite derselben, macht... Die Art... in welcher sich dies 
Absolute in die ganze Mannigfaltigkeit und Bestimmtheit der reell-ideellen ! &&!
Einzelphänomene 'dirimieren' und entfalten sollte, ist auch für Novalis von Anfang an die 
dialektische... [und] man darf nicht vergessen, daß Novalis vor Hegel seine 
Gedankenwelt ausbildete."
69 
 
And here again: 
 
"Es ist zweifellos, daß für Novalis der Gegensatz von Sein und Schein zugleich auch die 
beiden Seiten des Absoluten, die reelle und die ideelle bezeichnen soll.  Damit rückt der 
Gegensatz von Sein und Schein offenbar zugleich in die Nähe des Gegensatzes von 
'Ansichsein' und 'Erscheinung' im Kantischen Sinne.  Bei Kant war dieser Gegensatz 
freilich ein schließlich unüberbrückbarer gewesen... [Aber für Novalis] ist die 
Erscheinungswelt (die 'gegenständliche Welt', wie Novalis sagen wird) nicht mehr bloßer 
'Schein', sondern die für das wahre Sein wesensnotwendige andere Hälfte: seine 
'Erscheinung'.  Novalis vermag in der Tat Sein und Erscheinung, Sein und Schein als die 
in Wahrheit zusammengehörigen Komponenten der wahren dialektischen Totalität des 
'Absoluten' zu bezeichnen."
70 
 
Where Benjamin turns Novalis into a "Fichteanized Leibniz," if you will, Haering turns 
Novalis into Hegel.  Both scholars agree that the act of reflection is an integrated part of 
the activity of the absolute whole (an organic relationship); but the precise substantial 
nature of this absolute medium of reflection, and the precise manner in which reflection 
accesses that nature, are different between their two readings.  More specifically with 
regard to Novalis' turn away from Fichte, according to Haering: in the reflection of the I 
on itself, the I also encounters itself as a felt object, immediately given to itself in 
material, sensuous particularity; the perception of the difference between reflection and 
feeling in the I then begs the question of the possibility of their unity, to which reflection 
next ascends by thinking of the whole of which both the real and ideal in the I could be 
constitutive parts.  This higher whole is the notion of the Absolute as "life force," the 
unitary real-ideal and ideal-real substance, in which the I is reflective insofar as it is ideal 
and can feel itself sensuously insofar as it is real.  Through the reflective process of 
dialectical sublation, the I eventually becomes aware of itself as a merely finite moment 
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in the Absolute as the infinite living organism.  Once again, even natural objects in the 
world, like plants and animals, are finite realizations of the Absolute striving to know 
itself and eventually reaching the point of self-consciousness in the very dialectical 
reflections of the human mind.  Unlike Benjamin, Haering argues that the I, in spite of its 
own finitude, can still ascend to knowledge of the Absolute through reflection, because 
each reflection and correlate sensuous feeling is an attempt by the Absolute to come to 
know its infinite nature in the I.  Indeed, Haering claims that this raising of finitude to 
ever-higher levels of more unifying, more infinite concepts — rather than Benjamin's 
non-systematic penetration of reflection into the Absolute — was precisely the process of 
"Romanticizing the ordinary" for which Novalis is so famous.   
  Thus in contrast to Benjamin, Haering does not see any problem of our never 
reaching final knowledge of this Absolute for Novalis.  "Nonclosure" is not an element of 
his reading, nor is its absence discussed.  Instead, we are to understand that the Absolute 
is finally reachable through the dialectical process; every finite object in the world or 
reflection in the mind is a manifestation of the very Absolute itself in its dialectical march 
towards the closure of self-knowledge.  Though no single or stand-alone reflection can 
provide complete knowledge of the Absolute (and instead we must pass through the 
entire dialectical process to reach its completion), there is at least a conceivable endpoint 
to this process that did not exist for Benjamin.  Any given cognition, Haering writes, is an 
"Übergang zu einem anderen und — als begründetes — zur Einheit mit ihm in einem 
höheren Ganzen, ja, schließlich in einem wenigstens hypothetischen System."
71  Haering 
has been roundly criticized by scholars who followed him for failing to acknowledge 
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Novalis' reflective nonclosure and therefore his difference from Hegel.
72  Nonetheless, 
this criticism has not led to a preference for Benjamin's open-ended alternative (which 
still ultimately argues for reflective mediation by an organic Absolute even as it denies 
that reflection penetrates the Absolute completely).  Instead, as we will see now, more 
recent scholars have rejected that reflection is even a vehicle of the absolute for Novalis 
at all. 
 
III.  Géza von Molnár 
 
  Géza von Molnár's 1970 study, Novalis' Fichte Studies, marks the beginning of an 
important shift in Novalis scholarship, both interpretively and with regard to the primary 
sources of Novalis' philosophy that scholars used.  Indeed, these two factors are closely 
related.  Though in 1929 Paul Kluckhohn advanced the organization of Novalis' 
philosophical notes with his better analysis of their content and handwriting, it was Hans-
Joachim Mähl who brought these notes to their most coherent and reliable state yet with 
an even more painstaking study of the changes in Novalis' handwriting over time.  Mähl 
also gained access to more original material after the 1959 death of the publisher Salman 
Schocken, who had carried some of Novalis' papers into exile during the Nazi period.
73  
Mähl's critical edition (Novalis: Werke) was published in 1965, and the most significant 
result of the new arrangement was the expansion and improvement of the Fichte Studien 
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in particular.  Von Molnár was then the first scholar to offer an explication of these notes 
by themselves, and one of his conclusions has been shared by all scholars who followed: 
the Fichte Studien form a unique stage of Novalis' thought that forces us to reconsider 
previous readings of his philosophy.  Von Molnár especially criticizes Haering for failing 
to treat these notes separately (since they were indeed available to him even in 
Kluckhohn's edition, though incompletely).  Von Molnár quotes Kluckhohn:  
"Gerade weil diese Aufzeichnungen die Anverwandlung der Fichtischen Philosophie in 
ihren einzelnen Stadien bis zur Selbstfindung des Autors sichtbar machen, haben sie 
ihren Eigenwert und verdienen für sich allein betrachtet zu werden, was bisher noch nicht 
geschehen ist, da alle Darstellungen von Hardenbergs Philosophie die Studien mit den 
späteren Fragmenten vermischen."
74   
 
With von Molnár, a new phase of Novalis interpretation emerges, which acknowledges 
that the Fichte Studien contain different philosophical content than the later fragments 
(like the Blüthenstaub but especially the Allgemeine Brouillon). 
  More specifically, the organic commitments in Benjamin and Haering's readings 
of Novalis — that underlying human reflection is the ontological unity of subjectivity and 
objectivity in the Absolute, thanks to our relation as integral part of the Absolute's whole 
that conditions the activity of reflection in the I — are denied in this new phase of 
scholarship by its reading of Novalis' opposite stance on reflection in the Fichte Studien.  
In slightly different but related ways, each of the readings we consider here (by von 
Molnár, Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, Manfred Frank, and Clare 
Kennedy) claim that, in the Fichte Studien, Novalis outrightly rejects the knowable 
inherence of reflection in the Absolute; instead, the representational quality of human 
consciousness necessarily defers any knowledge we might have of it, separating the act of 
knowing from the object known rather than unifying them in an organic holism.  In the 
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case especially of Frank's reading, Novalis is seen as adhering to Kantian critical limits 
that prevent knowledge of the thing in itself; in light of our inability reflectively to grasp 
the source of our knowing, then, Fichte's foundationalist attempt to ground knowledge of 
knowledge is rejected in favor of a radicalized Kantianism that deems even the 
transcendental idealist project unavoidably hypothetical.  The conclusion of the Romantic 
metacritique of criticism is that philosophy must remain open-ended, nonclosed. 
  The result of this scholarly shift has been a re-appropriation of Novalis, and of 
early Romanticism in general, to post-structuralism avant la lettre, as well as the 
marginalization of organicism to the last stage of his philosophical development, the late 
fragments.  For example, the endless deferral of absolute knowledge thanks to the 
effective "différance" of reflection has garnered comparisons of Novalis to Derrida: 
Margaret Stoljar speaks of his "veritably Derridean deferral of closure," and Clare 
Kennedy devotes an entire study to the parallels that can be drawn between these two 
thinkers.
75  Derridean nonclosure seems to preclude the very possibility of organic 
commitments, as Paul de Man has written ("[Novalis propounds] a temporality that is 
definitely not organic, in that it relates to its source only in terms of distance and 
difference and allows for no end, no totality"
76), and with which Alice Kuzniar has 
agreed ("Novalis advocates a proliferation or a redundancy of structures, rather than the 
organic, unitary form often attributed to him... The oft-cited, supposedly Romantic 
metaphors of organicism — cycles and embryonic development — must be 
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challenged"
77).  Meanwhile, Novalis' organicism has been relegated to a later stage of his 
philosophical activity, above all to the Naturphilosophie of the Allgemeine Brouillon, 
where it has either been disparaged as a degeneration of his thought (Manfred Frank calls 
this stage "wirklich fragmentarisch, auch im schlechten Sinne"
78); or defended as an 
unjustly sidelined phase of his intellectual development (Frederick Beiser complains that 
recent studies have "failed to consider his later philosophical development"
79 adequately 
enough, and asserts that we ought "to vindicate the older scholarly tradition and restore 
the rightful place of the organic in romantic thinking"
80); or, his later organicism has been 
more neutrally explained as part of the addition of an aesthetic program to re-enchant the 
natural world (Allison Stone writes, "The evolution in Novalis' thinking [towards an 
organicized nature] becomes apparent once we appreciate that he has a central aim of 
showing how we could reacquire a presently lost experience of natural phenomena as 
'enchanted' — meaningful, mysterious, and animated by spirit"
81).  In the midst of such 
interpretive diversity, this much is clear: the history of Novalis scholarship shows a 
definitive tradeoff between "organicism" and "nonclosure" in his philosophy, and the 
philosophical faultline along which this schism occurs is the problem of how reflection 
does or does not enable consciousness of the Absolute.  Thus we turn now to Géza von 
Molnár's reading of the Fichte Studien, which was the first to suggest that reflection does 
not operate organically for Novalis at this stage in his thought. 
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  According to von Molnár, Novalis' notes from the years 1795 and 1796 indicate 
that he followed Fichte quite closely during this first phase of his engagement with 
German idealism, largely taking his cue from Fichte's philosophy of the ego and only 
diverging from it in certain specific respects that in no way add up to the proto-
Hegelianism of Haering's reading (nor to Benjamin's interpretation).  We are told that, 
like Fichte, Novalis is interested in the special paradox of empirical consciousness: the 
apparent dualism between the subject and the outer world of objects, objects which are 
nonetheless given to the subject in and as the subject's consciousness.  In other words, 
Novalis agrees with the Wissenschaftslehre that the ego's empirical consciousness is "the 
point of tangency" of subject and object.
82  The ego manifests a paradoxical simultaneity 
of both division and unity: subject and object are divided insofar as the object appears as 
if standing against the subject, and yet they are united insofar as objects appear to the 
subject at all, as the subject's immediately available consciousness of objects.  Certain 
questions naturally follow: What is the substrate that underlies and conditions this 
difference-in-unity of consciousness?  Can it be known?  Like Fichte, Novalis calls this 
ground — whatever it may be — the "absolute," because it would have to be the most 
fundamental condition of the knowledge-relationship of subject and object.  "Novalis 
cannot consider the prime empirical dichotomy of subject and object without referring its 
apparent dualism to a ground of absolute unity," von Molnár explains, and so Novalis 
follows Fichte in asking the same question, begged by Kant, about the nature of that 
which absolutely relates knower and known.
83 
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  But Novalis breaks with Fichte — and, most importantly for the present history of 
Novalis scholarship, here von Molnár's reading breaks with Benjamin's and Haering's — 
by claiming that the identification of this substrate as an "Absolute" is a function of the 
way we must think about it, and does not qualify as knowledge of it.  In different ways, 
Benjamin and Haering had allowed for such knowledge by expanding the immediacy of 
Fichtean reflection to an Absolute that is no longer just contained in the I, but rather 
contains the I's reflection immanently within itself.  Von Molnár does agree that the 
primary reason for Novalis' rejection of Fichte's own, idealist proposition for absolute 
knowing was that it was "too subjectivist": for Novalis, the object side of consciousness 
was, indeed, just as important as the subject side, and only a philosopher consumed with 
the "moralistic fervor" to preserve the subject's freedom would insist otherwise.
84  
However, in contrast to Benjamin and Haering, von Molnár claims that the specific 
reason for Novalis' equal privileging of the object was that the ego's consciousness of 
objects is possible in the first place because the ego simply finds itself as that special 
point of tangency at which subject and object appear in "balanced neutrality."
85  And in 
even more significant contrast to his two predecessors, von Molnár further argues that 
there can be no expansion of the powers of reflection beyond the confines of this I, 
because the balanced neutrality of subject and object that characterizes the paradoxical 
experience of the I's empirical consciousness is also a dichotomy that forces two opposed 
concepts of the Absolute in itself — concepts between which reflection cannot validly 
choose. 
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  Following Novalis' fragment #8, in the Fichte Studien, that "Die Handlung, dass 
Ich sich als Ich sezt muss mit der Antithese eines unabhängigen Nichtich und der 
Beziehung auf eine sie umschliessende Sfäre verknüpft seyn — diese Sfäre kann man 
Gott und Ich nennen," von Molnár claims that Novalis' two hypothetical, regulative 
candidates for the Absolute are "God" and "Ego": God as the self-conditioning, absolute 
source of the world of objects, and Ego as the self-conditioning, absolute source of 
subjectivity.  The problem is that reflection cannot choose between them.  They are 
equally valid, because they explain equally well the respective absolute sources of subject 
and object in the I; yet they are irreconcilable, because nothing in the I's paradoxical 
experience (of subject-object unity and difference in itself) could allow the choice of one 
over the other, and meanwhile, they are mutually exclusive descriptions of the nature of 
the Absolute considered in itself.  Nor does Novalis appeal here to conceptual sublation, 
von Molnár counters Haering, because insofar as oppositions are related to each other, 
Novalis' "dialectic" must be understood as more fundamentally Fichtean — because 
always confined to the empirical limits of the ego — than Hegelian.
86  Thus the I is 
prevented from ever knowing what the Absolute is.  Its nature remains a fundamentally 
unknowable "X" for human consciousness.  This reading supports a stronger form of 
nonclosure than we saw in Benjamin, and does so precisely because it lets go of the 
organic commitment to the inherence of reflection in the Absolute.  Von Molnár writes: 
"Absolute unity, the Absolute itself, is for Novalis a purely negative value, never to be 
perceived directly as One and, therefore, manifest only in the relative unity between the 
empirical ego's subjective and objective aspects; never to be expressed by any one name, 
and, therefore, entitled either 'God' or 'Ego' according to the perspective from which it is 
viewed."
87 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86 von Molnár 28-29 
87 von Molnár 44 ! '%!
"God" and "Ego" are alternative conceptual descriptions of the Absolute that arise merely 
regulatively as a function of the apparent dualism of subjectivity and objectivity in the I, 
which the I cannot deny because that is the fundamental quality of its experience.  "God" 
and "Ego" are not perceptions of the Absolute as it really is in itself, but are effects of 
how the I must think about the possibility of the Absolute, given that the only experience 
available to the I is the "paradox that otherness is sameness, that ego and non-ego are 
related."
88  In light of their use of different sources, Benjamin and Haering's insistence 
that human reflection, for Novalis, actually has an organic relationship to an organic 
Absolute effectively amounts to the mistaken incorporation of Novalis' later (and 
different) opinions on Naturphilosophie into this early phase of philosophical 
engagement.  In von Molnár's reading of the phase from 1795 to 1796, no organic 
commitments are attributed to Novalis.  Hence von Molnár's claim that the main 
difference between the Wissenschaftslehre and the Fichte Studien is merely "a variation 
in emphasis" — the former emphasizes the I's moral striving against the not-I; the latter, 
the balance of I and not-I in the I — though this is a variation that results, significantly, in 
the open-endedness of philosophical reflection for Novalis.
89  The impossible choice 
between descriptions of the Absolute as "God" or "Ego" is Novalis' nonclosure in von 
Molnár's reading of him. 
  Arguably one of the weaknesses of von Molnár's reading is that it does not 
philosophically motivate Novalis' break from Fichte's subjective conception of the 
Absolute.  Von Molnár claims that Fichte suppresses the not-I in service of the I's 
freedom, whereas Novalis prefers to account for empirical consciousness with a more 
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balanced dualism between subject and object in the I; but why?  In answer, von Molnár 
suggests at the end of his study that Novalis rejected the ego-Absolute because his goals 
were ultimately "aesthetic" rather than "practical":  
"From the aesthetic standpoint, the disharmonious strife between the absolutely founded 
'ought to' of the ethical imperative and the demands of physical existence which 
ultimately are doomed to submission is most unsightly.  The artist, therefore, seeks out 
that point of unity, that point of harmonious tangency, which must underlie all 
relationship, even that of opposition... [Novalis steps] away from the divinity of ethics, in 
whose honor Fichte had still erected his edifice of thought, toward a potentially equal 
glorification of the aesthetic.  Novalis' reinterpretation of Fichtean philosophy during the 
years 1795 and 1796 must be viewed as the final step which was to usher in the new era 
of art's isolated supremacy."
90 
 
Here the transition from Fichtean ethics to Romantic aesthetics amounts to a difference in 
taste, rather than an argument for or against the former.  After all, citing the mere 
"unsightliness" of the dominating ego is not a philosophical justification for avoiding it 
(unless an aesthetic argument is integrated).  A philosophical motivation for Romantic 
aesthetics is just what is offered by the next most influential interpretation of Novalis as a 
philosopher to follow historically after von Molnár's reading: the 1978 L'Absolu litteraire 
by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy (hereafter referred to as The Literary 
Absolute according to its English translation in 1988).  This highly regarded 
interpretation showed, in greater philosophical detail than von Molnár did, how the root 
of Novalis' transition to aesthetics lies in the subject's inability to present itself to itself in 
reflection — in other words, that Romantic aesthetics is motivated by nonclosure.  
However, The Literary Absolute is not without its flaws, the most surprising and 
lamentable of which is its omission of any textual support from the Fichte Studien.  Since 
it is limited in this way, it does not contextualize Novalis' philosophy in response to 
Fichte like Benjamin, Haering and von Molnár did.  Yet the authors still paint a picture of 
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Novalis that is consistent with the new wave of readings of him, precisely by addressing 
the inability of reflection to achieve knowledge of its ground. 
 
IV.  Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 
 
  Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy begin their reading of Novalis with the problem of 
nonclosure after Kant, specifically as the problem of the unknowability of the ground of 
knowing considered as self.  That is, it begins with the empty Kantian cogito, or with the 
fact that Kant seemed to ground the intelligibility of objects in the human subject, yet 
allowed for no representation of the self to itself.  To restate the problem in their terms: 
Kant restricted the "I" to a mere "logical necessity" that "must accompany 
representations" so that those representations might be of a piece for one consciousness, 
but this move not only prevented the self from knowing itself as phenomenon, it also 
threatened to strip the subject of any possible substantiality.  The Literary Absolute states: 
"One must set out from this problematic of the subject unpresentable to itself and from 
this eradication of all substantialism in order to understand what Romanticism will 
receive, not as a bequest but as its 'own' most difficult and perhaps insoluble problem."
91  
Each of the interpretations in the second wave of readings approaches Novalis' 
philosophy from this starting point — the basic metacritical problem of our knowing the 
source of our knowing in the very act of knowing itself — but Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Nancy distinguish themselves with the suggestion that it is specifically Kantian aesthetics 
that inform the Romantic answer to the problem of the Darstellung of the subject to itself 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, c1988) 30-31. ! '(!
and that render philosophy nonclosed.  "Kant opens up the possibility of Romanticism," 
they plainly assert.
92 
  Kant’s third Critique suggested that beauty presents the self to itself – or more 
specifically, a beautiful object can make the self intuitable, or available to the senses – in 
two possible ways: either immediately, through aesthetic pleasure, or regulatively and 
mediately, in the image or Bild of the beautiful in art, nature, or culture.  Let us begin 
with the first possibility.  According to Kant, when an observer looks at a beautiful 
object, the form of which definitionally cannot be subsumed under a discrete concept of 
the understanding, then a special kind of reflection takes place in the mind: the faculties 
of understanding and imagination bring themselves into a relation of “free play,” or 
reciprocal striving to subsume the empirical given under a concept.  This striving of 
aesthetic reflection is endless, because its goal of conceptual subsumption is impossible.  
Importantly, this same striving is also the unity of the subject, because it is the very self-
synthesis of the faculties of the subject.  Moreover, this “free play” of the faculties is 
experienced by the subject as aesthetic pleasure.  Pleasure in beauty, in other words, is 
the sensibilization of self-synthesis to the self, according to Kant; pleasure is, however, a 
nondiscursive or nonconceptual presencing.  The second proposal for Darstellung of the 
self from the third Critique is mediate rather than immediate.  Though Kant seemed to 
relegate the subject to the mere function of unity or synthesis of the faculties, the 
beautiful object is indeed a concrete, material thing.  And for its being a beautiful thing, it 
expresses more than can ever finally be stated in discursive terms: its object is ultimately 
ineffable and only to be endlessly approximated, yet is made as intuitable as it can be in 
beauty.  Beauty makes possible at least the symbolic presentation of the Ideas of reason, 
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and most importantly, it symbolizes the Idea of freedom of the self as a self-sustaining, 
spontaneous being in a sensible world.  As such, beauty offers a merely regulative 
sensibilization of the “substance” of the “subject” – an analogy, in physical form, for the 
non-physical ground in freedom that undergirds all human endeavors in the world.   
  Kant ultimately limited aesthetic feeling to the architectonic role of mediating 
between cognition and desire, and he limited beauty to the merely regulative role of 
orienting moral beings in the physical world.  But for Novalis, Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Nancy claim, Kant’s suggestion that the subject can only become sensible to itself in 
beauty serves to upend the primacy of philosophy tout cour.  These authors write: 
“Philosophy must fulfill itself in a work of art; art is the speculative organon par 
excellence… this Romantic conversion… presupposes an extremely complicated 
maneuver, which takes place ‘behind Kant’s back,’ so to speak.”
93  That is, for providing 
a sensibilization of the very thing missing in Kant’s system after the first Critique – the 
self-present self, the ground of knowledge beyond the confines of his system of 
knowledge – beauty inadvertently becomes the condition of Kant’s own system for the 
Romantics (hence the “literary” in The Literary Absolute).  But importantly, beauty is 
also non-conceptual, and so steps outside the boundaries of philosophy per se.  After all, 
as we saw above, the sensibilization of the self occurs through reflection on “the image 
(Bild) of something without either a concept or an end.”
94  For Novalis, the unsolvable in 
philosophy must move into art, which in turn merely presents the unsolvable as such, in 
the feeling of endless striving and in the image without conceptual determination.  The 
self is not finally grasped in art, and instead, art performs the infinite deferral of such a 
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conceptual grasping.  The English translators of The Literary Absolute explain this 
indetermination or “equivocity” clearly here: “Equivocity occurs when, in its auto-
productive gesture, literature and its (philosophical) subject, of necessity, but an 
unaccountable necessity that begins to undermine literature despite itself, never reaches 
identity: ‘The Same, here, never reaches sameness’.”
95  Here we are far from Benjamin's 
reflective immediacy with the Absolute conceived as mental medium of reflection, as 
well as from Haering's claim that "Dichtung und Philosophie" enjoy a "lebendige Einheit 
in dialektischer Wechselbeziehung" in Novalis' thought.
96  Instead, these French readers 
of Novalis conclude in favor of a strong version of nonclosure: the unavailability of the 
ground of knowing to philosophy, presentable in art only insofar as art is unable finally to 
arrest the subject in discursive terms.  Philosophy must seek its "fulfillment" in the 
performance of its own impossibility in art, which is to say, philosophy cannot complete 
itself and so must remain nonclosed.   
 
V.  Manfred Frank 
 
  If The Literary Absolute can be credited with deepening our understanding of 
Romantic aesthetic equivocity, we must save the highest credit for a work that appeared 
one year later: Manfred Frank's Einführung in die frühromantische Ästhetik of 1989.  
(However, in Frank's own words this earliest work was "still inadequate," so we will 
reference the later study that he considers more thorough, his Unendliche Annäherung of 
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1997.
97)  As we will see, this work effectively bridges the gap between von Molnár and 
The Literary Absolute by situating early Romantic aesthetics in the more detailed 
contexts of the Romantics' rejection of Fichte's notion of self-consciousness, and their 
acceptance of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's argument for the inevitable estrangement of 
reflection from its ontological ground.
98  To date, no other scholarship on Novalis as a 
philosopher enjoys such prominence as Frank's contribution.  For example, Jane Kneller, 
who published the first English translation of the Fichte Studien in 2003, writes in her 
introduction to this text: 
"In German scholarship, no one has argued more forcefully for the independent 
contributions and unique place of early German Romanticism in German philosophy than 
Manfred Frank.  The 1989 publication of his lectures on Romantic aesthetics has been 
instrumental in reviving interest in the Fichte Studies."
99   
 
Frank's work solidified the present scholarly acceptance of Novalis as a thinker ahead of 
his time, who rejected the inherence of reflection in the Absolute and so embraced the 
paradox of knowledge, that knowing must operate at an unbridgeable remove from its 
ground.  Though Frank first debued his position over twenty years ago, the majority of 
interpretations of Novalis that since followed have not so much disagreed with Frank's 
stance, as they have explored the similarities that Frank's reading seems to open up 
between Novalis and post-structuralism.  Thus in the following sections, we examine 
Frank's ground-breaking interpretation of the Fichte Studien extensively, and then look at 
one representative example of these post-structuralist re-readings of Novalis: Clare 
Kennedy's Paradox, Aphorism and Desire in Novalis and Derrida (2008). 
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  Among the many virtues of Frank's interpretation, perhaps the most important for 
our purposes is that it acknowledges the indebtedness of Novalis' thought to another 
figure, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi.  Indeed, the holes that arguably remain in von Molnár's 
reading can be filled by Frank's contextualization of the Fichte Studien in Jacobi's 
rebuttal to Kant that took place in the Pantheismusstreit.  To review: in von Molnár's 
reading, Novalis rejected Fichte's practical striving of the I over the not-I in favor of the 
"balanced neutrality" of subject and object in empirical consciousness, in which the 
paradox of the I as simultaneously divided and united also prevents any defensible choice 
between the descriptions of the Absolute as either "God" or "Ego"; our claim was that 
von Molnár did not philosophically motivate Novalis' preference for "balanced 
neutrality" over Fichte's absolute ego.
100  But Frank's reading of Jacobi's influence better 
explains Novalis' insistence on an object in the I that cannot be surmounted by the I's own 
self-reflection.  
  Jacobi was a leading metacritic of Kant's transcendental idealism.  Kant's dualism 
between sensibility and understanding in the mind solved a major impasse between 
rationalism and empiricism: it gave intersubjective grounds for the knowability of 
empirical facts, and it justified the irresolvability of metaphysical aporia, by claiming that 
the concepts of the understanding (only) properly apply to the contents of sense.  But in 
Jacobi's own reformulation of this dualism, he exposed what he saw as a necessary 
presupposition of Kant's argument, which would go on to influence the entire Romantic 
generation, Frank claims.  According to Jacobi, Kant's limitation of predicative forms to 
the faculty of understanding, along with his limitation of the testament to the existence or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100 Again, von Molnár merely said that balance was more "aesthetically pleasing," but even this appeal to 
aesthetics was more thoroughly detailed, philosophically, in The Literary Absolute than by von Molnár. ! (#!
"thereness" of an object to sensibility, meant that the appearance to human consciousness 
that many different things exist must then "be explained as an illusion, which has nothing 
to do with being itself but rather with the conditions of our knowledge."
101  Individual 
things, Jacobi laments, cannot be said to be created by a God who transcends them, but 
rather are recognized as individual or as causally related to each other at all only because 
the mind supposedly imposes notions of "substance" and "cause" on an existence that 
does not contain these relations in itself.  Kant's model of cognition thus seems to 
presuppose that there is only one true, existing substance that contains no real division or 
difference in itself (between objects, or between subject and object) — a Parmenidean 
being — and that the certainty of the existence of this singular being is given 
immediately to sensibility; the act of predication in judgment, then, merely posits a 
"derivative form" of being, which is the relative existence of objects vis-a-vis other 
objects that we experience in ordinary consciousness, which makes our consciousness an 
illusion or falsification of being.
102 
In Jacobi's eyes, this reformulation of Kant's position should have also been a 
scathing criticism of it, because it seemed to him that by even countenancing such a 
notion of "being," Kant was embracing "an All that is One and therefore nothing," or a 
pantheism that annihilated all real individuality.  Jacobi saw this problem as just another 
example of how the restriction of knowledge of an object to subject-grounded reflection 
only separates human beings from the Absolute (his non-philosophical alternative was 
sheer faith in a transcendent God).  But Novalis, according to Frank, instead accepted 
Jacobi's redescription of Kantianism.  That is, the idea that knowledge must entail a break 
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from its ground in identical being became the new mantra of Romantic philosophy, Frank 
says.  The ultimately unitary nature of being, and the positing in the synthetic act of 
judgment of relative, individual existence to objects, have as their combined consequence 
for Novalis that consciousness consists of illusion.  What it means to be conscious of a 
thing is to attribute a relative, differentiated existence to what in itself is actually unitary 
and self-identical.  At the same time, Novalis acknowledges that there would be no 
consciousness in the first place without this division – all awareness of things 
definitionally sets a subject over and against an object, and objects against each other – 
but that cognition is also thereby not a truthful representation of that which 
fundamentally exists: unitary Parmenidean being.  In claiming this, Frank says, Novalis 
joins Hölderlin in considering judgment to be an “Ur-Teilung,” a creative pseudo-
etymology that calls knowing the “original-separation” of unitary being into subject and 
object(s).  Novalis’ philosophical argument is ontologically realist, Frank says, because it 
attests to mind-independent existence, at the same time that it is epistemologically 
modest, because the very conditions of knowing do not allow us to have valid knowledge 
of this being.   
Importantly, though Frank does indeed countenance a reading of Novalis as 
integrating the act of knowing with the ontological substrate of all things (being) insofar 
as he grants that sensibility attests to existence in an immediate connection to it, Frank's 
is still not a reading of Novalis as organicist, because nothing about the nature of that 
substrate in itself accounts for the relationship between subject and object in human 
consciousness (much less does Frank offer any claim that the substrate is alive).  We 
humans are connected to the brute fact of existence through our sensibility, but can say ! (%!
nothing about that being's nature in itself, because our felt immediacy with it is nothing 
more than the barest attestation to its thereness, and then in reflecting upon it to make it 
an object to ourselves, we falsify it.  Again, according to Frank, this stance is Novalis' 
agreement with Kantian strictures (albeit following Jacobi's redescription of Kant). 
According to Frank, for Novalis, the falsifying tendencies of judgment then have 
the same impact on self-knowledge that they do on consciousness of being in general.  If 
judgment is always separation from unity, so self-judgment only separates the self from 
itself; there cannot be, as Fichte claimed, a conflation of subjecthood and objecthood in 
the act of self-reflection itself.  More specifically, in his Fichte Studien, Novalis argues 
that when the self turns upon itself as object, the division inherent in any act of reflection 
between self-as-subject and self-as-object means that the self cannot know itself as 
knower.  It encounters itself as object, but not simultaneously as subject.  One might 
visualize the difficulty here with the amusing analogy of a dog chasing its own tail in the 
attempt to “get behind itself.”  The dog is always already “in the front with itself,” just as 
we are always already in consciousness (conscious awareness of objects), so that the 
dog’s ability to stand behind itself is as impossible as our taking, as an object of 
knowledge, the taking-as-object that is the subject’s act of knowing.  In Frank’s succinct 
summation: "immediacy and self-reference are incompatible with each other."
103 
But just as knowledge in general requires felt immediacy with being, so too does 
the self's undeniable consciousness of itself entail a certain kind of immediacy of the I 
with its own being.  According to Frank’s reading of Novalis, the self is indeed 
immediately given to itself, but once again, only through feeling.  That is, the self is 
present to itself, but not via reflection as an object of knowledge, which is the division of 
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or ascription of a concept to an indeterminate given; rather, the self’s undeniable 
encounter with itself, as something that it nonetheless cannot know, indicates that the 
self’s familiarity with itself is instead non-discursive, non-conceptual, or indeterminate.  
Novalis also calls the self’s immediate familiarity with itself Gefühl, which he uses 
interchangeably with “sensibility” and in line with its definition by Jacobi as the sensory 
encounter with being as unitary, indeterminate existence.  Frank writes that, for Novalis, 
feeling: 
“…is a way in which consciousness is not objectifyingly opposed to but is immediately 
familiar with itself.  This feeling, to which the seamless identity of being is revealed, can 
ground the relation of the self to itself as a knowing relation to itself as itself.  The mere 
[reflective] relation of a subject to itself could not do this.”
104 
 
In other words, where reflection fails to take the self-sameness of the self as an object of 
knowledge, feeling succeeds, though only as the self’s non-conceptual immediacy with 
itself (and with the unity of being in general).  This notion of feeling could (conceivably) 
be consistent with Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s discussion of the feeling of aesthetic 
pleasure as the sensibilization of the self to itself, but Frank does not consider the 
problem at this stage of Novalis’ thought to be aesthetic; instead, he relates “feeling” in 
Novalis to the Jacobian-Kantian “sensibility” of the first Critique, not the third.  (That 
said, Frank does agree that this problem of non-conceptual awareness "prepares an 
aesthetic solution” for the Romantics discussed below.
105)  Certainly Frank’s 
interpretation is far from Benjamin’s argument that the self can know itself specifically 
because reflection penetrates into the infinitely filled Zusammenhang of the Absolute as 
“medium of reflection.”  By instrumentalizing both Jacobi’s notion of being and Kant’s 
notion of sensibility, Frank claims – contra Benjamin – that the fundamental oneness 
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shared by the self with itself and with being at large is sensible rather than conceptual, 
material rather than formal, real rather than ideal for Novalis.  And, for its being "real 
rather than ideal," but not "the real that can be recognized as always already ideal," 
Frank's reading of the self's immediacy with itself in feeling is also not compatible with 
Haering's Hegelian description of self-relation.
106  Frank's immediacy denies even the 
possibility of reflective mediation of the Absolute.  “The seamless identity of being is 
revealed” to feeling, but that revelation only attests to the primacy of something that 
cannot be known in the self, in all its acts of knowing.
107  Being is not an epistemological 
ground, because it is not the conceptually knowable ground of our knowing; rather, it 
grounds consciousness merely ontologically, as the substantial condition of the self’s 
existence.  Frank explains, “nothing follows from [being] in the logical sense of the word, 
except that the self is no longer the master of its own house.”
108 
  We are now in a position to understand how Frank's reading fills the gaps in von 
Molnár's interpretation.  If judgment is an "original separation" from the unity of being 
that is given immediately in feeling, then von Molnár's "balanced paradox" of empirical 
consciousness is more appropriately described as the twofold fact that the self is given to 
itself immediately in feeling, but separated from itself in reflection.  Novalis accepts this 
balance and cannot countenance Fichte's absolute ego, because, following Jacobi's 
reformulation of Kant, he does not grant that being can be accessed reflectively; being is 
merely immediate with sensuous feeling as a brute subjective givenness or "thereness" of 
existence, and its conceptual description is a distortion that inaugurates the illusion of 
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consciousness in the first place.  Indeed, Novalis' model of the mind ends up looking 
much less like Fichte's, as von Molnár had claimed, and more like Kant's (albeit in a 
Jacobian re-reading); Frank even calls Novalis' position "a return to Kant before absolute 
idealism had time to spread its wings."
109  But in agreement with von Molnár, Frank 
claims that "God" and "Ego" then become mere conceptual placeholders for the 
indescribable Absolute, but now in the more Kantian sense of "regulative" concepts, or 
mere ways we must make sense of the world if we are to explain our cognition of it — 
ways that are grounded in us and not in the world.  The Absolute is a figment of the 
mind. 
  According to Frank, the upshot of Novalis' deflation of the absolute status of the 
self, as well as of the unknowability of the existential condition of consciousness (being), 
is that philosophy is open-ended or nonclosed for Novalis.  "Philosophy" is of course the 
Kantian but especially Fichtean transcendental project of the self-reflection of the 
knowing subject upon itself as knower, so as systematically to justify knowledge of 
objects.  Frank calls Novalis' position “anti-foundationalist,” in specific contrast with 
Fichte’s idealism.  Because there is no absolute, self-knowing self that grounds 
knowledge by showing it to be in a deductive relationship with the self’s identity, but 
instead consciousness is merely ontologically conditioned by a being that is outside its 
conceptual grasp, all conceptual statements about being are necessarily only a striving 
towards an impossible goal.  Philosophy must instead content itself with a "not-knowing 
that knows itself as such," as Novalis writes.  Frank calls attention to Novalis' notion of 
the "ordo inversus" to highlight the mirror-like aspect of the philosophical limitations of 
reflection.  The object given in self-reflection is quite literally a mirror image — and so 
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presents an "inverted order" — of the original unity of the subject with itself, rather than 
that unity itself; and so philosophy that would ground itself in self-reflection actually 
only investigates its own incapacity to arrive at the would-be foundation of philosophy.  
Instead, since no single principle could serve as a starting point, the sum total of 
empirical facts gathered by science can only ever be a probable description of being, 
where “probable” means “maximally well connected,” or internally coherent.
110  
According to Frank, there is no possible Archimedean perspective from which 
consciousness could know that its “maximally coherent” claims about being are true of 
being, and so he writes: 
“[F]or Novalis, the formula of philosophy as a ‘longing for the infinite’ is thus an 
indication of philosophy’s intrinsic openness, or the non-final nature of its claims… 
completing the search… [is impossible, which is to say that] realizing what is sought [is 
impossible]… Novalis establishes an explicit connection between the thought that being 
is beyond knowledge and the characterization of philosophy as an infinite task.”
111   
 
Human beings simply find themselves always already in consciousness, unable to 
conceptualize the conditions of it, and hence faced with the ultimately limited 
philosophical task of unravelling the false impressions that follow from the illusory 
nature of judgment, the most important of which is Fichte's mistaken belief that the self's 
identity in absolute reflection is the foundation of knowledge.  In Frank’s view, Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy are correct in arguing that, for Novalis, philosophy must turn to art 
for a “solution” to this diminution of its powers.  Frank writes, the inability of philosophy 
to secure complete knowledge… 
 
“…prepares an aesthetic solution: what philosophy attains to only in the long run (so 
never actually), aesthetic intuition can grasp immediately, even though taking it as a 
content inexhaustible by any concept.  ‘When the character of a given problem is 
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unsolvability, then we solve it if we present its unsolvibility as such.’  Art is able to 
achieve this as ‘Darstellung des Undarstellbaren.’”
112   
 
An incomplete figuration of being in art is its only possible fulfillment, and so here Frank 
agrees with the authors of The Literary Absolute.  But Frank’s reading also uncovers an 
even more complex motivation for this “aesthetic solution” than the two French scholars 
describe, namely that the specific limitation in every act of knowing is that it is 
ontologically “grounded” in unitary being.  For its complexity, for its greater degree of 
contextualization in late 18th-century thought, and for the connections it draws between 
the defining concerns of Novalis and other early Romantics, Frank's reading of the Fichte 
Studien justifiably holds sway as the most important scholarship on philosophical 
Romanticism to date.  And the image of Novalis as a poet who yearns for unity with 
being receives, from Frank, its most contemporary formulation yet: philosophy is the 
necessarily endless striving of always-inadequate conceptual description towards its lost 
origin in being.   
 
VI.  Clare Kennedy  
 
  The windfall of interest in Novalis as a philosopher that followed Frank's 
scholarship is largely thanks to his characterization of the earliest stage of Novalis' 
thought as a strikingly contemporary nonclosure.  Above all, scholars have drawn 
comparisons between Novalis and Derrida, and so next we consider one of the more 
recent and explicit of those studies: Clare Kennedy's Paradox, Aphorism and Desire in 
Novalis and Derrida. It might actually seem surprising that Frank's reading would ever 
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encourage this particular comparison; certainly Frank himself has been an outspoken 
critic of drawing parallels between philosophical Romanticism and post-structuralism.
113  
If anything, the Novalisian notion of the non-reflexive, felt ground of consciousness in 
identical being seems to have closer affinities to Heidegger, whom Derrida countered 
with his notion of différance as the endlessly non-totalizing "infrastructure" of identity.  
But precisely for this reason, we focus here on Clare Kennedy's work.  Her scholarship 
addresses the challenge that Frank's reading of "feeling" presents to any simple claim for 
the total resemblance between Romanticism and post-structuralism, and concentrates on a 
more specific arena of overlap between Novalis and Derrida (one with which Frank, too, 
would agree): the importance of paradox to both thinkers.
114  The paradox that pervades 
both Novalis' and Derrida's writings is the necessity that one strive to articulate the 
Absolute, yet simultaneously acknowledge the impossibility of such an articulation.  
Kennedy describes: "The texts of both writers are often meditations upon ways of 
accommodating the idea of the absolute, and looking at their reflections on philosophy's 
desire for a secure foundation or absolute origin leads us directly to consider the 
emphasis which both place on aporia."
115  Just as Derrida demonstrated how all texts 
"write with both hands," or offer a transcendental term even while the contingency of the 
text only inevitably denies the presence of the transcendent, so too does Novalis refer to 
the Absolute while also calling it an impossible object.  Central to both arguments is the 
claim that no designation of an object as this or that particular object can occur except via 
representation, which is also always the deferral of any possible knowledge of the object 
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in itself; in turn, the absence of this presence provides the only possible relation to it, not 
as dialectical approximation but as the endless seeking of the "tout-autre." 
  Clare Kennedy essentially restates Manfred Frank's reading of the Fichte Studien 
in such a manner that its existing, implicit parallels with Derrida's thought become more 
apparent and explicit.  Most importantly, she recasts Novalis' rejection of Fichte's 
absolute self-reflection as a Derridean deconstruction.  While Fichte attempts to ground 
knowledge in "a self-consciousness which emerges along with the self, [a] conscious self 
which, because its Being is simultaneous and identical with its self-positing, is absolute, 
whole, and self-identical," she tells us that, for Novalis, "consciousness of something is 
not possible without objectification and representation," and that representation 
necessitates that the represented object cannot be of the same order as that which does the 
representing.
116  By locating self-consciousness at the self's self-identical origin, Novalis 
claims, Fichte fails to see the difference engendered by the representational structure of 
consciousness itself and thus the deferral of absolute self-presence that follows from that 
difference.  Kennedy writes: "Novalis' terminology [regarding Fichte] is reminiscent of 
Derrida's description of Hegelian philosophy as 'the absolute desire to hear oneself 
speaking'."
117  Furthermore, the same medium of the endless deferral of the self's 
presence to itself — the sign — is also the means for its being endlessly addressed, again 
in Derridean fashion.  Kennedy calls this paradox "the impossible possible."
118  "The sign 
is conceived only on the basis of the presence that it defers and is held to ensure 
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movement towards the deferred presence that it seems to reappropriate; the absence is 
thus a modified presence," she writes.
119  More specifically, the "modified presence" of 
the Absolute is its "absolute alterity," or the manner in which its radical inaccessibility is 
also its only possible suggestion.  Novalis' formulations of this problem come strikingly 
close to Derrida's descriptions of the same, Kennedy says.  She quotes Novalis here: "Der 
Begriff rein ist also ein leerer Begriff — ein Begriff, dem keine Anschauung entspricht 
— ein weder möglicher, noch wirklicher Begriff... — eine nothwendige Fiction."  
Likewise, Derrida writes:  
"Dans le visage, l'autre se livre en personne comme autre, c'est-à-dire comme ce qui ne se 
révèle pas, comme ce qui ne se laisse pas thématiser.  Je ne saurais parler d'autrui, en 
faire un thème, le dire comme objet, à l'accusatif.  Je puis seulement, je dois seulement 
parler à autrui, l'appeler au vocatif qui n'est pas une catégorie, un cas de la parole, mais le 
surgissement, l'élévation même de la parole."
120 
 
Or, in Kennedy's paraphrase: "That which escapes objectification and knowledge 
manifests itself as a certain absence.  We cannot speak of the absolutely-other, only to 
it."
121  Of course, even though Novalis denies that the Absolute can be present in its 
representation, feeling (Gefühl) is indeed the direct immediacy of conscious experience 
with being; so one might wonder whether Novalis accords it the status of the Absolute in 
the place of absolute reflection or the transcendent sign.  Here Kennedy takes Frank's 
objection to the resemblance between post-structuralism and Romanticism seriously, but 
once again, she does not ultimately disagree with Frank's position.  She writes, "This is 
vitally important[:] the 'Selbstgefühl,' unlike the Fichtean Absolute ego, is not absolutely 
original, autonomous, or spontaneous.  It is, rather, contingent, the 'Resultat' of an 
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absolute cause which always already escapes it."
122  Thus Novalis does distinguish 
himself from Derrida, just as Frank argues, insofar as Derrida would not countenance that 
there can even be such thing as a felt immediacy with identical being; but while Kennedy 
grants this distinction, her point is that feeling still does not qualify as the transcendental 
signifier that would guarantee the closure of the discursive philosophical system.  Instead, 
feeling once again serves as the radical alterity to reflection that prevents reflection's 
closing in upon itself, still in a distinctly Derridean sense.  Thus Kennedy's paradox — 
that we must seek a ground in the Absolute and yet cannot reach it — remains the 
Romantic and the post-structuralist credo on the human condition. 
  To summarize: each of the more recent readings of Novalis considered here (by 
von Molnár, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, Frank, and Kennedy) have in common that the 
traditional reading of Novalis as organicist falls from view, thanks to the claim that 
reflection cannot access the Absolute — reflection is not immediately unified with the 
organismic self-conditioning of the Absolute — and instead effects the separation of 
consciousness from it.  Indeed, our goal has been to show that organicism about being 
even seems to be incompatible in the secondary literature with the stance that 
consciousness necessarily entails distortion: after all, how could we validly claim to 
know that the Absolute is organized organically, if knowledge of the Absolute is 
fundamentally illusion and representation is fundamentally deferral?  How can we speak 
of organic unities at all, when all consciousness is a break from unity and the experience 
of endless nonclosure?  According to this interpretation, the mistake of previous readers 
of Novalis (such as Benjamin and Haering) was that they believed that, for Novalis, 
reflection presences the Absolute thanks to its inherence in the Absolute, i.e., its status as 
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an integral part of its immanent whole, either because the Absolute is a mental web of 
reflections (Benjamin) or else because the Absolute spirit's self-production of being could 
converge with our own reflection dialectically (Haering).  With the rejection of this 
model of reflection, and the endorsement of the role différance in Romantic 
epistemology, so too did scholars reject the living nature of the Absolute in Novalis' 
thought. 
 
VII.  Frederick Beiser 
 
  The notable exception to this trend in contemporary readings is Frederick Beiser, 
who has frequently insisted that readers not forget the importance of organicism to 
Novalis' thought.
123  Beiser does, in fact, largely accept Frank's interpretation of the 
Fichte Studien, but he rejects the general caricature of Novalis as a philosopher of 
nonclosure that tended to follow Frank's reading, because he is concerned that the 
unknowability of being in Novalis' earliest work is not actually representative of his 
overall thought.  There are two aspects to this concern: his contention that the Fichte 
Studien are not quite as consistent as Frank's reading would make them seem, which 
Beiser thinks ought to diminish their centrality to the scholarly conception of his 
philosophy; and his belief that the later, Platonically-informed turn towards organicism 
(above all in the Allgemeine Brouillon) does not qualify as post-structuralist nonclosure 
avant la lettre and is still an important stage of Novalis' development that should not be 
neglected or underplayed. 
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  In Beiser's German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, the discussion of 
Novalis' Fichte Studien is mostly a restatement of Frank's groundbreaking reading of the 
same.  That is, Novalis rejects Fichtean self-reflection, Beiser writes, because he cannot 
countenance that the self can become an object to itself insofar as it is the condition of 
taking objects in the first place; non-discursive self-feeling is the only allowable 
givenness of the self to itself in consciousness, but it too cannot become a foundation for 
a philosophical system.  The format of this denial of Fichte then extends into a denial of 
the possibility of systematic transcendental philosophy in general: a denial of the 
possibility of closure, in other words.  Any attempt to find a ground in the Absolute for 
knowledge within the confines of reflection must fail, because reflection can only "define 
a thing through negation, by how it contrasts with other things," whereas the Absolute 
would necessarily have to be the underlying identity that conditions all difference.
124  
Philosophy then becomes the endless striving towards impossible knowledge of the 
Absolute in reflective terms.  Clearly Beiser's discussion traces the same basic outline of 
Frank's reading. 
  However, Beiser also points to what he sees as inconsistent layers of the Fichte 
Studien that do not harmonize with Frank's reading, and which he believes betray the 
immaturity and hesitancy of Novalis' earliest philosophical work.  At many points in the 
Fichte Studien, Novalis does not hold back from describing what being is like in itself 
(saying more than simply that it is "identity," the regulative indifference of subject and 
object), and he even describes how we might actually know its nature through the 
systematic use of reflection.  Beiser writes: 
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“Whatever Novalis’ motives in criticizing philosophy, they did not prevent him from 
trying to develop his own system…  The tension between Novalis’ critique of philosophy 
and his own philosophical ambitions runs even deeper, however.  Although… he casts 
doubt on all knowledge of the absolute, he does not hesitate to speculate about its 
nature.”
125 
 
For example, Novalis says multiple times that the highest sphere of Being is God (the 
Absolute), who contains in Himself two aspects, “Natur” and “Person,” which come 
together in Him “wie zwey Pyramiden, die Eine Spitze haben.” (#153)  It seems that 
Novalis attributes the original division (Ur-Teil) that constitutes human thought to the 
two sides of highest level of Being, God — God as matter, and God as form — thus 
suggesting that we participate in God’s existence in our very act of thinking.  Novalis 
also suggests that we can know that God has this nature and that our thought relates to 
Him in this way, Beiser says, because the difference between feeling and reflection must 
be conditioned by ever-higher levels within being itself, that are themselves ultimately 
conditioned by the highest possible sphere of being, which could only be God as the self-
unifier of all difference.  Thus it seems to Beiser that Novalis very briefly experiments 
with a proto-dialectical, reflective methodology for knowing an Absolute that has an 
organic nature in itself, even while paradoxically also denying, as Frank claimed, that 
reflection can mediate the Absolute at all.  These earliest notebooks thus lose some of 
their significance for Beiser as the defining statements of Novalis' overall philosophy.  
He writes: "For all their importance, the notebooks are also an early and immature work, 
riddled with doubt, hesitation, ambivalence, and inconsistency... After all, the notebooks 
are just that: notebooks, collections of jottings written on various occasions and never 
intended for publication."
126 
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  According to Beiser, Novalis' thoughts in the Fichte Studien on the nature of God 
are the barest rudiments of an organic theory of the Absolute, a theory that receives 
better, though also never complete explication in the later fragments and especially the 
Allgemeine Brouillon.
127  Beiser's description of this later organicism is very similar to 
Haering's (though he is careful to critique the "Hegelian spectacles" with which Haering 
turns Novalis into a system-builder).  Like Haering, Beiser argues that Novalis' 
organicism consists of a vitalization of substance that counters Descartes' mechanistic 
model of matter and causality.  Cartesian metaphysics holds that matter consists of inert 
extension in space, Beiser explains, for which all change occurs by the efficient causality 
of external collision: parts impinging mechanistically on lifeless parts, like clockwork.  
Nature is a machine, so it becomes unclear how the mind, as free thought outside of 
space, could possibly have an impact on the matter of nature — hence the dualist 
conclusion that the mind is another substance entirely, and stands outside of nature, or 
Spinoza’s conclusion that the mind is in fact unfree, a dependent attribute or accident of 
substance.  In contrast, in the organic framework, matter already contains the animus for 
purposeful change within itself, because matter itself is alive: it is Lebenskraft.  Matter 
pursues its own organization, and so can develop purposively into the various levels of 
nature, from minerals to plants, animals, and humans, and finally to the mind itself.  Mind 
is the highest point of organization of matter, and so not at odds with it, substantially 
speaking.  As Beiser explains: 
“The mind and body are no longer heterogenous substances, they are only different levels 
of organization and development of the single living force throughout nature.  The mental 
is simply the highest degree of organization and development of the living forces active 
in matter; and matter is merely the lowest degree of organization and development of the 
living forces present in the mind.  We can therefore regard mind as highly organized and 
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developed matter, matter as less organized and developed mind.”
128 
 
Indeed, the goal of Nature’s organization is to know itself through the free and purposeful 
movements of the human mind.  So when, in the Vermischte Bemerkungen, Novalis says 
that “der Unterschied zwischen Wahn und Wahrheit liegt in der Differenz ihrer 
Lebensfunctionen,” or when he speaks of Fichte as having an “inside” view and Spinoza 
an “outside” perspective on Being, he refers to the ability of living matter to be both 
subjective and objective at its different levels of potency. (#8)  Beiser often calls Novalis’ 
metaphysics a “marriage of Fichte and Spinoza” – a seemingly paradoxical fusion of the 
absolute freedom of the I, and absolute mechanism of Nature – because in organic 
substance, there is no difference between Fichte’s idealism and Spinoza’s realism, except 
unproblematically between higher and lower levels of complexity.  The notion is 
essentially Herderian. 
  But if Beiser agrees with Frank that the Fichte Studien mostly deny that reflection 
can give us such knowledge of the Absolute's organic nature, and if he claims that 
Haering was also incorrect to argue for the dialectically discursive mediation of the 
Absolute even in the later stages of Novalis' more explicit organicism, then the next 
question becomes: what philosophical model does allow for knowledge of the organic 
nature of being, according to Novalis in Beiser's reading of him?  How does reflection 
change for him, so that the subject can know the ground of its relation between itself and 
object?  On the one hand, Beiser is clear that Novalis "unfortunately does not explain in 
any detail how idealism and realism would demonstrate one another."
129  But on the other 
hand, he says another of Novalis' later philosophical influences at least implicitly 
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suggests the solution: (neo-)Platonic intellectual intuition.   
  Of course, we have already heard many times that Novalis rejects Fichte's 
intellectual intuition in the Fichte Studien because he would not countenance that 
reflection could ever render immediacy with the object of its conceptualization.  But in 
1798, according to Beiser, evidence from letter correspondence shows that Novalis had 
meanwhile read and enjoyed the writings of Plotinus.
130  This fact, along with subsequent 
developments in the content of his philosophy, suggest to Beiser that Novalis embraces a 
very different and much more ancient notion of "intellectual intuition" later in his 
intellectual career — a notion that is indeed a capacity of reason, but quite different from 
Fichte's version.  Beiser explains: 
“Following [the Platonic] tradition, the early Romantics saw reason as not only a 
discursive faculty but also as an intuitive one.  Reason is not simply a formal power that 
conceives, judges, and draws inferences from facts; rather, it is also a perceptive power 
that discovers a unique kind of facts not given to the senses.  This perceptive power often 
went by the name of intellectual intuition... It was through the intellectual intuition of 
aesthetic experience, [the Romantics] believed, that reason could perceive the infinite in 
the finite, the absolute in its appearance, or the macrocosm in the microcosm… What 
[intellectual intuition] intuits is the unity and indivisibility of an organic whole, a whole 
that is irreducible to its parts, and from which no part is separable.”
131 
 
The "intellektuelle Anschauung" of the Platonists is the rational-aesthetic perception of 
the unity and indivisibility of a whole, as a property that emerges from, or is more than, 
the sum of the parts that compose the whole.  Reason in this capacity is not division of 
identity into parts, but rather the immediate synthesis of conceptual wholes from parts.  It 
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is also aesthetic, because this rational unity appears as beautiful.
132  The ancient notion of 
intellectual intuition is the perception of the universal idea that underlies sensual 
particulars and gives these particulars their goal and purpose in the unifying whole; for 
example, there are very many contingently existing leaves, but no leaf is exactly like the 
other, and so our capacity to perceive the different leaves as nonetheless participating in 
the universal idea of the leaf is intellectual intuition.  Thus we can see its potential as 
perception of the organic nature of the Absolute, as well: it is our capacity immediately 
to perceive how individual, real objects are actually interdependent parts of the greatest 
possible ideal unity that underlies and informs all difference.  The real and the ideal can 
be known, in intellectual intuition of wholes, to demonstrate each other and to be 
different only insofar as they are different perspectives on the same fundamental 
substance, the Absolute as the real-ideal or ideal-real.  Now, Beiser acknowledges that 
Novalis almost never speaks explicitly of Plato.
133  But he avers that references in the 
Allgemeine Brouillon to "the inner light or ecstasy" of reason, and the idea that Fichte's 
ego was the forerunner of "reason or the divine logos" are evidence that his 
epistemological turn towards a knowably organic notion of the Absolute was informed by 
Plato (via Plotinus).
134 
  It is precisely Novalis' Platonically-inspired turn to organicism that leads Beiser to 
reject the currently more popular description of Novalis as, generally speaking, a 
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philosopher of "nonclosure."  Indeed, Beiser believes the Romantics' organicism is 
incompatible with a philosophy of nonclosure, because their Platonism grants the 
cognition of the unity of the real and ideal, or material and mental, in rational terms and 
thus still within the boundaries of philosophy itself, which is the criterion for closure.  
Two statements from two different works demonstrate Beiser's point: 
"Frank places the early romantics in the tradition of the critique of reason that ends in 
postmodernism... The hallmark of his interpretation of Novalis has been his tireless 
insistence that these thinkers affirm the thesis that the ground of rationality presupposes 
something that transcends rationality.  Such a thesis is flatly contrary to the Platonic 
tradition, to which early romantics belong."
135 
 
"There is nothing new in stressing the importance of the organic concept for 
romanticism... However, this traditional view does not agree with the most recent trend of 
Romantikforschung, which has questioned the old emphasis on the organic concept, and 
which has stressed instead the lack of completeness and closure in romantic thought.  
[But] this organic concept is indispensable in unraveling the paradox of romantic 
metaphysics, and more specifically... its apparently quixotic [marriage of] idealism and 
realism."
136  
 
Beiser ultimately upholds the opposition between "organic closure" and "post-
structuralist nonclosure," aligning himself with the more traditional stances of Benjamin 
and Haering.  Thus even though Beiser lies outside the trend of contemporary scholarship 
by emphasizing Romantic organicism, and even though Beiser would not agree with the 
precise arguments for organicism presented by Benjamin and Haering, his reading still 
falls in line with the historical dichotomy in Novalis scholarship that we have been 
detailing in this chapter. 
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Chapter Two 
!! 
The Historical Precedence of Novalis' "Organic Nonclosure": 
Jacobi and Herder 
 
 
  Chapter One demonstrated a shift in Novalis scholarship over time between 
readings of "organicism" and readings of "nonclosure" in his thought.  That chapter 
argued that this shift occurred because of changing interpretations of Novalis' notion of 
reflection. While the first wave assumed that Novalis argued for the inherence of human 
thinking in divine thinking (that reflection in the human I is God's reflection), the second 
wave, and especially Manfred Frank, argued that Novalis' notion of reflection was 
essentially Kantian, and so knowledge of the being that conditions that reflection is off-
limits and any talk of the Absolute has a merely regulative function for him.  The second 
wave dismissed the organicism of the first, opting instead for a reading of "nonclosure," 
or the hypothetical quality of knowledge claims due to the impossibility the grounding of 
a closed system of knowledge in the absolute being that conditions knowledge. 
  This Chapter Two proposes that the problem with this supposedly necessary 
tradeoff between organicism and nonclosure in Novalis' thought — "necessary," again, 
on the basis of Novalis' limitation of valid knowledge to Kantian representation — is that 
it ignores a third intellectual possibility in which both organicism and nonclosure are 
unified rather than mutually exclusive.  In this position, the Kantian restriction of the 
exercise of understanding to the material offered in a given sensation itself becomes the 
very platform from which to make a valid inference to the organic nature of being and the 
organic relationship of consciousness to being.  By this we mean not the dialectician's 
insight that the always-already-reflected quality of Kantian consciousness validates a ! *$!
reflective sublation to a higher level of knowledge, but rather the Jacobian insight that the 
privacy, the perspectivality, the quality of that consciousness as a personally lived 
experience, is both what validates the presupposition of a higher, unifying ontology and 
does not allow that higher sphere to become an object of consciousness.  To borrow a 
Heideggerian term: our "thrownness" into the empirically limited perspective of Kantian 
discursive judgment can, by virtue of its very dependent status as a "thrownness into" and 
not a "creation of" its own conscious content, know itself to be thrown from an absolute 
creativity, and even specifically from a panentheistic creativity.  Kant's phenomenal 
realm of appearance then becomes "appearance" in the ontologically stronger sense of the 
"revelation" of the noumenal realm — even as this appearance remains, because of its 
very nature as empirical and immanent to consciousness, a falsification of the infinite and 
transcendent absolute, such that no finite claim made by empirical science can approach 
the absolute and must remain a mere approximation of its nature ("nonclosure").  This 
position is most commonly attributed to slightly later thinkers such as Schleiermacher 
(with his Über die Religion of 1799), the late Herder (with his Metakritik of 1799), and 
the late Schelling (with his Berlin lectures of the early 1840's), but the overarching thesis 
of this dissertation is that Novalis held it himself as early as 1795 in his Fichte Studien. 
  The intellectual insight needed to understand this third possibility is that it 
introduces the self-experience, or subjectivity, of consciousness into the Kantian 
transcendental argument, whereby it links the "lived" or private awareness that 
consciousness has of itself to the existential ground of that consciousness, without (so it 
claims) disrupting the fundamental restriction of knowledge to a "possible experience" 
that lets it remain "Kantian."  Several thinkers after Kant believed that the experience that ! *%!
consciousness has of itself is a special indication of the organic nature of the synthetic 
being that conditions it, and that Kant not only required knowledge of this being if his 
system was to be coherent, but that he implicitly assumed this knowledge and made use 
of it anyway.  Briefly, so as to introduce the fundamental claim: the argument for moving 
from self-experience to ontology is that, first, the undeniable immediacy we have with 
our own conscious contents is the self-experience of the limitation of representational 
cognition to sense; and second, in a transcendental inference, that the condition of this 
self-experience can only be a self-creating being, the accidental property of whose 
(noumenal) self-creation is our phenomenality.  But while Fichte, for example, used this 
line of thinking also to argue that the relationship between ontological ground and 
empirical conscious perspective could be reflectively articulated, other thinkers — like 
Jacobi and Herder, but also Novalis — believed that this self-experience of consciousness 
could only amount to a personal, so non-universalizable, witnessing of absolute 
dependence, which is to say, dependence on the Absolute.  The felt immediacy of an 
infinitely dependent reflection indicates, though only in subjective terms or "for me," the 
nevertheless epistemically undeniable fact that God becomes real in us.  There is an 
Absolute, and it is the panentheistic God. 
  For our purposes, the historical background required to understand how the post-
Kantian discourse on reflection and being shifted to include this subjective bridge to 
organic ontology is the work of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi and Johann Gottfried Herder in 
the Pantheismusstreit.  More precisely, it is Jacobi's philosophy in spite of himself, a 
difference that Herder and others understood.  Jacobi's metacritique of Kant suffered 
from a fruitful internal inconsistency: in spite of his own anti-Spinozism, Jacobi ! *&!
influenced the post-Kantian generation to adopt monist, organic theories of being and to 
reconcile this monism with Kant's theory of representation.  In the eyes of some thinkers, 
like Fichte and Hegel, the organic insights that Jacobi brought to Kant enabled the 
intellectual possibility of the systematic closure of Kantian epistemology.  But for others, 
such as Herder, the epistemological modesty that Jacobi shared with Kant prevented — 
even within an organic ontology — the possibility of closure.  The lineage from Jacobi's 
epistemologically modest Spinozism to Herder's organic nonclosure is an important 
influence on Novalis' own work, even the early Fichte Studien. 
  Of course, to claim that Jacobi is an important influence on Novalis is not at all 
new.  Manfred Frank's groundbreaking reading of Novalis was so influential, in part, 
because it convinced scholars that Jacobi was a heretofore ignored voice in Novalis' 
thought, and that listening to that voice would reveal new meaning in the Fichte Studien.  
As we saw, the momentous consequence of Frank's reading was that Jacobi's critique of 
Kant — namely that if knowledge follows from the synthesis of blind sensation and 
empty concept, then Kant's model of judgment in fact painted consciousness as "illusion" 
— was accepted as Novalis' own position.  In this reading, reflection's constitutive 
illusion cannot be overcome, rather only revealed as illusion, so that consciousness 
becomes a "non-knowing that knows itself as such" and any theory of an organic 
Absolute becomes a regulative fiction of the operation of reflective illusion.  In this 
chapter, we aim to present a fuller story of Jacobi's influence, so as to build the case for 
the point made in our final chapter, namely that Novalis takes advantage of Jacobian 
subjectivity or "Dasein" to make stronger ontological claims than Frank believes he ! *'!
made.  In our reading, Jacobi's inadvertent organic Spinozism was as important to 
Novalis as his metacritique of Kant.  Novalis interprets Jacobi much the way Herder did.   
  This Chapter Two will proceed through the following steps.  In part one, it traces 
the contours of Jacobi's metacritique of Kant, which is also part of his critique of 
philosophy in general.  In part two, it details Jacobi's alternative theory of consciousness: 
his theory of the human being as an organic soul-body complex.  In part three, it 
describes Jacobi's notion of the epistemic warrant to knowledge of this ontology.  In part 
four, it shows how Jacobi's organic alternative contained, especially in light of his 
metacritique of Kant, an implicit and inadvertent Spinozism that many thinkers saw as 
the key to resolution of outstanding problems in Kant.  In the final part five, we discuss 
how Herder seizes upon this line of thought in his own philosophy, which is a philosophy 
of "organic nonclosure."  Each of these sections sets the historical stage for the organic 
nonclosure of Novalis himself, which is the subject of the next, and last, chapter.  
 
I.  Jacobi's Metacritique of Kant 
 
  Like Kant, Jacobi believed that the flaw — and the arrogance — of rationalist 
philosophy was its belief that it could arrive at metaphysical truths solely through the 
logical analysis of concepts.  The problem with rationalism was that it derived being from 
thought, describing what is by examining the necessities of logic, and more specifically 
by mistaking the merely formal relations of thoughts to each other for the ontological 
relation of form and matter.  Kant's and Jacobi's epistemologies, in contrast, both limited 
what humans are validly able to know to sensuous experience.  Unlike God, whose ! *(!
thinking creates being,
137 human thinking must be tied to finite, contingent experience of 
the empirical manifold.  Human consciousness is a "taking-in," not a producing.  The 
human capacity to think cannot justifiably exercise itself outside the contents of 
sensation; "pure reason" steps beyond its valid limits.  In these ways Jacobi's theory of 
knowledge is every bit as modest as Kant's.  However, unlike Kant's transcendental point 
of view, Jacobi made these claims from a Christian fideist standpoint.  Below it will be 
shown that Jacobi's casting of the epistemic mode of consciousness as "belief" (Glaube) 
was his expression of the dependence of human thought on God's creation, or on created 
being that simply opened up to the subject in what is really the divine revelation of 
consciousness in us.  For Jacobi, pure reason is indeed invalid because it is removed from 
its existential touchstone in sense, but in the ontologically stronger meaning of the 
removal from a divinely revelatory origin: concepts are higher-order abstractions of sense 
perceptions, or generalized re-presentations of a reality divinely given and already 
formally structured in sense.  Thus though we are conscious by the grace of God, it is a 
mistake to believe that we can "think God" — account for his nature solely through 
logical argumentation — since the truths of metaphysics do not result from the subject's 
logical efforts, but rather are simply given in sensation by God.   
  In spite of their differences, and because of the epistemological modesty they 
nonetheless shared, Jacobi sought Kant's support as a kindred thinker during the 
Pantheismusstreit that he initiated in August of 1785 (see discussion below).  But after 
Kant published the second edition of his first Kritik, Jacobi became more and more 
pronounced in his disagreement with him.  It seemed that Kant himself was still making 
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the traditional rationalist mistake, again upending the proper relationship between 
thinking and being, only now in the sphere of consciousness.  In his 1787 essay entitled 
"David Hume über den Glauben," Jacobi described the issue as their different ways of 
accounting for the "taking-in" of the outside world in consciousness — that is, how they 
differently explained what makes objects exist for a subject, or what makes the world 
appear to the subject as outside him.  Kant had of course argued that the human mind is 
passive, in the faculty of sensation, with respect to the matter of representation, but 
active, in the faculty of understanding, with respect to the form; subjective consciousness 
of objects, the givenness of a world of objects to a subject, follows from the synthesis of 
these two faculties, which are external to each other.  Sensation is "blind" and 
understanding is "empty," but together they enable self-conscious perception of content.  
But for Jacobi, that Kant's "discursivity thesis" would locate the emergence of the 
subject's experience of the world in a reflective act could only amount to what Hamann, 
too, called "Purismus der Vernunft"
138: the attempt per impossibile to extract being from 
a concept.  The only difference between the flawed rationalisms of the prior century and 
Kant's own mistake, is that "being" in this case is the "being-there" of consciousness, or 
Dasein.  Jacobi countered that the basic quality of experience as a givenness, to a subject, 
of an external world of objects could never be accounted for by the subject's application 
of a concept; a concept, which is mere empty form, cannot bring about the basic 
thereness of the world for a subject — it cannot make Dasein emerge.  Of course, Kant 
had claimed that it is indeed sensation that connects the subject to the contingently given 
empirical manifold, but the problem for Jacobi was that this empirical data could only 
become for the subject by means of the subject's application of concepts, which still 
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makes subjective form-giving the ground of the appearance of reality.  For Jacobi, the 
"blindness" of Kantian sensation amounted to relinquishing orientation in the real.  It 
seemed indefensible to Jacobi that Kant would, on the one hand, hold to the good insight 
that thought leaves its basis in reality when it extends beyond what it knows immediately 
in sense to be true and existing, and yet, on the other hand, also argue that reality only 
becomes an object of consciousness specifically by means of the cognitive activity of the 
subject (and that only thusly is the universality of knowledge secured).  Kant seems to 
give excessive priority to reflection, which — precisely by being made the prime 
determiner of valid cognition — in fact loses touch with the basis of knowledge, which is 
sensed reality.   
  More specifically, Kant's insistence that consciousness follows from an act of 
reflection upon contingently given and "blind" sense data amounts to the equation of 
consciousness with illusion, Jacobi claimed.  Because Kant locates the categories, and 
above all the category of causality, only in the subject, reality outside the subject cannot 
be known as the cause of our experience that the world consists of events that follow each 
other in this or that particular way.  If we accept that the matter of consciousness is 
contingently given in sense, but that the causal and structural relationships within that 
matter, as well as its relationship to the subject — and thus our perception of external 
events as occurring in this or that way — are provided not in that contingently given 
sensation, but by the understanding, then we can only conclude that reflection, rather than 
reality, accounts for our specific experience of reality.  In other words, human cognition 
is the contrivance or falsification of reality, and we are left with the extreme idealist 
conclusion that consciousness is illusion.  Since Jacobi understood Kant's epistemological ! "++!
goal to be the grounding of the objectivity of knowledge of the world, the unavoidable 
conclusion that "consciousness is illusion" only amounted to the failure of that 
philosophical project.  Where understanding no longer orients to reality as its one and 
decisive norm, the criterion for "real" versus "merely thought" falls away, and the road to 
Berkeleyan idealism paves itself.  And were Kant, instead, to preserve the objectivity of 
knowledge by insisting that sensuous impressions of objects are not "blind," but already 
contain an orderedness that corresponds to the categories of the understanding, he would 
contradict another key tenet of his own philosophy: that we cannot know the Ding an 
sich.  Hence Jacobi's famous quip towards the end of the David Hume, "Ich kann ohne 
das Ding an sich nicht in die Transzendentalphilosophie hineinkommen, mit dem Ding an 
sich aber nicht darin bleiben."
139 
  According to Jacobi, we should expect precisely this upending of the proper 
relationship between thinking and being from philosophy in general.  All philosophy 
cannot but be the attempt to explain existence by means of reflection, which then only 
ever misrepresents existence in the terms of thought.  "Reflection," or the operation of 
explanation, makes one event conditional upon another event, and so opens up a regress 
of causes that can never exit itself to know the ultimate ground of the events.  So if 
reflection is the medium of one's argument about being, then reflection necessarily loses 
sight of the fundamental nature of being, not as a causal sequence, but as a revelation, 
what Jacobi calls "Geschehen," a bringing-into-being by means of God's transcendent 
power.  Jacobi writes in his David Hume essay: 
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"Stellen Sie sich einen Zirkel vor, und erheben Sie diese Vorstellung zu einem deutlichen 
Begriff.  Wenn der Begriff genau bestimmt ist, und nichts außerwesentliches enthält, so 
wird das Ganze, welches Sie sich vorstellen, eine ideale Einheit haben; und alle Theile 
werden, nothwendig miteinander verknüpft, aus dieser Einheit hervorgehen.  Nun haben 
wir, wenn wir von einer nothwendigen Verknüpfung des Successiven reden, und das 
Verknüpfende selbst in der Zeit uns dabei vorzustellen glauben, nie etwas andres 
wahrhaft in Gedanken, als gerade ein solches Verhältnis wie das bei dem Zirkel; ein 
Verhältnis, worin alle Theile zu einem Ganzen wirklich schon vereinigt und zugleich 
vorhanden sind.  Die Succession, das objective Werden lassen wir aus; als wenn es sich 
von selbst begriffe, wie es sinnlich sich von selbst vor Augen stellt; da doch gerade 
dieses, nemlich das Vermittelnde der Begebenheit, der Grund des Geschehens, das Innere 
der Zeit, kurz das principium generationis dasjenige ist, was eigentlich erklärt werden 
sollte."
140 
 
Logical operation (here, the "nothwendige Verknüpfung" of parts in a "deutlichen 
Begriff") can only but misrepresent ontological operation ("das Verknüpfende selbst in 
der Zeit"), and so, as an attempt to know what is, reflection will only ever set up the 
unknowability of existence ("nie etwas andres wahrhaft in Gedanken").  Kant's systematic 
approach to knowledge has done just that.  His dualistic conditions are the conceptual 
product of a transcendental reflection upon Dasein, and not surprisingly, the result of his 
reflection, if Kant is only honest about his confusion regarding the thing in itself, is a 
conditionalizing of being to understanding; and the proper consequence of that 
conditionalizing is that consciousness is Berkeleyan illusion.   
  Jacobi believed that this tendency on the part of philosophical culture of his time, 
even in Kant, to entrust analysis with the explanation of (Da-)Sein had its fullest 
expression and intellectual origin in the philosophy of Spinoza.  Spinoza's ontological 
argument for God's existence tried to prove God's existence, and precisely by attempting 
to prove God, i.e., to make reflection the medium of the justification of God, only ended 
up equating God with being and making our thinking a mode of his being.  Jacobi was a 
traditionalist, an orthodox theist who believed in a personal and transcendent God, and so 
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this pantheistic result was anathema to him.  He embarked on a crusade to show that all 
philosophy, because it operates in the medium of conceptual analysis, invariably results 
in this "Spinozistic" consequence of the full equation of thinking and being (which can 
only mean the "Spinozistic" annihilation of individuality and freedom, and the atheistic 
denial of the transcendent God, or in Kant, the solipsistic rather than materialist 
equivalent of the same).  Jacobi called upon his generation to perform a "salto mortale": 
to jump head over heals and start walking on the firmer ground of faith, by rejecting 
philosophy tout cour.  To meet Kant on this battlefield, Jacobi needed an alternative 
account of consciousness to the dualistic faculty model, one that retained Kant's 
orientation of thinking in sensation, but that made consciousness the divinely enabled 
immediate revelation of being. 
 
II.  Jacobi's Organic Theory of Consciousness 
 
  Jacobi's alternative preservation of the receptivity of human consciousness to a 
contingent, sensuously received object is his equation of all of consciousness with sense 
perception, the epistemic modality of which then becomes "Glaube" ("belief") in the 
senses both of Humean sensuous feeling and religious faith.  Jacobi says that the 
appearance, in our minds, of a world of objects outside of us — consciousness or 
"Dasein" — is the divinely enabled registering or mirroring of that world by our souls, a 
mirroring that occurs directly upon our sensuous affection by the world, rather than (with 
Kant) as the product of application of a priori concepts by an independent understanding.  
The figures to whom Jacobi appeals in making this claim against Kant are Leibniz and ! "+$!
Hume.  Leibniz, too, argued that concepts refer objectively to the order and constitution 
of the relationship of objects in themselves, while the conceiving of this order in 
immediate mental representations lies in the individual mind alone.  But whereas Leibniz 
claimed that God pre-established the harmony between these two real and ideal realms, 
Jacobi maintains that this very same notion of harmony, this immediate mental 
presencing is, instead — and in re-interpretation of Hume — "sensuous," because it is a 
mental immediacy with physical affection.  According to Jacobi, God is indeed 
responsible for establishing harmony, though not in Leibniz's sense of two realms that 
independently march on in mirror image of each other, rather in the sense of endowing us 
with souls that have this capacity for immediate presencing.   
  In other words, Jacobi offers an organic theory of consciousness: a theory of the 
human being as soul-body complex, or material parts organized into the true unity of 
wholeness by the soul, whose mirroring of that unity is our consciousness.  In the organic 
being, the self-presence of the mind and the material body are mutually fulfilling aspects 
of its single living being, in which consciousness emerges when its definitionally unitary 
being comes into contact with another being outside it.  Organic beings have many parts 
(for example humans have limbs, hair, organs, etc., or trees have leaves, branches, bark, 
etc.) but importantly, their status as unitary individuals — their identity as "one person" 
or "one tree" — depends on the emergence of a wholeness that is greater than the sum of 
their constitutive parts.  The organic being, in other words, is not a mere "heap," but 
rather what Leibniz, Jacobi quotes, called the unum per se
141: the only true substance, 
because a self-maintaining unity.  Its maintenance as itself or as this greater whole — 
which is not only constituted by many different parts, but also whose parts are constantly 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
141 Jacobi 254 ! "+%!
replaced according to the plan of the whole — is not dependent on an external cause, but 
rather on a principle of unity that is wholly internal to the individual.  Jacobi joins many 
before him when he calls this internal agency the "soul," or, from within the perspective 
of the soul itself, the "I."  The organism's continual activity of preservation as itself is its 
"life," and this continuance appears on the outside as the unitary body and on the inside 
as the unitary mind.  Material parts are inessential insofar as they are replaceable, and 
essential insofar as their ongoing replacement is the continual substantiation of the 
essence of the being, its internal form.  Jacobi writes:  
 
"Wir fühlen das Mannigfaltige unseres Wesens in einer reinen Einheit verknüpft, die wir 
unser Ich nennen.  Das Unzertrennliche in einem Wesen bestimmt seine Individualität, 
oder macht es zu einem wirklichen Ganzen... Dahin gehören alle organische Naturen.  
Wir können keinen Baum, keine Pflanze, als solche, das ist, ihr organisches Wesen, das 
Princip ihrer besonderen Mannigfaltigkeit und Einheit, zerlegen oder theilen ... [Ihr] 
Körper ist aus einer unendlichen Menge von Theilen zusammengesezt, die er annimmt 
und wieder zurückgiebt, so daß von allen auch nicht Einer wesentlich zu ihm gehören 
kann.  Sie fühlen aber diese Theile als zu ihm gehörig mittelst einer unsichtbaren Form, 
die wie einen Wirbel mitten in einem Strome verursacht."
142 
 
While only one being exists, it nonetheless exhibits two aspects, mind and body, 
depending on the perspective from which it is approached.  Internally, it exhibits the 
subjective unity of mental life as an "I."  Externally, it exhibits the objective unity of 
physical life as a "body."  The two do not influence each other, insofar as "influence" is a 
causal relationship; rather, mind and body are mutual fulfillments of each other: neither 
can exist without the other, and they come into being at the same time and through each 
other.  Thus Jacobi writes that the body is expressed in the soul, at the same time that 
"das denkende Wesen, als solches, hat mit dem körperlichen Wesen, als solches, keine 
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Eigenschaft gemein."
143  Instead, what happens physically is registered immediately 
internally as mentality.  In one and the same moment of the organism's definitional self-
perpetuation, mentality and physicality are produced as the internal and external 
expressions or "accidents" of this ontologically singular being.  The mind inheres in all 
points and all parts of the body, and insofar as the body is a unity, so too is its mentality 
the unitary experience of the singular I.  Mental and physical life inhere immediately in 
the organic being like the two sides of a single coin.   
  According to Jacobi, his theory of the organic nature of the human being accounts 
for how consciousness is determinate content for a subject, without falling into the 
solipsistic traps either of Kantian dualism, nor of the Humean skepticism that follows 
from our access supposedly to nothing more than subjective representations.  It does so 
by reasserting the proper hierarchy of being and thought: thought is dependent on being.  
More specifically, Jacobi reformulates consciousness as the reciprocal fulfillment of 
subjectivity and objectivity that is grounded not in the understanding's application of a 
concept, but in the quality of being as an activity — the striving of organic life.  He 
writes:  
 
"Ich erfahre, daß ich bin, und das etwas außer mir ist, in demselben untheilbaren 
Augenblick... Daß unser Bewußtseyn lauter in einander greifende Momente des Thuns 
und Leidens, der Wirkung und Gegenwirkung darstellt, die ein reales, in sich bestimmtes 
und selbstthätiges Princip voraus sezten, ist auffallend... So müssen [Individua], wenn sie 
Wirkung erfolgen soll, andre Wesen mittelbar oder unmittelbar berühren.  Ein absolut 
durchdringliches Wesen ist ein Unding.  Ein relativ durchdringliches Wesen kann, in so 
fern es einem andern Wesen durchdringlich ist, dasselbe weder berühren, noch von ihm 
berührt werden.  Die unmittelbare Folge der Undurchdringlichkeit bey der Berührung, 
nennen wir den Widerstand.  Wo also Berührung ist, das ist Undurchdringlichkeit von 
beiden Seiten; folglich auch Widerstand; Wirkung und Gegenwirkung... "
144 
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In other words, when an organism, which is the self-determining activity of being and 
therefore a real unity, comes into contact with another being that is also impenetrable and 
therefore able to impinge effectively upon its living activity, then this impediment is 
immediately registered inside the organism as the consciousness of objects.  The 
organism is, by definition, a striving to incorporate infinitely divisible matter into its 
unitary being, thereby becoming a Dasein or being-in-the-world; but when a being 
outside itself resists this attempted "penetration" of its being, or when the organism is 
only partially penetrated by another being, then the organism's "forward movement," as 
Jacobi calls it, is checked against this object and so is forced into passivity with respect to 
this object, and the internal representation of this check is object-perception.  Jacobi 
follows Leibniz in claiming that perception is nothing but the internal representation of 
an external change.  Jacobi's organic theory of consciousness counters both Kant and 
Hume: the dependence of representations on contact with an object is grounded not in a 
subject's concept application, but in the activity or striving of living being.  In Kant, the 
faculties of sensibility and understanding are wholly separate, and consciousness depends 
on the possibility of reflection as their synthesis (though Kant does not commit either to 
the notion that the subject is the source of that reflection, nor that it is a product of 
reflection by something else).  Jacobi, in contrast, unites sensation and conceptualization 
of sensation in the single activity of life, in which both capacities emerge at once; 
sensation is never "blind," as Kant would have it.  For Jacobi, the difference between 
sensation and understanding is only functional.  In fact one never exists without the other, 
since they are mutually dependent for their respective actualization.  Over time, after 
repeated examples of penetration by objects checked by the organism's activity, the ! "+(!
resulting awareness forms a concept, which is to say that concepts are not a priori, contra 
Kant, but rather originally dependent on sensuous affection by the thing of which they are 
a concept.  Concepts are higher-order abstractions of a subject-object distinction already 
present in the moment of physical affection, because sensation is always already also 
conceptualized.  Jacobi writes: 
 
"So erkläre ich mir auch das Nachsinnen, das Ueberlegen, und ihre Wirkungen, aus der 
immer fortgesezten Bewegung (wenn ich mich so ausdrücken darf) des activen Princips 
in uns gegen (nicht wider) das passive, nach Maaßgabe der empfangenen Eindrücke und 
ihre Verhältnisse.  Bey jeder Wiederholung ihres Consensus in Absicht eines nemlichen 
Gegenstandes muß die Vorstellung neue Bestimmungen erhalten, und bald mehr 
subjectiv bald mehr objectiv vergrößert werden.  Die Entdeckung wichtiger Wahrheiten, 
und die Entstehung lächerlicher Irrthümer, wird auf diese Weise gleich begreiflich.  
Wenn wir von der Seite der Spontaneität allein — ohne zu erwägen, daß diese sich nur 
reagirend außert — die Vernunft betrachten: so sehen wir der Vernunft nicht auf den 
Grund, und wissen nie recht was wir an ihr haben."
145 
 
The givenness of self to itself, and at the same time the givenness of world to the self, are 
produced in the very first moment of affection, which brings sensation and understanding 
into existence at the same time.  Sensation is already formally organized, and 
understanding already has sensuous content, in other words, and so concepts are not a 
priori, as in Kantianism; concept formation is only "a priori" insofar as the life activity 
that is checked is, indeed, original to the organism.  The dependence of the a priori on the 
a posteriori also explains why rationalism's derivation of being from thought could only 
be, as Jacobi says, a walking on one's head.  Concepts are higher-order abstractions upon 
immediately, sensuously experienced distinctions (between objects and between the 
subject and the object), which means that concepts are not closer to truth, but rather 
removed from it.   
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III.  Dasein and Glaube 
 
  Now that the details of Jacobi's organic theory of consciousness have been 
provided, the reader might be wondering how Jacobi could even think he had the right to 
philosophical speculation about body and soul in a post-Kantian environment.  But 
Jacobi's response is to question Kant's own purported right to restrict this kind of 
knowledge on the basis of transcendental reflection.  Jacobi offers an alternative notion of 
Dasein as its own justification for the knowledge that it mirrors being, as well as an 
alternative notion of the epistemic status of knowledge as Glaube ("belief").  Both claims 
relate to his religiously motivated desire to see consciousness as a divine revelation — a 
gift that God grants to us, his creatures. 
  Earlier we showed that, in Jacobi's eyes, Kant's transcendental reflection only 
managed to establish the unknowability of being.  Kantian critique attempts to carve out 
the conditions of knowledge of being, but precisely by seeking them, only sets up the 
very conditions under which being would be unknowable: transcendental reflection upon 
the conditions of self-consciousness consciousness suggests "sensibility" and 
"understanding" as separate faculties, but if understanding is indeed separate from 
sensibility, then consciousness would have to arise from understanding's reflection upon 
sensation — understanding makes being appear as consciousness on its terms — which 
means precisely that consciousness is not an immediate mirroring of being, not a true 
mental re-presentation of being, but rather the production of a Berkeleyan sphere of 
illusion.  We should even expect the operation of transcendental reflection to upend the 
proper relation between being and thinking, Jacobi says as part of his critique of ! "+*!
philosophy in general: as a merely formal process, all reflection presents being in merely 
formal terms, in Kant's case literally accounting for Dasein in the terms of the formal 
understanding.  Philosophizing — seeking explanation by means of analysis — always 
leads to "Spinozism" or nihilistic and atheistic monism, whether in the form of 
deterministic materialism or, in Kant's case, a solipsistic idealism that is essentially an 
inverted materialism with the same consequences. 
  Jacobi argues in the David Hume essay that this failure of Kant's system to secure 
the terms of valid knowledge is precisely the reason we do not need to cater to Kantian 
notions of epistemic warrant: Kant has warrant backwards.  Kant's platform for 
transcendental deduction is the minimal standpoint of the skeptic — the existence of self-
conscious consciousness — from which he then reflectively seeks its conditions so as to 
justify any knowledge of being that remains within those conditions; but in fact, securing 
warrant should occur the other way around: the starting point in the experience of Dasein, 
the self-awareness that consciousness has of its own existence, is all the "proof" one 
needs in order to know that consciousness is the immediate presentation of being as 
mental life.  The core of Jacobi's claim is that the self-experience of consciousness — its 
quality as a lived experience, an opening up of the world for me alone in the here and 
now of my private perspective — is what validates knowledge of the fact that mental life 
mirrors being; any abstraction from that experience only has a weaker warrant.  What my 
lived experience proves, albeit only as private and not universalizable proof, is that I 
simply find myself in a position of not being able to have consciousness except as a 
mental relation to the world.  "Das Wirkliche kann außer der unmittelbaren 
Wahrnehmung desselben eben so wenig dargestellt werden, als das Bewußtseyn außer ! ""+!
dem Bewußtseyn, das Leben außer dem Leben, die Wahrheit außer der Wahrheit."
146  
The point here is not that all of our thoughts are directly oriented to the world — 
imagination and speculative philosophy often obviously take leave of any recognizable 
experience; the point is rather that consciousness, i.e., firsthand awareness, is always the 
interdependence of subjectivity and objectivity: I experience my I-ness simultaneously 
and inextricably with my experience of the world.  "Ich erfahre, daß ich bin, und das 
etwas außer mir ist, in demselben untheilbaren Augenblick."  So there is no "relation of 
thinking to the world" that needs further proof than the intuitively or self-evidently 
obvious fact that my experience just is a world-relation.  The most indubitable thing, 
precisely because it is my nonreducible personal experience and the first point from 
which all abstract knowing begins, is that Dasein directly depends on Seyn: it is a 
mirroring that would have no content and thus no existence for itself except as the 
mirroring of being.  "Wir fühlen das Mannigfaltige unseres Wesens in einer reinen 
Einheit verknüpft, die wir unser Ich nennen... Sie fühlen aber diese Theile als zu ihm 
gehörig mittelst einer unsichtbaren Form, die wie einen Wirbel mitten in einem Strome 
verursacht."  Jacobi answers Kant with an ontology, not because he fails to appreciate the 
lack of his right on Kantian grounds to speculate about ontology, but because only 
philosophizing from the standpoint of being considered as opened up directly to our 
consciousness even is the true orientation of thinking in being, the limitation of 
consciousness to sensation, that he thinks Kant too is fundamentally committed to 
upholding.  
  Since Jacobi's justification for the meta-knowledge that our consciousness is an 
immediate registering of being is a merely private or subjective experience, and so not 
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universalizable, Jacobi concludes that the epistemic mode of our consciousness of being 
is more properly described as "belief" than "knowledge" (though it is no less objective, as 
in object-oriented, for this epistemic downgrade).  By "Glaube," Jacobi claims in his 
David Hume essay to mean Hume's notion of sense perception or feeling, but the 
religious overtones of this term are equally important to him.  At some level, all 
knowledge of objects fundamentally orients from a lived experience that is irreducibly 
individualized — the organic soul's mirroring of a bodily encountered world — and so is 
a witnessing or disclosure by a soul that is dependent, not only on the object, but on a 
higher power that placed it in this receptive or contemplative relation to its object in the 
first place.  This dependence is central to both sensuousness and religious experience.  
Jacobi calls the "revelation" of consciousness "der geheime Handgriff des Schöpfers... 
Ein Schauer ergreift mich, so oft ich dieses denke; mir ist jedesmal, als empfienge ich in 
dem Augenblick unmittelbar aus der Hand des Schöpfers meine Seele."
147  What I 
experience, in my experience of Dasein as a simultaneity of the "I" and the "object," is 
also the divine givenness to me of this capacity for reception of the object:   
 
"Die Quelle des Lebens bedarf keines Gefäßes.  Sie ist nicht wie der Tropfe, der es 
bedarf, daß ein Gefaß ihn sondernd fasse und bewahre.  Schoepfer ist dieser Geist; und 
das ist seine Schöpfung, daß er Seelen eingesezt, endliches Leben gestiftet, und 
Unsterblichkeit bereitet hat... Es erklärt zugleich, warum wir von diesem Wesen aller 
Wesen nichts begreifen, und seine Natur, wenn wir sie erforschen wollen, nach unserer 
Vorstellungsart sogar unmöglich finden müssen.  Denn wir mussten abhängig werden bis 
ins innerste Mark unseres Daseyns, und deswegen unfähig seyn, schlechterdings unfähig 
seyn und bleiben, von einer ganz unabhängigen Natur, einer durch und durch reinen 
Thätigkeit, uns die entfernteste Vorstellung zu machen... unser endliches Daseyn musste 
mit dem Leibe [beginnen]...Unsere natürliche Erkenntniß konnte nie über das Resultat in 
einander fließender Verhältnisse des Endlichen zum Endlichen, vorwärts und rückwärts 
unabsehbar, sich erheben."
148 
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Our consciousness of God — Glaube, now as in religious "faith" — is just as "sensuous," 
though in the negative sense of awareness that what it takes to be the creator of life is 
absolutely beyond the restriction of our creativity to our embodiment.  More specifically, 
that negative sensation of God is the awareness that, even if we "became dependent to the 
last limit of our existence," or attend to our embodiment to the greatest possible degree in 
the attempt to feel all aspects of our soul's relation to being, still we would not be able to 
overcome the (thereby negatively revealed) fact that our souls must be placed into 
relation with our bodies by a higher power.  Thus for Jacobi, the experience of the 
interdependence of subjectivity and objectivity is equally the religious sensation of the 
dependence of the "I" on the "Thou" that makes that experienced interdependence 
possible.  It is under this dual formulation of sensuousness and religious feeling that 
Jacobi hoped outrightly to reject philosophy and to replace it with a Glaube that would 
revive traditional fideism.    
 
IV.  Jacobi's Inadvertent Spinozism and the Road from Kant back to Being 
 
  One of the greatest stories of unintended intellectual influence must be Jacobi's 
role in the Pantheismusstreit.  He had hoped to show that all philosophical thinking leads 
to a morally repugnant, because "Spinozistic" (atheistic and nihilistic) reversal of the 
proper hierarchy of thinking and being, and that philosophers must perform a "salto 
mortale": they must stop "walking on their heads" by rejecting philosophy tout cour, and 
start walking on the ground of sensuously substantiated common sense and traditional 
religious faith.  Instead, Jacobi ended up playing a central role in both a Spinoza revival ! ""$!
and the grandest period of philosophy that Germany has yet seen: German Idealism and 
philosophical Romanticism.  The historical details of his influence in the controversy — 
his "outing" of Lessing as a Spinozist — are more well-known, but the intellectual details 
are perhaps less obvious, in part because they involve an inadvertent and 
unacknowledged Spinozism on the very part of Jacobi himself.  Jacobi's Spinozism, when 
it is embraced as an intrinsic (even if unintentional) part of his argument against Kant, led 
many of his contemporaries to the exciting conclusion that Kantianism, too, only makes 
sense as Spinozism. 
  This fact of the implicit union of Kant and Spinoza in Jacobi's own inadvertent 
Spinozism is an important context of Novalis' thought, specifically for the way that it 
shows that the organic movement in Germany began as an intellectual reaction to a 
fundamentally modest epistemological program.  Kantianism, as a theory of reason as 
spontaneous yet involuntary, is nothing if not the insistence that the condition of 
consciousness remains at all times partially mysterious to consciousness.  It's important to 
remember this modesty, because too often scholarship has seen organic theories of being 
exclusively as an epistemologically immodest revision of Kant, i.e., in the idealisms of 
Fichte and Hegel.  These systems did both argue, albeit in different ways, that an organic 
notion of being was the pathway to the closure of Kantianism.  But theirs was not the 
only organic epistemology that sprung from the union of Kant and Spinoza implied in 
Jacobi's thought: the other, also highly public option was Herder's nonclosure.  We will 
detail Herder's organic nonclosure later, but the task still falls to us now to describe 
Jacobi's inadvertent Spinozism and how it even could lead, intellectually speaking, to the 
incorporation of Spinoza into Kant's system. ! ""%!
   To review, we have seen that Jacobi believes that Kant's notion of reflection, as 
an a priori concept application by an independent understanding to the blind sensuous 
content in sensibility, amounts to Berkeleyan idealism, if it is only honest about the 
contradictory demands it places on the Ding an sich.  In order reasonably to claim, in a 
Kantian theory of the understanding, that consciousness re-presents being rather than 
producing a sphere of illusion, one must also be able to know that the forms of the 
understanding correspond to the percepts of sensation, which themselves must be an 
immediacy with being.  But Kant cannot allow this knowledge, so long as the thing in 
itself cannot also be known to be a cause of sensations: this correspondence of 
understanding and the immediate presentation of the thing in itself in sensation required a 
metacritical perspective that is a thinking beyond the boundaries of Kant's own 
restrictions.  So Jacobi said that Kantianism must admit that it is the theory of 
consciousness as "illusion," or the active operation of an understanding that finds what it 
puts in sensation.  Jacobi's alternative was to claim that consciousness is the soul's direct, 
internal mirroring of being, and that only this dual-aspect theory would be the true 
orientation of thinking in being that any theory of a representational, rather than creative, 
intellect requires.  His justification for this knowledge of the ontology of consciousness 
was two-pronged.  On the one hand, he appealed to the self-experienced nature of 
consciousness as a Dasein, the living, wholly private dependence of my consciousness of 
self on a simultaneous consciousness of object.  On the other, he challenged Kant's notion 
of warrant: he need not abide by Kant's restriction of knowledge of being, because that 
restriction was made by means of a knowledge-invalidating inference to the conditions of 
Dasein.  He believed that all "reflection" (including transcendental reflection), since it is ! ""&!
a mode of explanation that redescribes being in the purely formal conditioning terms of 
thought alone, could only misrepresent the fundamentally revelatory quality of being.   
  But in Jacobi's formulation of his own alternative to Kant — the striving of the 
soul continually to organize the material of the body into a true unity, which organic 
whole would be capable of resistance to beings outside of it and so form a conscious 
image of that resistance in the soul, i.e., "consciousness" — Jacobi fails to see that he, 
too, is proposing that the purely formal activity of the soul organizes the manifold of the 
body into a unity that would then register the outside world in its own terms.  His 
organism is still an act of reflection, albeit a reflection as a concrete entity: ontologically 
speaking, the organism is the forming of matter such that the thereby produced "informed 
matter," or being, can recognize in its formal aspect what the matter encounters in the 
world and according to the terms delineated by its form. "Wir fühlen das Mannigfaltige 
unseres Wesens in einer reinen Einheit verknüpft, die wir unser Ich nennen... Sie fühlen 
aber diese Theile als zu ihm gehörig mittelst einer unsichtbaren Form, die wie einen 
Wirbel mitten in einem Strome verursacht."  So, in trying to prioritize being over 
thinking in a theory that still supports a representational or sensuously limited 
consciousness — a priority that he believed Kant had lost sight of, with solipsistic 
consequences — Jacobi still found himself needing to place an act of reflection at the 
founding act of consciousness.  And the consequence of this theory of reified reflection, 
of which Jacobi himself had forewarned, is that consciousness indeed loses its quality as 
"firsthand": consciousness becomes merely a mode, accident, or byproduct of the organic 
quality of being, indeed a correspondence to being, but a correspondence as an 
appearance solely in mental terms, rather than a presentation of that being in itself, which ! ""'!
being is a creative reflection, a reflection that reifies and is reified.  In short, Jacobi's 
alternative, organic account of consciousness is itself a Spinozism.  More specifically, it 
is a unity of Kant and Spinoza: by making Kant's synthesis into a being, he makes 
Kantian consciousness into a mode of being. 
  Had Jacobi understood his own position better, he surely would have been 
horrified to recognize his enemy Spinoza in his own thought.  Jacobi's God was supposed 
to be the orthodox, wholly transcendent and personal God, and his sensuous appreciation 
of God was supposed to be a traditional fideism.  But many of Jacobi's post-Kantian 
contemporaries were not so repulsed with his Spinozism, because it solved a problem.  
Jacobi had offered a convincing metacritique of Kant, and suggested the solution, without 
(in spite of himself, it turns out) reneging on the precepts that made Kant a figure worth 
saving in the first place.  That is, Jacobi had convincingly pointed out Kant's inconsistent 
use of the "thing in itself"; he had demonstrated that Kant lacked the epistemic license to 
deny all knowledge of it; he also showed that the subjectivity of consciousness — its 
lived quality as a Dasein — was ground enough to know that Kant's thing in itself is 
actually his discursive synthesis as a being; and by so converting Kant's epistemology 
into an ontology — by reifying Kant's discursive synthesis — he had maintained the 
valued Kantian principles of the restriction of consciousness to sense, reason as 
involuntary spontaneity, and the difference between phenomenal and noumenal realms.  
Granted, the original Kantianism must indeed be altered, but some would argue that its 
spirit remains.  The grounding act of synthesis has been re-understood as an "intellectual 
intuition," the creative reflection that gives rise to being as the simultaneity of being and 
consciousness of being, or in other words, this act of reflection produces our empirical ! ""(!
consciousness as the byproduct or "accident" of its self-creation.  Kant did not permit 
"intellectual intuition," but after Jacobi and in the eyes of many, it was hard to see how he 
could maintain his most important claims without it. 
  The terms of this summary of Jacobi's "Spinozistic Kantianism" (or just as well, 
"Kantian Spinozism") are general enough that the reader should be able to recognize very 
different thinkers as specific examples of it: Fichte, Hegel, or Herder, for instance.  Fichte 
called the organic being the "I," a "Tathandlung" or activity of self-positing being, whose 
parts are the I-as-subject and the I-as-object in reflection, the organic interdependence of 
which parts is actualized by external affection, to produce empirical consciousness as a 
byproduct of the original being of the Tathandlung; Hegel and Herder instead called the 
organic being Geist or God, a panentheistic divine whose causa sui self-reflection also 
produces the world, which is his instantation and whose relation to his original Logos 
produces our consciousness of objects.  We introduce organicism this generally, because 
again, our overarching goal in this chapter is to demonstrate that organicism need not rule 
out nonclosure.  Fichte and Hegel might have famously appealed to their respective 
organic beings with the goal of incorporating the "Ding an sich" into empirical human 
understanding, in Fichte's case as a foundation on which to build a closed system, and in 
Hegel's case as the goal of a process of dialectic reflection that reaches closure at its 
endpoint.  But these "closures" are not the only option for organicism.  Herder adopted 
organicism while trumpeting the impossibility of such systems (though his nonclosure 
was spelled out in response to Kant rather than to Fichte or Hegel).  We turn now to 
Herder.   
 ! "")!
V.  The Nonclosure of Herder's Organicism 
 
  Johann Gottfried Herder and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi exchanged a famous letter 
during the Pantheismusstreit — an exchange that showed Herder understood the power 
of Jacobi's implicit Spinozism much better than Jacobi understood himself.  They were in 
touch because Jacobi was, of all things, seeking support for his anti-Spinozism.  In 1781, 
Jacobi, who had heard that Moses Mendelssohn planned a memorial work for the recently 
deceased Lessing, privately asked Mendelssohn if he was aware that Lessing was actually 
a "Spinozist."  Jacobi claimed that Lessing confessed an appreciation for Spinoza's hen 
kai pan in a conversation between them in person in 1780, shortly before Lessing's death.  
Since calling someone a Spinozist had been, for some time, culturally tantamount to 
accusing someone of atheism and nihilism, Mendelssohn was scandalized at this 
defamation of his good friend and fellow Aufklärer, and so turned from memorializing to 
defending Lessing in his Morgenstunden oder Vorlesungen über das Dasein Gottes, a 
work that aimed to clarify that Lessing's was an "enlightened" pantheism.  Jacobi, 
meanwhile, introduced his alternative anti-philosophy in his Briefe über die Lehre 
Spinozas, which was published almost at the same time as Mendelssohn's work in 1785.  
The joint appearance of these works inaugurated the Pantheismusstreit — which, for all 
its intellectual influence, ended up being a social faux pas for Jacobi: it did not seem 
respectful to the beloved and recently departed Lessing that Jacobi would try to diminish 
his reputation, and to make matters worse, Mendelssohn died only a year later, in 1786, 
and it seemed that Jacobi had hastened his death.  In the attempt to gather more minds to 
his side, Jacobi wrote to Herder with the expectation that he would agree with him.  ! ""*!
Herder's response shocked Jacobi: Herder took sides with Spinoza!  Instead of justifying 
Jacobi's gauche move, Herder wrote to Jacobi: 
 
"Das proton pseudos, lieber Jacobi, in Ihrem und in aller antispinozisten System ist dies, 
daß Gott, als das große Ens entium, die in allen Erscheinungen wirkende Ursache ihres 
Wesens ein 0, ein abstrakter Begriff sei, wie wir ihn uns formieren; das ist er aber nach 
Spinoza nicht, sondern das allerreellste, tätigste Eins, das allein zu sich spricht: ‚Ich bin, 
der ich bin, und ich werde in allen Veränderungen meiner Erscheinung… sein, was ich 
sein werde.’... Was Ihr, lieben Leute, mit dem ‚außer der Welt existiren’ wollt, begreife 
ich nicht: existiert Gott nicht in der Welt, überall in der Welt, und zwar überall 
ungemessen, ganz und unteilbar… so existiert er nirgends. Außer der Welt ist kein Raum; 
der Raum wird nur, indem für uns eine Welt wird, als Abstraktion einer Erscheinung... 
Gott ist das höchste lebendigste, tätigste Eins – nicht in allen Dingen, als ob die was 
außer ihm wären, sondern durch alle Dinge, die nur als sinnliche Darstellung für 
sinnliche Geschöpfe erscheinen."
149 
 
Herder cannot make sense of Jacobi's orthodox creator God who is "outside existence," 
because what is outside existence is as good as nothing.  Space is an abstraction that we 
produce from the appearance of existence to our senses, and so there is no such thing as 
space "outside" existence where a personal creator God might himself "exist."  Being 
must be what it is in and through God, and Herder believes that Spinoza's pantheism was 
a defensible version of this position.  In this response, Herder shows a full appreciation 
for both the explicit and implicit layers of Jacobi's own thought.  God's thinking produces 
creation, but if thinking, as Jacobi himself so passionately argued, loses touch with being 
if it is not an ontological immediacy with being, then existence too must be dependent on 
God's thought in a fundamentally immediate way.  God is in being. 
  Herder claimed that what Spinoza needed — and what Jacobi himself ironically 
provided in spite of all his arguments to the contrary — was a vitalized notion of God's 
pantheistic being.  The feared consequences of pantheism (its atheism and nihilism) could 
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be avoided if Spinoza's flawed conception of "substance" were only replaced with the 
very living, active God to whom Jacobi inadvertently pointed all along.  Spinoza only 
seemed an atheist and a fatalist because his equation of God's being with nature was 
limited by his Cartesian understanding of substance as inert, dead extension; thus God, 
and the human beings that are modes of God, lose intentional agency in favor of a mental 
lockstep with clockwork mechanism.  But again, Herder argues that such a notion of dead 
extension is not the true nature of God's being, but rather an abstraction from our 
sensation of existence, and that Spinoza's Deus sive natura can be salvaged if we re-
interpret God as Kraft: force, living matter, or units of existence that are themselves 
intentional.  Kraft is Herder's appropriation of the Leibnizian monad, but "with 
windows," so to speak, just as Jacobi argued: the fundamental unit of existence is the 
organism, a unity of body and soul.  God, the Urkraft or primal, original and absolute 
force, is himself an organism — the ultimate organism of which all created things are 
parts (parts that are themselves organisms or Kräfte).  Such a vitalized notion of 
substance lets the pantheistic God become a full, positive, and intrinsic infinity rather 
than the propertyless, agencyless ground that Jacobi feared in his atheistic vision of 
Spinozism.  Creation need not be a machine-God set once and ineluctably into 
deterministic motion, but rather can be a living process, ever-evolving and developing.  
God is the transcendent force that, in becoming immanent and finite, in becoming life 
itself, sustains all life.  The orthodox Holy Trinity of God the Father, God made man in 
the Son, and God the Holy Spirit who remains with us after Christ's death and 
resurrection, is recast in Herder's panentheistic trinity as God the soul, God the body 
(creation), and God the life, the ongoing perpetuation of body by soul. ! "#"!
  The goal of this section of this chapter is not to discuss Herder's precise 
contribution to the Pantheismusstreit, but to emphasize an aspect of it that has become 
obscured thanks to the tendency to hasten discussion of Herder on the way to Hegel, an 
aspect that has therefore been lost to the contemporary debate on Novalis' own 
organicism: Herder's organicism is also a philosophy of nonclosure.  Just like Jacobi, he 
ascends to knowledge of organic being from the non-propositional, because merely 
private experience of consciousness as Dasein.  From the organism's first-person 
perspective, our always-already immediate status simultaneously with our selves and 
with our conscious contents is immediate because it inheres in God's self-creating, living 
substance, in his ongoing thinking-cum-existence; yet the ground of God, the 
unconditioned, is not the conditioned thing that we experience as the actual contents of 
our consciousness.  The striving of God's living substance opens up the consciousness in 
which we then find ourselves permanently lost to our conscious origin.  Hegel supported 
the same organismic notion of God as Herder, but would later introduce dialectical 
reasoning with the goal of demonstrating closure, within his own system of knowledge, 
as the convergence of God's self-knowledge and of human knowing in the movement of 
living being into the movement of living concepts and eventually to stasis in knowledge 
of the fact that God knows himself in us.  But for Herder, who never develops a 
dialectical notion of concepts, the inherence of human knowing in God's being can never 
become a knowing with God.  God's appearing in and as finite beings is eternally 
distinguishable from God the ground of that appearance.  Since the latter remains 
uncognizable, yet is the ultimate condition of our knowledge, Herder's philosophy is one 
of "organic nonclosure." ! "##!
  Herder avoids the simple equation of God with nature — the equation that is so 
offensive to the orthodox religious insistence on the omnipotent transcendence of God — 
by calling God an "organism."  This qualification means that Herder's "pantheism" is 
better described as a "panentheism," a notion of the divine as simultaneously 
transcendent and immanent, which simultaneity is due the special part-to-whole 
relationship that defines the organism.  The parts that constitute God's existence are 
indeed finite, but since God is the whole that those parts actualize, a wholeness that in 
turn directs the interrelationship of the parts so that he is actualized as their whole, God is 
also more than his parts.  God is analogous to that more familiar example of an organism, 
the human being: body parts constitute the human existence, but the whole that the parts 
actualize (the body) and the unified mental perspective that inhabits those parts (the 
mind), are more than just the sum of their parts.  However, unlike the human organism, 
God's thinking creates being.  Thought of himself brings himself into existence, which 
existence is also all of creation, from the smallest creature to the colossal cosmos.  In his 
self-contemplation, God is a completely self-sustaining, self-maintaining existence, the 
Urkraft, the ultimate and absolute organism.  His eternal self-finitization is his infinite 
existence, and so his becoming determinate and limited in created things does not mean 
he is reducible to mere finitude; finite parts of his being die, but these parts are absorbed 
into other life forms again and again in the process by which God, the whole, maintains 
himself as himself eternally.  The existence of finite, created beings is thus dependent on 
God's infinite life, a relationship that Herder describes in Gott, einige Gespräche with the 
analogy of the branches and roots of a tree: 
 ! "#$!
"Alles trägt sich selbst, wie die Kugel auf ihrem Schwerpunkt ruhet: denn alles Daseyn 
ist ja in seinem eignen ewigen Wesen, in seiner Macht, Gute und Weisheit gegründet... 
Nichts kann untergehen, nichts vernichtet werden oder Gott müßte sich selbst vernichten; 
aber alles Zusammengesezte wird aufgelöset, alles was Ort und Zeit ausmißt, wandert.  
Da nun in unendlichen Daseyn alles liegt, was kann und ist; wie Endlos wird die Welt, 
Endlos nach Raum und Zeit und in sich selbst beständig.  Gott hat den Grund seiner 
Seligkeit Wesen mitgetheilt, die auch wie er, das Kleinste wie das Größeste, Daseyn 
genießen... [wie] Zweige von seiner Wurzel ewigen Lebensaft schöpfen."
150  
 
When God's thought becomes real, he creates himself and so becomes finite and 
determined, but remains a transcendent infinitude insofar as he also forever sustains the 
life of this finite creation.  In Herder's panentheism, nature is in God, but God is also 
more than nature.  Though God is the ground of existence, no determinate existence is 
adequate to his eternal being, his infinite whole, according to Herder. 
   Herder extends the consequences of this inadequacy to the mental life of the 
organisms that are the constitutive parts of God's being, thus explaining the limitations of 
human knowing with his organicist theology.  The organisms or Kräfte that God creates 
in his self-instantiation are finite versions of his own being, which however reverse the 
divine relationship between thinking and existence: God's thought is productive of 
reality, while the thought of finite creatures (including human beings) is merely a taking-
in, a re-presenting of reality.  The details of Herder's argument are as follows.  God's self-
contemplation brings himself into being, a being that is also all of creation, in which he 
recognizes himself because each finite part is itself also a Kraft or organism.  Kräfte, 
including human beings, are finite analogies of God.  So just like God, and precisely 
because they are immanent parts of his being, each Kraft is a living unity of mind and 
body.  And just as God recognizes himself in this creation as a whole (his body), 
organismically actualizing the unity of that body in the very act of self-recognition, so too 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
150 Johann Gottfried Herder, Gott, einige Gespräche (Gotha: K. W. Ettinger, 1787) 197, 199. 
 ! "#%!
does the mind of each finite Kraft recognize itself in its body, which is also composed of 
lower Kräfte, thereby actualizing the organic unity of the body and its own mental 
perspective through that recognition.  In other words, Kräfte exist in an ascending, 
endlessly embedded hierarchy in which each organism actualizes at a higher level the 
abilities of the lower organisms of which it is composed, and God, the highest and 
absolute Urkraft, is actualized by the sum total of these eternally developing parts.  
However, even though the organisms that compose God's absolute organism are 
analogies of his being, because they are finite the divine relationship between thinking 
and being is reversed in them, which reversal gives rise, in the human organism, to our 
merely representational consciousness.  In other words, the Kräfte that are produced by 
God's self-reflection are the mirror image of his being — a being-that-is-a-thinking, 
rather than a thinking-that-is-a-being — which means the mental life of each organic 
being is limited by its embodiment.  Unlike God, whose thought creates that of which he 
thinks, the contents of consciousness in the created being must be given, via the finite 
body that sensuously registers the external world, to the soul that is actualized as the 
specific organic unity of these specific parts; that is, the soul re-presents (in the sense of 
"presenting again") in unified form the mixed sensory manifold contingently experienced 
by the body.  Consciousness is dependent for its contents on the given revelation of the 
senses, and not on the capacity of its own soul to produce that of which it thinks, which 
only God can do.   
  This dependency is evident in the details of Herder's psychology of knowledge, 
which like Jacobi's is an organicized alternative to the dualistic faculty model of 
judgment that Kant proposed.  According to Herder, consciousness in human beings, ! "#&!
characterized as a consciousness simultaneously of self and of a world of objects given to 
that self, is an actualization of the abilities of our particular organismic being.  The Kräfte 
that compose our body are themselves embodied souls that are specifically capable of 
sensation, and they register the impingement of the external world in sensory manner; in 
turn, and in reciprocal reaction to the impingement, the soul that unifies these body parts 
into a bodily whole also unifies these sensations into a single, simultaneously self-
conscious consciousness by recognizing itself in the mental aspect of its Körpermonaden.  
Herder describes this actualization as the soul's recognition of itself in sense "as if in a 
mirror": 
 
"Wir fühlen uns in einem sehr vielartigen und zu Einem Zwecke äußerst fein organisirten 
Körper lebend.  Körperlich zu reden, fühlt sich die Seele d.i. unsre Kraft zu erkennen und 
zu wollen, selbst in ihren abgezogensten Verrichtungen mit dieser Masse... verbunden, 
daß sie diesen Ort im Universum nicht verlassen kann... Sie fühlt weiter, ihre selbst 
gedachte und abgezogenste Kenntniße als Resultate ihrer Verbindung mit dem Körper... 
Sie fühlt endlich... sich als Inwohnerin gleichsam in diesen Körper ausgegossen, daß sie 
mit allen Werkzeugen desselben empfinde, desselben Körperliche und Organische Kräfte 
brauche, dadurch immer eine Kraft von sich anwende, sich also im Gebrauch dieser Kraft 
fühle, wohlseynd, daurend in sanftem Maas fortstrebend fühle — sich also in diesem 
Körper, wie in einem Spiegel ihr selbst erkenne."
151   
 
Though body and soul can be functionally differentiated, their capacities are intimately 
dependent on each other.  Neither the recognition of the soul in the Kräfte of its body, nor 
the higher-order spiritualization of sensation as perception of objects, could occur except 
by means of each other in a reciprocal fulfillment.  This reciprocity is thanks to the 
fundamental nature of the organism as a mutual determination of parts for the sake of an 
emergent whole; the very being of the parts and the very being of the whole are 
interdependent — neither can exist without the other.  In the human organism, and as a 
function of this reciprocal nature of its being, cognition is the higher-order fulfillment of 
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animal sensation, and takes the form of a self-conscious consciousness of objects.  Herder 
believes that Kant's faculty separation smacks of the scholastic tendency to invent sub-
personal agencies for as many capacities as could be imagined.  Hence Herder writes: 
"Unsere Seele hat zwo Kräfte oder Klaßen von Kräften, die der Philosoph obere und 
untere nennet, aber nur der Philosoph und als Philosoph nennet er sie so."
152  Reason 
should be seen, Herder claims, as the unified and spontaneous expression of our 
particular organic being.   
  Herder's philosophy of life is strikingly similar to Jacobi's, even while his 
theology is so different.  Herder agrees with the anthropocentric turn in Jacobi's 
epistemology, or in other words, he agrees that knowledge does not follow from the a 
priori analysis of concepts, but rather that concepts are themselves formed from the 
contact of an organically embodied soul with the world.  This anthropocentrism is a form 
of religious and epistemological modesty for both philosophers: only God's thinking is a 
producing, while human consciousness is a mere representational taking-in according to 
its divinely appointed organic capacity.  The insistence on the dependence of human 
consciousness on a soul that grasps the world only through embodiment is also a 
sensualism that they both share.  The private mental life of the "I" is not a self-generating, 
self-subsistent being apart from the body, but the actualization of an interior perspective 
in a direct, reciprocal determination with the soul's external, bodily extension.  According 
to both Herder and Jacobi, philosophy must proceed from the assumption of an 
immediate, and therefore indisputable, certainty of being, which is given to us through 
the self-experience of our existence as an organic soul-body complex.  Jacobi emphasizes 
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this sensualism with his equation of consciousness with "feeling" — an immediacy of 
self-feeling and the feeling of something given to the self — and Herder similarly claims 
that consciousness arises in one stroke as the soul's recognition of itself in the mental 
aspect of the Körperkräfte.  But this last point of similarity also suggests the 
inconsistencies of Jacobi's position, which were mentioned earlier, and which Herder 
resolves with his vitalism.  Jacobi says consciousness is the result of the active striving of 
the soul against a passivity instigated by external impingement; but it's hard to imagine 
how this reciprocity of activity and passivity could be the immediacy of existence and 
consciousness of existence that Jacobi seeks, yet meanwhile be grounded in sensation 
rather than, say, a Fichtean absolute ego, unless consciousness raises the pre-conscious 
mental life of the body to a higher level — a claim that makes consciousness into a basic 
aspect of what "substance" is, i.e., Spinozism. 
  Herder explains the immediacy of being and consciousness by means of our 
inherence in God's organic being, contrary to Jacobi; but precisely because Herder, like 
Jacobi, conceives of consciousness as an immediacy — a givenness in the mind of a 
world of objects, not mediated by the act of an independent mind, but rather as a 
spontaneous organic unity of mind and body — his philosophy likewise resists the 
tendency of other post-Kantian transcendental idealists to ground knowledge in the 
ratiocination of the subject, and instead supports nonclosure, the impossibility of the 
systematization of human knowledge.  The ground of the appearance of objects to the 
subject cannot itself appear as ground, and so any philosophy that purports to build a 
system of knowledge from this ground, as if it even could be incorporated into a system 
as a knowable foundation, must fall short of this goal. ! "#)!
  Herder conceives of consciousness as the product of the striving of God's organic 
being, and the "nonclosure" of his philosophy is the concealment of this ontological 
ground from the very consciousness to which it gives rise.  According to Herder, 
consciousness occurs because a soul perpetually strives to substantiate itself in a body; 
this activity is "life," and its product is a unity, the organism, in which mentality and 
materiality inhere as two aspects, like two sides of a single coin.  These aspects are 
realized in reaction to each other and ultimately activated upon impingement of the 
organism by an external object, just as Jacobi claims.  But Herder is clear: that striving of 
life is the striving of God to create himself, and that duality of internal and external 
aspects of being is the unity of mind and being that God effects by being the original, 
absolute self-creative thinking.  In other words, for Herder, God's self-reflection 
conditions "appearance" in the sense of our human mental representation or subjective 
experience of the world: "In jedem Erkenntniß, wie in jeder Empfindung spiegelt sich das 
Bild Gottes."
153  But crucially, God as ground of appearance does not appear as himself.  
Appearance is explicitly acknowledged in Herder's philosophy as a kind of "illusion."  
God is the eternal, transcendent, omnipotent capacity for infinite form-taking, but his 
appearance — the mental life of organisms — is the mirror image of this infinite nature, a 
world of finite objects given to an only seemingly self-sufficient ego.  But this is just the 
point: God's appearance must be illusion.  Appearance is the determination, limitation, or 
finitization, in spiritual form, of a God who is absolute, who is the ability to be any 
possible form.  After all, what would it even mean for the infinite to appear as infinite?  
That could only mean the generation of endless appearances, which is precisely the 
nature of the organismic cosmos, an eternal churning.  We've already seen that, when 
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God self-contemplates and instantiates himself in that contemplation, the instantiations 
(finite Kräfte) invert his divine relationship between being and thinking.  Our point, now, 
is that this reversal is also ultimately Herder's argument for nonclosure.  God's appearing 
means becoming an embodied mental life, which is precisely not an appearance as 
infinite, even as it is the enabling of appearance at all.  The careful reader will see that 
Herder's notion of illusory consciousness via God's ontological inversion is an organicist 
version of what Frank identified as the "ordo inversus" in Novalis (though didn't 
acknowledge it to be organically motivated in him): the tendency for judgment to invert 
the relationship between being and thinking, and so to require a reflection of reflection, 
not to cognize the absolute ground of reflection, but simply to correct its epistemic 
mistake, whereupon it recognizes its infinite dependence on an infinite God. 
  Even though it is the very opening up of our phenomenal realm of the appearance 
of objects, the process of God's self-instantiation is transparent to God alone, because his 
thought alone creates of itself.  Herder made this point very clearly in that fateful letter to 
Jacobi: God is "das allerreellste, tätigste Eins, das allein zu sich spricht: 'Ich bin, der ich 
bin, und werde in allen Veränderungen meiner Erscheinung (diese beziehen sich nicht auf 
ihn, sondern auf die Erscheinungen untereinander) sein, was ich sein werde.'"
154  In 
himself, God is the freedom to become one of infinitely many appearances.  In contrast, 
human consciousness, which is conditioned, is merely receptive and dependent on God's 
activity, which is unconditioned; were we to know God, we would have to become God, 
become the one and only knowing that is also a creating of the one and all, as Herder 
explains: "Eine völlig philosophische Sprache müßte die Rede der Götter sein, die es 
zusahen, wie sich die Dinge in der Welt bildeten, und also jeden Namen der Sache 
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genetisch und materiell erschufen."
155  Both objectively and subjectively, human beings 
inhere in God's being; but this is immediacy with God only insofar as he has "thinged" 
his intrinsically formless and infinitely free capacity for becoming all things.  The very 
ontological mystery in question, the organic "thinging" or becoming-real of God's 
thought, produces the world-disclosure of consciousness in our finite being that cannot 
then turn around and witness its own birth, but rather must receive the resulting sensuous 
impressions as a divine gift, and simply bear witness to the reality opened up to it.  
Herder writes: "Wir endliche Wesen, mit Raum und Zeit umfangen, die wir uns alles nur 
unter ihrem Maas denken, wir können von der höchsten Ursache nur sagen: sie ist, sie 
wirket; aber mit diesem Worte sagen wir alles."
156  Once again, it is Novalis who 
expressed this limitation — which is Jacobian and Herderian, this chapter has aimed to 
show — most poetically with his fragment, "Wir suchen überall das Unbedingte, und 
finden immer nur Dinge."
157    
  For both Jacobi and Herder, organic nonclosure is an explicit critique of Kant.  By 
assuming that the formal aspect of human consciousness is grounded in a faculty of 
understanding that is autarkic and sense-independent, Kant attempts to preserve a 
classical model of the autonomous or self-legislating subject, even while making 
consciousness dependent on contingently given sensuous content.  The problem with this 
move, in Herder's eyes, is that understanding cannot be separate from sensation, though 
indeed it must be functionally distinct.  They are functions that must fulfill each other, 
which is to say, understanding must become itself in the very act of its recognition of 
sense — to grant it independence, Kant would have to claim that understanding has a 
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self-understanding apart from its actual functioning as understanding (Marion Heinz aptly 
calls this a "performative contradiction"
158).  Herder's insistence on this reciprocity is also 
his argument that the very indubitability of our private conscious standpoint is the 
indication of our nature as an organism: it is his agreement with Jacobi's argument for 
organic being from Dasein.  In understanding an object, the mind only recognizes what is 
already given in sense, which means the understanding is not the source of the given nor 
of the likeness between itself and its object, yet in the very act of recognition that brings 
consciousness into being, it immediately identifies its shared nature with the given, a 
sharedness that is an organic homology between subject and object.  In assuming this 
notion of self-presencing being, Herder is not dogmatically ignoring Kantian epistemic 
limits, but rather offering, just like Jacobi, a metacritique of the architectonic with which 
Kant draws those limits: "Was Philosophie thut," Herder writes of transcendental 
idealism, "ist bemerken, untereinander ordnen, erläutern, nachdem sie Kraft, Reiz, 
Würkung schon immer vorraussetzt."
159  In other words, after presupposing the 
ontological possibility of a unitary expression of mind and body in consciousness — the 
"standpoint of the skeptic" that Jacobi, too, argues is the only "proof" needed for 
objectivity —  Kantian philosophy further analyzes the parts of this unity as if to show 
whence the unity came.  But for Herder, our organism's consciousness just is a unity, so 
analysis of the parts that supposedly compose it only takes a perspective on 
consciousness that we simply cannot have.  Herder writes: "To make oneself independent 
of oneself, i.e., to place oneself beyond all original, inner and outer experience, to think 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
158 Marion Heinz and Heinrich Clairmont, "Herder's Epistemology," in A Companion to the Works of 
Johann Gottfried Herder (New York: Camden, 2009) 56 
159 Johann Gottfried Herder, quoted in Clark, 745. ! "$#!
beyond oneself, entirely free of the empirical: this no one can do."
160  That is, we cannot 
break apart consciousness ex post facto as if "understanding" were ever any real, self-
legislating entity apart from "sensation."  Herder's argument is fundamentally the same as 
Jacobi's, only he embraces both the implicit Spinozism and the explicit epistemological 
modesty of Jacobi's position.  Philosophy cannot ground itself, but must rather take its 
bearings from consciousness understood as immediacy with being, a given presencing of 
substance to itself, which is God's organismic self-constitution.   
  Another way of formulating this metacritique is that grounding the contents of 
consciousness in the rational a priori activity of the individual is only reason's seeking 
itself and, upon finding itself, mistaking itself as the ground of that consciousness.  
Frank's notion of the "ordo inversus" suggests itself again — though Herder's organicist 
version states, in contrast to Frank, that philosophy that does not accept conscious 
immediacy with being as God's immanent self-revelation merely finds in the self what it 
puts there.  Jacobi too argued that Kant only establishes the unknowability of being by 
attempting to extract Dasein from the operation of an independent understanding.  In 
Gott, einige Gespräche, Herder even acknowledged his more fundamental agreement 
with Jacobi on precisely this point: 
 
"Die Wahrheit, die er [Jacobi] mit diesen Ausdrücken ['Sinn' und 'Glaube'] festsezten 
will, dünkt mich doch immer, unpartheiisch erwogen, sehr annehmenswerth... 'das 
Vernunfteln sei nicht das ganze Wesen, nicht der ganze Bestand des Menschen.'  
Substanz, Daseyn, liege allen, auch den edelsten Kräften unsrer Natur zum Grunde; diese 
könne nicht in Vernünftelei aufgelöset oder gar durch sie hinwegraisonnirt werden.  Ohne 
Existenz und eine Reihe von Existenzen dächte der Mensch nicht, wie er denket; folglich 
müßte es auch der Zweck seiner Gedanken seyn, nicht, sich Hirngespinste zu erträumen 
und mit Scheinbegriffen und Scheinworten, wie mit einer selbstgemachten Wirklichkeit 
zu spielen; sondern wie ers [Jacobi] nennt, Daseyn zu enthüllen, solches als etwas 
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Gegebnes oder (nach seinem Ausdruck) als eine Offenbarung Gottes anzunehmen, über 
welche und hinter welche man nicht hinauskann.  Man müsse also seine Sinne durch 
Erfahrung, seinen innern Sinn durch Wahrheitliebe, Ordnung und Zusammenhang im 
Denken reinigen und schärfen, allen willkührlichen Verbindungen existenzloser 
Scheinbegriffe, d. i. dem trägen, todten Nichts entsagen und dafür was da ist, in den 
Eigenschaften und Beziehungen wie es da ist, kennen lernen.  Ein solches Erkenntniß mit 
innigem Gefühl der Wahrheit verbunden, sei allein wahr."
161 
 
Here Herder proclaims his agreement with Jacobi's organic explanation of the 
relationship between thinking and being.  Existence is an in-itself that is also for-itself, a 
unity of subject and object grounded not in the subject's rational act of appropriation of 
the object, but in the very nature of substance as disclosive, because alive.  For us, reality 
disclosure by the substance of which we are composed just is our subjectivity, and our 
proof of this fact is simply our "thrownness" into the privacy of our conscious 
perspective.  Herder's implicit philosophical opponent is Kant, seen here, just as Jacobi 
did, as falling prey to the sins of the very rationalism Kant's theory was meant to counter: 
"playing with ideas as if with a self-made reality."  Kantian "arguing away" of ontology 
via epistemology is a "subtle reasoning" that mistakes its own activity as the ground of 
disclosure rather than as originally dependent on sensuous immediacy, or felt givenness, 
that must simply be taken on faith, a sensuous faith, as immediacy with the real.  The 
consciousness in which we always already find ourselves is the sphere that opens up the 
world to us, and the sphere "beyond and behind which" there is no knowing.  Properly 
understood, then, truth is always the immediate, which is to say, in the organic terms 
shared by Herder and Jacobi, that truth is delivered in our organism's embodied 
relationship to the world that it is divinely designed to reveal: "such knowledge, in union 
with an inner feeling for the truth, is alone true."  So, Herder's is also a philosophy of 
"organic nonclosure."  We cannot take, as an object of our consciousness, the manner in 
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which substance is also an Innewerden, because we are always already within the realm 
of subjectivity that substance opens up to us; to ground it in reason's activity, moreover, 
is only to have reason find what it puts there.  Our immediacy with being is an 
ungroundable "belief," and for Herder, moreover, it is ultimately a givenness to God's 
organismic Being of which we are a living part. 
  Herder is most famous as one of the first major philosophers of cultural 
relativism, especially through his notion of different languages as the repositories of 
unique cultural inheritances; now we see how intimately related this relativism is to his 
organicism.  If concepts only arise in the first place thanks to the actualization of 
cognition in the mutual fulfillment of mind and matter, then sensuous circumstance — 
with all the environmental diversity that entails — is the context of an ultimately living, 
breathing, constantly evolving human knowledge.  A "pure" reason and "neutral" 
sensation are precisely not the ground of universal human knowing.  The building of 
Kantian (or Fichtean, or Hegelian) systems, which only forcibly misconstrue the organic 
revelation of consciousness as a self-legislating reason that is transparent to human 
understanding, must be replaced with a model of mutable knowledge formed in ever-
changing circumstances, as Herder scholar Sonia Sikka so aptly writes: 
 
"Whether placed in the subject or the object, categories claiming for themselves universal 
application and eternal validity are mistaken about the character of human relation to 
reality.  They attribute to the human power that invents those categories an autonomy 
from the shifting sands of embodied experience which it never truly possesses."
162 
 
The phrase "shifting sands of embodied experience" is a fitting metaphor for Herder's 
ontology.  The organism, in both Herder's and Jacobi's philosophies, is a mind 
sensualized in continuous physical change, a constantly striving but unitary perspective 
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on a world encountered in and through a body composed of innumerable parts, which are 
replaced like flowing grains of sand by the soul (God as Geist).  And though the same 
organic ontology accounts for the presencing of reality in all human minds, the precise 
reality revealed changes with shifting circumstances and so knowledge of it cannot be 
justified by any universal a priori framework.   
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Chapter Three 
!!! 
Organic Nonclosure in Novalis' Fichte Studien 
 
 
  Chapter Two detailed an intellectual-historical alternative to the "false dilemma" 
of Novalis scholarship, or the supposed mutual exclusivity of "organicism" and 
"nonclosure" in Novalis' thought.  We showed that two other figures of the post-Kantian 
philosophical scene — Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi and Johann Gottfried Herder — argued 
influentially for the right to draw far-reaching ontological conclusions from the 
perspectivality of a "Kantian" representational consciousness, at the same time that they 
denied that being could be articulated in the logical terms required for a closed system of 
knowledge.  We showed that Jacobi paved the road from Kant back to being (largely in 
spite of himself), and that Herder popularized a specifically organicist notion of that 
being.  The fact that we only ever experience our subjectivity at the same time as we 
experience objects outside of us (Jacobi) implies that the Kantian faculties of 
understanding and sensibility are mutually fulfilling — i.e., they are capacities actualized 
as themselves upon their relation; this organic relation of the conditions of our 
consciousness implies that consciousness comes into being as a byproduct of the coming-
into-being of being (Herder).  Kant's phenomenal realm becomes the byproduct of the 
activity of the noumenal realm, and more specifically, it is the revelation, in space and 
time, of the panentheistic, organismic God.  Yet even though the ground of consciousness 
can be known to be this God whose creative self-reflection conditions both the identity 
and the difference of subject and object in our consciousness, nonetheless God's being 
cannot be taken as an object of consciousness, such that the certainty of our knowledge 
claims could be secured by deduction from his absolute ground.  What prevents this ! "$(!
closure is that our receptive intellect cannot become immediate with God's creative 
intellect in any way except as the nondiscursive "opening" or revelation that is Dasein: 
the reflective synthesis of sensations, i.e., our private sphere of consciousness as lived 
experience.  This reconciliation of a panentheistic ontology with an anti-foundationalist 
epistemology is the philosophy of "organic nonclosure." 
  In this Chapter Three, we provide a close reading of Novalis' Fichte Studien
163 in 
order to show that this "organic nonclosure" is precisely Novalis' own stance, too.  In 
other words, even as early as Novalis' first philosophical text, Novalis supports the notion 
of a divine, organismic Absolute that comes to empirical consciousness of itself through 
our finite being.  Jacobi and Herder loom large as intellectual precedents in the text, but 
Novalis mostly formulates his position in tight reaction to Fichte's foundationalism and 
theory of the ego Absolute, or Tathandlung.  While Novalis fundamentally agrees with 
Fichte (both men influenced here by Jacobi) that the personal experience of self-
conscious consciousness entitles the subject to knowledge that our consciousness is the 
appearance of the Absolute, he believes that Fichte has been deceived — by a necessary 
illusion of the divine Absolute's self-instantiation — into believing that the underlying 
being is the human subject.  In his correction of Fichte's deception, Novalis demonstrates 
that the Absolute can in fact only be negatively approached in philosophy; contra Fichte, 
the Absolute cannot form a self-evident foundation from which a system of knowledge 
could be deduced and so secure the claims of empirical science with finality.  Instead, 
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Novalis suggests a more modest theory of truth: because we have a right to knowledge 
that God conditions human consciousness of objects, the efforts of empirical science are 
indeed not in vain (solipsism is not a danger for the human knower); but there can be no 
final surety of any given claim about the world.  The only available option to finite 
knowers such as ourselves is the endless attempt at the coherence of empirical 
observations, a process that can never know when it has reached the finish.  In short, 
Novalis' position in the Fichte Studien is "organic nonclosure": our consciousness inheres 
in God's being and so our scientific investigation of the world can take place in the good 
faith that it indeed reveals being, but God's being cannot be incorporated into a system of 
knowledge that would ever allow us to know that science has come to an end. 
 
I.  "Bewußtseyn ist ein Seyn außer dem Seyn im Seyn": Novalis' Organicism 
 
  In his Fichte Studien, Novalis examines self-conscious consciousness and so joins 
philosophers from Descartes to Kant in orienting the task of philosophy — the defense of 
empirical knowledge — in the knowledge one can have of oneself.  Novalis 
fundamentally agrees with Kant that human consciousness is discursive, i.e., the synthetic 
product of understanding and sensibility.  But unlike Kant, who asked about the 
conditions of self-conscious consciousness in general (his was a transcendental reflection 
upon what is required for any consciousness that can say of its content that it is "mine"), 
Novalis follows the lead of Fichte and Jacobi in examining the private and lived 
experience of consciousness — consciousness considered as in fact mine.  Another way 
of putting this point is that, while Kant was concerned with any consciousness that can be ! "$*!
accompanied by an "I think," Novalis is concerned with immediacy, the actual experience 
of self-conscious consciousness.  Hence when Novalis speaks of Kant's two conditions of 
consciousness, understanding and sensibility, he describes them instead in the 
phenomenological terms of "Reflexion" and "Gefühl," or the synthesizing perspective of 
the I and the intimately connected, sensuous material synthesized in the I.   
  One of Novalis' keystone ideas is that human beings do not experience feeling and 
reflection separately, but rather that our experience is their inextricable unity.  "Gefühl 
und Reflexion bewirken zusammen die Anschauung." (#16)  More specifically, what 
Novalis describes of the firsthand experience of consciousness is that the unity of feeling 
and reflection forms a boundary around our possible experience, such that all 
consciousness we ever have is a reflected sensation, a "unifying third": "Gefühl und 
Reflexion bewirken zusammen die Anschauung.  Es ist das vereinigende Dritte — das 
aber nicht in die Reflexion und das Gefühl kommen kann." (#16)  Sometimes he uses the 
term "sphere" for the boundedness of consciousness, of which reflection and feeling are 
constitutive halves, as he writes in fragment #17 ("Reflexion" is "Hälfte einer Sfäre," 
where "Die Sfäre ist der Mensch" and the other "Hälfte ist das Gefühl").  We find 
ourselves always already inside the enclosed "Sfäre" of reflected sensation, or sensations 
unified into our singular perspective, and so we find ourselves thrown beyond the original 
act of the relation of sensations to each other that is the "Muttersfäre" that gives birth to 
our consciousness: "Warum wir [die erste Handlung] nicht gewahr werden — weil sie 
das Gewahrwerden erst möglich macht, und folglich dis in ihrer Sfäre liegt — die 
Handlung des Gewahrwerdens kann ja also nicht aus ihrer Sfäre herausgehen und die ! "%+!
Muttersfäre mitfassen wollen." (#1) Part of what it means to be always already within the 
sphere of self-conscious consciousness is that the origin of our consciousness is lost to us. 
  Thanks to the bounded quality of our consciousness, according to Novalis, the "I" 
can only ever experience objects within its own private perspective, which is to say, 
insofar as its understanding is actualized in feeling, its existential touchstone.  I cannot 
experience your perspective because I am not in your being ("Weil das Ich ein 
durchgehends bestimmtes ist, so kann es den allgemeinen Gehalt nur in sich erkennen... 
Wissen, als eine Bestimmung, kann es ihn nicht, denn sonst müßte er in ihm seyn", #1).  
Nor can I hope to analyze concepts independently of my empirical experience of them 
and still make valid claims about the world ("Die Filosofie soll nicht mehr antworten, als 
sie gefragt wird.  Hervorbringen kann sie nichts.  Es muß ihr etwas gegeben werden", 
#15).  With these two claims — and especially with the second — Novalis agrees with 
the Kantian limitation of valid knowledge to a possible experience, understood as the 
experience enabled by the understanding's embeddedness in the existential touchstone of 
sensation.  Yet, according to Novalis and in contrast to Kant, even though the sphere of 
consciousness can never witness the original act of reflection of sensation, and so cannot 
hope to grasp its own constitutive synthesis nor to glean universal truths by conceptual 
analysis alone, nonetheless the first-person experience of our thrownness into 
consciousness still does indicate the nature of the original relationship between sensibility 
and understanding that gives rise to our sphere.  Importantly, by working out the 
ontological implications of phenomenology, Novalis shows his participation in a 
distinctly post-Kantian discourse, and so the insights of his Fichte Studien ought not be 
characterized, with Manfred Frank, as a mere "return to Kant," nor should the objectivism ! "%"!
of his notion of reflection be characterized as a merely retrograde affinity for Platonism, 
as Frederick Beiser has suggested.   
  To preview Novalis' argument: the "spherical" quality of our consciousness also 
gives us the right to infer the inherence of our consciousness in a higher, self-
conditioning being.  It is the right, in other words, to organic Spinozism or Herderian 
panentheism.  To claim that the I's undeniable self-discovery as always already within a 
sphere of consciousness and beyond its point of origin is to claim that consciousness does 
not emerge until a synthesis of sensations occurs.  Understanding becomes understanding 
in the moment of recognition of itself in sensations given to it, and sensibility becomes 
sensibility in the presentation of its material by the understanding: that is, sensibility and 
understanding must be reciprocally determining or mutually fulfilling, an identity of 
matter and form that are only matter and form in their union with each other, to account 
for the boundedness of immediacy.  This hylomorphism of the two conditions of 
consciousness is significant, because it means that consciousness is an accidental 
byproduct of the coming-into-being of the "Muttersfäre": consciousness is a "mode" or a 
modification of the organic — actively self-creating — substance of the Absolute, which 
Novalis calls a panentheistic God.  Another way Novalis puts the same point is that the 
phenomenal sphere is the appearance of the noumenal sphere, in the sense of the way the 
noumenal sphere appears or reveals itself in and as our mental life.  Sensibility and 
understanding are not Kant's separate, dualistic faculties that unite only mysteriously 
across an unbridgeable divide; rather, the relation of sensations (the existential parts or 
components of consciousness) to each other (i.e., their reflective synthesis into the 
perspective of the I) is directed by the whole that they constitute — being — which ! "%#!
makes empirical consciousness the accident of the self-relation of being, the panentheistic 
being of God, or the whole that precedes the created parts that instantiate his existence as 
creation.  Our mental life is thus the self-awareness of being — and an answer to the 
problem of the knowability of being, or the basic goal of Kantian epistemology.  Again, 
what is so significant about Novalis' contribution to the post-Kantian debate is that he 
claims we have a right to knowledge of the relation of consciousness to absolute being — 
a right, in other words, to the knowability of being or its re-cognizability by our 
understanding — as an implication merely of the self-experience of consciousness as an 
enclosed sphere.  The goal of Chapter Two was to show a discourse of the relationship 
between reflection and being, in the philosophies of Jacobi and Herder, that does not rule 
out knowledge of the nature of being simply because reflection is a division from 
sensuous immediacy with being; our point here is that Novalis too joins in agreement 
with this discourse.  Our thrownness into a bounded sphere of consciousness as reflected 
feeling is itself a relation to the panentheistic or organicist Absolute: it is the relationship 
precisely of thrownness from it.  Textual evidence for this position now follows. 
  The self-experience of the boundedness or "spherical" quality of consciousness by 
itself implies that consciousness is a mode of organic being, according to Novalis, 
because "[d]ie Handlung, daß Ich sich als Ich sezt muß mit der Antithese eines 
unabhängigen Nichtich und der Beziehung auf eine sie umschließende Sfäre verknüpft 
seyn" (#8).  Novalis makes two, related claims to note here.  The first is that the self-
experience of consciousness — the I as immediacy — is only ever the result of the 
understanding's finding itself in a given object (given, as in, not produced by it: 
"Antithese eines unabhängigen Nichtich").  I simply do not have firsthand experience of ! "%$!
myself except as a unity of sensations (Herder made this same point in slightly different 
terms when he said that the soul "in d[em] Körper wie in einem Spiegel ihr selbst 
erkennt"
164).  The second claim to note in this fragment is that it is not possible for the 
understanding to find itself in a given object, unless that object is something in which the 
understanding can find itself, or in other words, unless concept and sensation share 
ontological likeness, a common root in a higher sphere whose relationship to itself 
conditions both the nonreducibility and the unifiability of form and matter ("und der 
Beziehung auf eine sie umschließende Sfäre").  By this "relationship of sphere to itself" is 
meant quite specifically that the sphere as whole directs, and is in turn instantiated by, the 
relationship of the parts to each other; that is, sensations in the synthetic relationship that 
is their reflection into consciousness.  Without this organic grounding, the "sie 
umschließende Sfäre" would not be the relation that conditions immediacy, but rather a 
third party in a tripartite determination that then begs how all three are related.  The 
relation of two functionally distinct yet ontologically identical parts — this identity-in-
difference of concept and percept — could only be grounded by their mutual containment 
in a higher being, or a whole that is constituted by them as parts but that also, in turn, 
relates the parts to each other as parts of its whole, its self-identity as sphere.  Since we 
do, undeniably, find ourselves always already in the sphere of reflected feeling (it is the 
minimal perspective to which even the skeptic would attest), we have a right to the 
inference to the higher sphere and its organic containment of our consciousness: "Der 
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164 Johann Gottfried Herder, quoted in Marion Heinz, Sensualistischer Idealismus (Hamburg: Meiner, 
1994) 124.  Novalis himself actually used the terms Körper and Seele with precisely this Herderian 
conclusion that the actualization of the soul's self-consciousness only occurs in the medium of, or in 
connection with, the body, in Fichte Studien fragments 568 and 637.  He also agrees with Herder about 
"matter" and "spirit" in being (not just body and soul in human being, but matter and spirit in all being) as 
mutually determining aspects in fragment 225. ! "%%!
Mensch fühlt die Grenze die alles für ihn, ihn selbst, umschließt, die erste Handlung; er 
muß sie glauben, so gewiß er alles andre weiß." (#3)   
  Novalis makes this point in several places, including the very first fragment: "Was 
ist Ich? / Absolutes thetisches Vermögen/ Die Sfäre des Ich muß für uns alles 
umschließen.  Als Selbst Gehalt kann es Gehalt erkennen.  Das Erkennen deutet auf sein 
Ichseyn." (#1)  The "I" is a capacity for bringing an object to self-conscious 
consciousness (it's an "absolutes thetisches Vermögen"), and is capable of recognizing 
itself in the given material because its capacity is "contained" in, or enabled by, a being 
of which it too is content, which is to say, for the very reason that the I is ontologically 
the same as its object, namely that they are related to each other by their inherence in a 
higher being, the I can re-cognize itself in the other ("als Selbst Gehalt kann es Gehalt 
erkennen").  The mere fact that the I finds itself always already in the sphere of subject-
objectivity that encloses all possible experience for it is by itself justification enough to 
infer that the I is the product of a higher being, even while the ground is not itself an 
object for the I ("Die Sfäre muß für uns alles umschließen").    
  Essentially Novalis utilizes Kant's limitation (that knowledge must be restricted to 
valid empirical experience) to infer the conditioning that gives rise to the very experience 
that empirical consciousness has of itself as limited.  Novalis does not claim to take the 
underlying being itself literally as an object of consciousness (the way that we are 
conscious of objects like a "computer" or "desk," for example), but rather to infer its 
organic nature from the very fact that consciousness cannot take its origin as an object: 
"[Das] Ich [ist] im Grunde nichts — Es muß ihm alles Gegeben werden — Aber es kann 
nur ihm etwas gegeben werden und das Gegebene wird nur durch Ich etwas... Dis hellt 
auch die Materie von Deductionen a priori auf.  Was dem Ich nicht gegeben ist, das kann ! "%&!
es nicht aus sich deduciren — aber mit dem Gegebenseyn tritt auch seine Befugniß und 
Macht ein, dasselbe zu deduciren."  (#568) 
 
If the I can only become self-conscious in its union with an object that must be given to 
it, and can become immediate with no object — including itself — except in that relation, 
then the empirical I must also acknowledge that it is only by virtue of a higher reflection 
that organically contains both the I and the object in its self-relation that the I finds itself 
in fact always already empirically self-conscious.  Because the I does in fact find itself 
thrown into empirical, self-conscious consciousness, it has the right to deduce that its 
undeniable thrownness is indeed a product of a higher being's self-relation, precisely 
because it could not find itself existing in the sphere of empirical consciousness without 
that higher "Muttersfäre."  
  So, without leaving the sphere of the I and the empirical knowledge that it marks 
as valid within its boundary ("wir sind hier noch nicht transcendent, sondern im Ich und 
für das Ich," #3), Novalis is able to make an inferential leap to knowledge of an ontology 
previously unavailable to Kant's system.  His notion of the inherence of consciousness in 
a higher being is an organic version of Spinozistic monism.  The I's finding itself always 
already in consciousness implies that an actively self-conditioning being lies at the root 
of empirical consciousness and enables that the understanding even can re-cognize itself 
in the opposed object.  This "Muttersfäre" brings itself into being, and its absolute self-
realization, which is an ongoing activity of self-materialization of its own form ("Was Ist 
— ist durch die Thätigkeit," #303), produces an "accident" or byproduct of 
consciousness, just like Socrates' tan is an accident of his underlying human being:  
"[D]as Absolute, wie ich das Ursprünglich Idealreale oder realideale nennen will, 
[erscheint] als Accidens..." (#17).  That is, by becoming substance — by becoming finite ! "%'!
or existing, by becoming being — in its act of self-realization or self-instantiation by the 
parts that constitute it as whole, the Absolute unites form and matter as nonreducible, 
mutually determining elements of existence.  Consciousness is an immediate product of 
this relation, and so an embeddedness as byproduct or "accident" of the substance of the 
Absolute: 
"Gefühl und Reflexion bewirken zusammen die Anschauung.  Es ist das vereinigende 
Dritte — das aber nicht in die Reflexion und [das] Gefühl kommen kann — da die 
Substanz nie ins Accidens kriechen kann, die Synthese nie ganz in der These und 
Antithese erscheinen.  So entsteht ein Object aus Wechselwirkung 2er Nichtobjecte." 
(#16) 
 
By "Nichtobjecte," Novalis means the form and matter of the understanding and 
sensibility ("Gefühl ist Stoff im Ich — Reflexion Form im Ich," #27) considered as 
independent, and thus not yet existants, because not yet actualized by the self-realization 
of the underlying being of the Absolute.  Once this Absolute brings being into being by 
its own act of self-realization, or self-materialization of its form, then consciousness (i.e., 
reflected feeling, substantiated form) emerges as the simultaneous self-experience of this 
being: the mental or internal aspect or mode of its becoming-finite.  In short, our 
consciousness is the way that the Absolute appears in finite form.  The phenomenal realm 
is conditioned by the noumenal realm, and the phenomenal is the appearance of the 
noumenal; Kant's "transcendental" conditions have become, in Novalis' reading, also the 
"transcendent" conditions whose becoming-immanent gives rise to our empirical 
consciousness. 
  Novalis also claims that the self-instantiation of the Absolute, or the becoming-
immanent of its transcendent form, conditions our consciousness as the byproduct of its 
becoming finite in fragment #25.  The fragment reads: ! "%(!
"Nachzuholen möchte noch seyn — daß die Urhandlung mit sich selbst in 
Wechselwirkung steht.  Ihre relativ erste Handlung, ihre relative Konstituirung, ist 
ursprünglich die zweyte, ihre relativ 2te Handlung, das Fortschreiten zum Was, 
ursprünglich die erste Handlung.  Leztere ist ursprünglich absolute, Erstere relativ 
absolut... Was ihm die Beschränkung durch sich selbst gleichsam zur Natur macht, das 
Absolute Ich, von diesem derivirt sich beydes, das Abhängige und durch sich selbst 
Beschränkte — Es ist das Eigentliche Unabhängige und Unbeschränkte." 
 
The Urhandlung or "original act" is the self-instantiation or self-materialization of the 
Absolute's immaterial form, whereby it becomes a finite being.  Because the original act 
is the finitization of the infinite, Novalis describes it as having two sides or moments — 
the "first" and "second" acts — which refer to the infinite-becoming-finite and the 
infinite-become-finite, respectively: a subtle difference meant to capture that finite being 
is produced by an ongoing activity of the self-finitization of the infinite.  "Was ihm die 
Beschränkung durch sich selbst gleichsam zur Natur macht, das Absolute Ich, von diesem 
derivirt sich beydes, das Abhängige und durch sich selbst Beschränkte — Es ist das 
Eigentliche Unabhängige und Unbeschränkte."  Here Novalis calls that infinite the 
"absolute I," but his point (an argument that will become even clearer when we address 
Novalis' criticism of Fichte below) is that the truly absolute "I" can only be the divine 
ego: self-finitization occurs because the Absolute can create that of which it thinks, so 
that an Absolute self-reflection is a self-materialization, a true "intellectual intuition" in 
the sense of a creative immediacy of form and matter. 
  So just as much as Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte, Herder is a key intellectual ingredient 
of the Fichte Studien.  Novalis does not mention Herder by name in the Fichte Studien 
(neither does he mention Jacobi, and only rarely even Fichte or Kant); indeed, his most 
programmatic statement explicitly gives himself credit for his Absolute: "Spinotza stieg 
bis zur Natur — Fichte bis zum Ich, oder der Person.  Ich bis zur These Gott." (#151)  ! "%)!
Nonetheless, many of Novalis' formulations of God's ontology and of God's organic 
relation to creation would have been famously familiar in Novalis' day from Herder's 
Gott, einige Gespräche (1787).  One of the reasons that the details of Herder's influence 
in the Fichte Studien is not presently more acknowledged is that it contradicts Manfred 
Frank's dominant reading that the Absolute is a merely regulative concept.  But far too 
many fragments in the Fichte Studien are made without any qualification that even could 
be interpreted, with Manfred Frank, as a regulative diminution of the ontological 
commitment to God's existence
165; indeed, Novalis most often speaks of God in the 
Fichte Studien with palpable reverence, not epistemological restraint.   
  Novalis agrees with Herder that the Absolute is the panentheistic God, an 
organismic version of Spinoza's divine being, and that consciousness is the modal 
byproduct of the infinite God's becoming finite as creation.  God is the self-creating 
ground of created existence, which makes him the whole that is actualized by the very 
parts that he creates (God exists by means of his creation) and the ongoing sustenance of 
created life, its immanent spirit: "These ist in der Monadik — Gott schlechthin allein.  
Antithese — Gott als Schöpfer.  Synthese — Immanentschaffende Gottheit." (#192)  
Created being is life, an ongoing activity, because only as eternal change can finite 
existence be a material approximation of the infinite and transcendent God: "Seyn ist 
Schweben" (#556); "Gott ist die unendliche Thätigkeit... Was Ist — ist durch die 
Thätigkeit." (#303)  God is the soul of the world (#567 and 568), and the world is his 
body, just like finite organisms are material parts put together by and in service of their 
immaterial souls: "Gott und Welt — wie Materie und Geist." (#453)  But unlike the finite 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
165 This specific interpretive issue (regulative vs. positive concept) will be addressed below, in the section 
about Novalis' ex negativo deduction. ! "%*!
organism, God is the only organismic being that, as Herder claimed, can truly say "I" in 
the sense of a being who is the creative subject of its own thoughts, the true immediacy of 
thinking and being: "Gott ist Ich. /Unendlichkeit — Allheit in der Theilbarkeit." (#54)  
Novalis also sketches his agreement with Herder's philosophy of nature, writing: "Die 
transscendente Natur ist zugleich immanent — so auch die immanente Person ist 
transscendent zugleich — und auch umgekehrt... Sie sind wie Eine Linie.  Her ist sie das 
Bild der Natur — hin das Bild des Ich." (#153)  This statement echoes Herder's thesis in 
Gott, einige Gespräche that nature and consciousness are aspects of God's being in an 
ascending hierarchy or chain of being that becomes more and more spiritually advanced, 
with the human being at the apex of finite beings.  This Herderian philosophy of nature is 
intrinsic to the philosophy of mind that we have been detailing in the Fichte Studien thus 
far.  Novalis writes, "Unsre Natur ist immanent — unsre Reflexion transscendent.  Gott 
sind wir — als Individuum denken wir" (#218): our consciousness is a byproduct of 
God's self-instantiation by means of his creative self-reflection, so that our sensation, the 
existential touchstone of our consciousness (and as an embodied capacity, the existential 
touchstone of our whole being), is our unity with God insofar as he is self-created matter, 
and our reflection, or the capacity to bring that sensation to imagistic consciousness, is 
our unity with God insofar as he is self-creating form.  "Wir sind, wir leben, wir denken 
in Gott." (#462) 
  This panentheism need not necessarily diminish the "Kantian" limitation of 
thought to sensation.  One of the main theses of this dissertation is that we must read 
Novalis' famous fragment, "Das Bewußtseyn ist ein Seyn außer dem Seyn im Seyn," in 
the pious mindset of a Herderian panentheist in order to appreciate its multiple layers of ! "&+!
meaning, rather than read it as a statement of epistemic limitation alone; this one line 
expresses both the limitations of our representational thinking and the conditioning of 
that thinking by the inherence of our being in God's being.  By adding brackets to the 
fragment, we can graphically indicate its polysemy: consciousness is a [being outside of] 
[being within being], or a [reflection] of [feeling] and therefore a bounded sphere that can 
know nothing but itself; at the same time — a simultaneity performed by the polysemy of 
the fragment — consciousness is a [being outside of being] [within being], or [the closed 
sphere of consciousness] [conditioned by the identity of being].  In short, consciousness 
is a "being outside of being within being" because it is a thrownness into the world by 
God's own becoming-immanent.  It is especially astonishing that Novalis arrived at a 
Herderian, organismic God by inference from the self-experience of bounded 
consciousness years before Herder offered the same vein of response to Kant in his 
Metakritik of 1799.  Herder's metacritique was indeed consistent with the psychology of 
knowledge that he had publically propounded for decades (i.e., the human being is a 
"Kraft" or living force that is simultaneously being and consciousness of being); but 
Herder himself did not see the argument from immediacy to panentheism until after 
Novalis did.  (That said, we do not mean to argue for Novalis' direct influence on Herder, 
since the Fichte Studien were of course never published.) 
  Thus far, this reading of Novalis distinguishes itself significantly from Manfred 
Frank's.  Frank argued that Novalis' philosophy was a hybrid of Jacobi's monist notion 
Being, or identity in a thoroughly Parmenidean rather than organic sense, and Kant's 
notion of judgment, or the discursive synthesis of a priori concept and sensuous matter.  
Novalis believed that Kant required that sensation (feeling) be a nondiscursive ! "&"!
immediacy of the self with Being; upon the reflection of that feeling by the 
understanding, consciousness separates itself from identity with Being and presents an 
illusory world of difference (between objects and between subject and object) in the 
sphere of consciousness.  Consciousness thus cannot hope to take its point of immediacy 
with Being as an object; instead, all philosophy can do is correct the "ordo inversus" that 
reflection presents to consciousness, namely the seeming priority of the I as a Fichtean 
ego, after which correction we merely understand that the I is not "master of its own 
house."  More than this, we cannot know.  The "Absolute" is then a merely regulative 
idea for Novalis, or the way the human understanding must think about its condition by 
virtue of its own cognitive nature as perception by means of division of identity.  The 
Absolute is an "Unding" in the sense of an "absurdity," something that doesn't exist and 
shouldn't be pursued philosophically with any goal of actually reaching it within thought 
(though thought will be compelled by its own tendencies to seek it nonetheless, and its 
approach will necessarily be endless, because impossible: an "unendliche Annäherung," 
as Frank titled his work).  My reading of Novalis, in contrast, argues that the reflection of 
feeling — the standing of the I's perspective over and against a sensuous immediacy with 
being in which that perspective recognizes and so actualizes consciousness of being — is 
warrant for the inference to a sphere of self-conditioning being or the Absolute, even as 
we are also thrown beyond the Absolute in the realm of phenomenal appearance.  The 
Absolute is indeed an "Unding," but not as an "absurdity"; rather it is that which, in itself 
or prior to its self-actualization, is not a thing, infinite rather than finite.  Its becoming a 
thing produces our consciousness and thereby is lost to us as an original transcendence.  
We can nicely summarize the difference with Frank with our different interpretations of ! "&#!
the fragment "Bewußtseyn ist ein Seyn außer dem Seyn im Seyn."  While Frank only sees 
one level of this fragment — namely that consciousness arises from a reflection or 
standing outside (Seyn außer) the immediacy of feeling with being (Seyn im Seyn), and 
so is cut off from immediacy — this dissertation both acknowledges this level and the 
other layer, which claims that this sphere of reflected feeling is conditioned by its 
containment in being, "im Seyn." Because he failed to acknowledge this polysemy, Frank 
could not see that precisely the reflective division that separates consciousness from its 
absolute ground and "throws" it into the sphere of empirical finitude is an absolute self-
reflection, God's becoming immanent as creation, and that thrownness is itself a relation 
to the Absolute for Novalis. 
 
II.  Novalis' Metacritique of Fichte  
  
  Fichte, too, supported the notion of an absolute being that conditions empirical 
consciousness, and specifically an absolute being that is a self-reflectively self-
constituting activity (which can also be called "organic" insofar as its whole directs and is 
put together from the relationship of its parts).  Just as influenced by Jacobi's reading of 
Kant as Novalis was, Fichte too saw himself as inferring this Absolute from the 
standpoint of the empirical self-awareness of consciousness.  But in contrast to Novalis, 
Fichte's Absolute is not God, but the human ego.  Fichte calls the "Ich" the Tathandlung, 
an absolutely free activity of self-reflection, and the self-creation of a subject-objectivity 
that, through its self-reflection, sets up an a priori self-given I that becomes empirically 
self-conscious upon sensuous affection by the outside world.  Now, if they shared so ! "&$!
many methodological instincts, then why does Novalis reject Fichte's Absolute in his 
Fichte Studien?  In the reading that follows, Novalis' argument against Fichte is that the 
human understanding, which must be dependent in its role within consciousness on a 
sensory matter that is given to it, cannot set up any consciousness by means of itself 
alone.  Novalis shows that, wherever Fichte believes to have indicated that the underlying 
being is a representational knower that can take itself as object, invariably his derivation 
actually ends up obscuring the ontological contribution of sense-matter by attributing its 
materialization to the formal activity of the understanding in the I alone.  In various ways, 
Fichte mistakes the understanding for the complex of understanding and sensation, form 
and matter.  Fichte's derivations therefore fail as inferences to being, and the self he 
"reveals" in not the ground of consciousness, according to Novalis.  Thus Novalis offers 
his own "metacritique" of Fichte's metacritique of Kant, by questioning of the validity of 
Fichte's inference to the being that conditions Kantian judgment. 
  Fichte understood himself to deduce the underlying being that gives rise to 
consciousness by seeking the condition of the self-experience of our empirical 
consciousness.  This project of locating the ground in being could proceed in any number 
of ways, but Fichte chooses (in the first versions of his Wissenschaftslehre) to take a law 
that is unquestionably certain — the law of identity, or "A is A" — and then ask, in what 
does its undeniability consist, what makes this law true for us, in short, what is the 
necessary condition of its undeniability?  Because of the particular undeniability of the 
law for our human consciousness, the condition of the undeniability should be the being 
that underlies our consciousness, according to Fichte.  Now, the point of "A is A" is that 
the "A" could be any thing; the truthfulness of the law does not stem from the object that ! "&%!
is claimed to be self-identical.  The law "A is A" is really the assertion of the absolute 
truth of the equation of A(1) and A(2), or the copula or bond "is," as in, some object "is 
itself."  More precisely, then, Fichte seeks the condition of the copula in order to find the 
being that conditions the undeniability of the law of identity.  Fichte then claims that it is 
only for a consistent standpoint that any given object can be consistently equated with 
itself; so, the condition of the copula must be the ego's representational capacity or 
capacity for synthetic, conceptual understanding that joins matter or sensations together.  
In other words, the absolute conditioning being of the certainty of "A is A" is reflection 
as being, which is to say, the unconditional self-positing or self-affirmation of the "I."  
The I is an "intellectual intuition," or a subject of and object to itself, an "I am I" that, in 
its self-reflection, conditions its own being and so conditions the standpoint whose 
affection by external objects, in what Fichte calls "feeling," gives rise to our empirical 
consciousness of objects, such as the consciousness that "A" is also an enduring, self-
identical thing. 
  Novalis agrees in principle with deducing being as the conditioning origin of the 
self-experience of consciousness.  Both Novalis and Fichte have been influenced by 
Jacobi's reading of Kant to believe that the inference to being is justifiable, because it is 
an inference to the conditions of the experience that consciousness has of itself.  But he 
does not agree that Fichte has successfully carried out this deduction, and therefore 
believes that Fichte has not successfully identified the nature of the absolute ground of 
consciousness. The problem with Fichte's deduction from "A is A," Novalis argues, is 
that it has not actually taken its bearings from the self-experience of empirical 
consciousness.  In the very first lines of his first fragment, Novalis writes that the law "A ! "&&!
is A" is a merely formal indication of identity, "ein philosophischer Parallelismus" that 
operates by the logical (but not ontological) rules of "Setzen, Unterscheiden und 
verbinden."  The law indicates the matter or the particularity of any given "A" with these 
relations — i.e., with the relations of form to itself alone — and so the ontological 
nonreducibility of matter to form, sense to concept, is precisely what is obscured by the 
analysis of "A is A" as if it were an empirical experience.  In "A ist A," the copula ("is") 
is not the actual matter of A, but rather the merely propositional relation of A(1) to A(2), 
so that the "to itself" of the law's relation of form to itself seems to be matter, but is not: 
the actual matter of A must be given to form in what Jacobi called a "Geschehen" and to 
which Novalis here refers in his comment, "was geschieht." (#1)  Hence his conclusion 
that "A is A" is a "Scheinsatz" or illusory proposition. (#1)  In thinking that the matter is 
explained by (what is here really) the relation of form to itself, Fichte only mistakes the 
relations within the law of identity for the relations of being.  According to Novalis, 
Fichte has fallen prey to the very cardinal sin against which his whole post-Kantian 
generation warned in unison.  He has effectively claimed to know the movement of 
concepts in abstraction from their sensuous instantiation, and so ends up misattributing 
the partner-role of sensuous matter to the logical relations necessitated by conceptual 
form alone.   
  Novalis continues this line of argument against Fichte in fragments #3 and #15, in 
which he discusses the phenomenological and the methodological aspects of Fichte's 
mistake, respectively.  Fragment #3 states: 
"Wenn nun der allgemeine Gehalt nur im Ich wäre, so könnte man das bestimmte Seyn 
nicht dem Nur Seyn entgegensetzen?  Der Glauben zwingt uns auch nur diese 
Scheingegensetzung vorzunehmen, zu der wir allerdings im thetischen Vermögen die 
Kraft besitzen.  /So wechselt das Denken und d[as] Fühlen die Rolle des Subjectiven und ! "&'!
Objectiven./ An dem Nur Seyn haftet gar keine Modifikation, kein Begriff — man kann 
ihn nichts entgegensetzen... Um das Ich zu bestimmen müssen wir es auf etwas beziehn.  
Beziehn geschieht durch Unterscheiden — beydes durch These einer absoluten Sfäre der 
Existenz." 
 
Here Novalis repeats the Kantian injunction that the I must only become empirically self-
aware as a result of the synthetic unity of the understanding and sensibility ("Um das Ich 
zu bestimmen müssen wir es auf etwas beziehn. Beziehn geschieht durch 
Unterscheiden"), because only such a dependent notion of self-consciousness upholds the 
representationality of human judgment.  Fichte believes that he, too, upholds this 
limitation by proposing an original immediacy of self that becomes empirically or 
actually self-conscious only upon affection by something outside the I.  But in the above 
fragment, Novalis essentially wonders: how are we even to understand an immediacy that 
is not actualized or empirical, given that there should be no awareness, no subject-object 
relation at all, without true opposition of self and other?  Given that determined being for 
Fichte is only in the I ("Wenn nun der allgemeine Gehalt nur im Ich wäre"), what is 
outside the I would then have to be "chaos" in the sense of undetermined being ("Nur 
Seyn"), and then, on the rule that the I must emerge from "Beziehn," the opposition 
between chaos and determination would have to give rise to the empirical self-awareness 
of the I.  But Novalis notes that chaos is not consciously objectifiable, because it is not 
something to which we can affix a concept or "Modifikation"; so Fichte has not 
succeeded in describing the original relation of the I to the external object that underlies 
the sphere of our empirical consciousness.  In essence Fichte has abstracted to the 
immediacy that he should have started from — a mistake that is subjectively easy to 
make, given that "das Denken und d[as] Fühlen [wechselt] die Rolle des Subjectiven und 
Objectiven": the existential or objective touchstone of thought is in fact sensation, not ! "&(!
thought by itself — but the subjectification of sensation by thought makes it seem, to 
itself, that it is an independent immediacy unto itself, a self-giving being.  This fragment, 
in other words, is the phenomenological version of Novalis' above critique of Fichte, 
which is that Fichte mistakes the dependence of form on matter for the dependence of 
form on itself, or in other words, mistakes the logical for the ontological.  Subjectively or 
phenomenologically speaking, I do indeed find myself in a sphere of objects given to my 
perspective, but it is a Fichtean mistake to believe that this experience — this givenness 
of objects to me — indicates the ontological priority and independence of the being of my 
I. 
  Fragment #15 discusses Fichte's same confusion of the relations of logic for 
ontology, only now from the methodological angle of Fichte's attempted metacritique of 
critical knowledge.  Again, Fichte hoped to secure the knowledge of knowledge — the 
Wissenschaftlehre — by deriving Kant's system from the self as Tathandlung, which 
should be revealed in a reflection upon the lived experience of self-awareness.  Novalis 
summarizes Fichte's method in fragment #15: "Nun wird sie ['die Filosofie'] 
Selbstbetrachtung seyn.  Ey!  wie fängt es der Lernende an sich selbst in dieser Operation 
zu belauschen" (later in the updated Wissenschaftslehre novo methodo, Fichte would state 
his position similarly: "die WißenschaftsLehre fordert jeden auf, zu überlegen, was er 
thut, in dem er sagt: Ich"
166).  Of course, we have argued extensively that Novalis 
supports the orientation of a philosophy of knowledge in the self-experience of 
consciousness.  He does not disagree with Fichte's general methodology of "self-
observation," but rather with its presumption that what the self-experience of 
consciousness intuits is — or even could be — the self as ground.  According to Fichte, 
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when consciousness reflects upon itself, it encounters a medium of conscious objects that 
must be the self, understood as an original thinking-that-thinks-itself.  This inference to 
the self as "intellectual intuition" or Tathandlung is necessary, Fichte claims, because the 
self-experience of consciousness is both immediate (a nonreducible thrownness into its 
own position) and thought (intellection).  But Novalis counters that the "self" is precisely 
not what this self-experiencing medium could be.  All consciousness is always already 
beyond the synthetic act that conditions it: "Die Filosofie ist aber selbst im Lernenden."  
Ex hypothesi, the synthetic act — what Novalis here calls "lernen" — operates by an 
impression of a distinct object upon our otherwise empty capacity to represent it, after 
which impression, self-conscious consciousness arises: "unter lernen verstehn wir 
überhaupt nichts, als den Gegenstand anschauen und ihn mit seinen Merckmalen uns 
einprägen."  So Fichte's claim (that what self-reflection "learns" is the self as medium of 
all consciousness) unfeasibly requires that, in the underlying synthesis, the self-as-learner 
impresses the self-as-object upon itself, i.e., impossibly separates itself from itself to take 
itself as object again.  "Es [das Ich] würde also wieder ein Gegenstand."  Novalis 
concludes that the self cannot be what we intuit immediately when experience reflects 
upon itself and is aware of a consistent medium or vehicle of the objects of our 
consciousness: "Nein Selbstbetrachtung kann sie nicht seyn, denn sonst wäre sie nicht das 
Verlangte."  Fragment #15 is the methodological version of Novalis' critique of Fichte in 
fragment #1.  The self-experience of empirical consciousness does not reveal the self as 
its conditioning being, because that would require, impossibly, that re-presentation can 
intuit itself, or in other words that an empty form can become, impossibly, a "Dasein" by 
somehow taking itself as matter.  By inferring the self as the ground of the self-! "&*!
experience of consciousness, Fichte has effectively mistaken the activity of inferring 
itself, i.e., the merely formal side of seeking the conditions of experience — metacritique 
— for the whole condition of consciousness: the seeking finds itself and mistakes the 
ground for a seeking-that-finds-itself, an impossible subject-objectivity. 
  Chapter One showed that all the reviewed scholars of Novalis' Fichte Studien 
concurred, in spite of their otherwise very different interpretations of his text, that 
Novalis disagrees with Fichte's Absolute as ego.  The present reading is no different in 
this respect: it too agrees that Novalis denies the condition of empirical consciousness 
could be an act of self-reflection by a representational thinker that takes itself as object 
and so sets up the self as the medium of empirical consciousness of objects.  But this 
dissertation disagrees with other readings on the precise terms of Novalis' rejection of 
Fichte.  The central dividing issue is Novalis' stance on what can be inferred from the 
experience that consciousness has of itself.  The dividing issue, to put it in discourse 
terms, is how Novalis appropriates the Jacobian insight that the experience of subjectivity 
simultaneously with objectivity implies that consciousness is immediate with being. 
   To review, Benjamin and Haering both suggested that, according to Novalis, self-
reflection is the knowledge that consciousness inheres in a pantheistic Absolute, in 
Benjamin's reading because Novalis conceived the "form of form" of self-knowledge to 
be an infinitely filled network, rather than infinite regress, and in Haering's reading 
because Novalis developed a dialectical philosophy, or dialectical convergence of human 
and Absolute thinking (i.e., a philosophy of closure), even before Hegel did.  In other 
words, both Benjamin and Haering attributed an organic, pantheistic notion of the 
Absolute to Novalis, because they saw Novalis as rejecting Fichte's human ego in favor ! "'+!
of a divine ego that reflects upon itself, thereby producing our consciousness as its 
immediate byproduct.  But later scholars like von Molnár, Frank and Kennedy rejected 
these earlier readings for not properly recognizing that Novalis never described the 
immediacy that the self has with itself in terms of "reflection," but rather as "feeling," or 
a non-conceptual, sensuous immediacy with being, which cannot become an object to 
itself and so acts as an absolute limit to the knowledge that consciousness can have of its 
ground.  Since consciousness arises as reflection upon — understood by each of these 
later readings as a division from — felt immediacy with being, consciousness is a realm 
forever beyond its origin, and the proposal of an origin in divine being is its merely 
regulative explanation for a limitedness that it cannot explain.  According to Frank, 
Novalis understands Jacobian notion of consciousness as "feeling" as precisely this 
inexplicable limitedness of consciousness.  The Absolute is not a pantheistic God for 
Novalis; it does not even knowably exist — it is an "Unding," or an absurdity, Frank 
claims.  Novalis' rejection of Fichte is then a rejection of Absolutes and absolute 
grounding tout cour.  
  In contrast, this dissertation suggests a middle path between these two phases of 
Novalis scholarship.  It is not the deduction of an absolute being from the self-experience 
of consciousness that Novalis denies, but rather the deduction of Fichte's representational 
self as the absolute in particular; our argument has been that Novalis utilizes the 
restriction of consciousness to the sphere of reflected feeling in order to infer that the 
ground of their relation is a creative form, a form that instantiates itself, and therefore 
could not be a dependent form, or representational consciousness.  Reflection is indeed a 
division from the nondiscursive immediacy of feeling, whereby it creates the sphere of ! "'"!
empirical consciousness, but because reflection enacts this division by recognizing itself 
only in feeling, the very dividedness of consciousness from its ground in being is 
simultaneously its right to the knowledge of its thrownness from the self-activity of the 
Absolute.  Thus Novalis joins Fichte (and Herder too, as we saw in Chapter Two) in 
believing that Jacobi's persuasive notion of the phenomenological simultaneity of subject 
and object actually commits him, in spite of himself, to an act of reflection as the 
condition of that simultaneity, so that Jacobi's convincing metacritique of Kant 
necessitates a union of Spinoza and Kant in the form of a single, self-reflectively self-
creating being, the accident of whose self-creativity is our empirical consciousness.  But 
while Fichte believes that he has successfully abstracted to the reflective condition of this 
Jacobian subject-objectivity as human ego, Novalis claims that his inference actually 
mistakes its own formal process for what is really a dependence of that form on a given 
sensuous matter.  That his deduction produced the underlying being as "Ego" is really the 
illusion of an inference that mistakes logic for ontology, just like "A is A" is Scheinsatz 
that only illusorily presents the essence of identity. 
 
III.  Novalis' Alternative Deduction: The Ex Negativo Approach to Panentheistic 
Absolute 
  
  We have just learned that, according to Novalis, the key mistake of Fichte's 
Wissenschaftslehre is that its inference to the being that conditions the sphere of 
empirical consciousness did not actually occur from the standpoint of the reflection of 
feeling that would validate that very inference.  Following the hybrid of Kant and Jacobi ! "'#!
that both Novalis and Fichte accept, knowledge is valid when it orients from an allowable 
experience (consciousness that is the product of a concept actualized in sense matter), and 
the private experience of subject-object simultaneity is the self-experience of our 
conscious immediacy with the being that conditions our consciousness.  Fichte attempted 
to use that self-experience as a platform for a transcendental reflection upon its 
conditions, so as to discover the Absolute; but since Novalis shows that Fichte's inference 
is in fact the operation of reflection in abstraction from its substantiation in sense, the 
deduction is invalid and the ego Tathandlung that Fichte discovers is also not the true 
Absolute.   
  Yet certainly it was not unreasonable of Fichte to believe that he had performed a 
proper deduction.  Even Novalis readily concedes this.
167  After all, it's a fair description 
of our self-experience of consciousness to call it an "Ausgangspunkt,"
168 or an orientation 
within our own perspective in all acts of knowing, which then not unreasonably begs a 
Fichtean inference to the condition of that subject as an original subject-objectivity.  If 
Fichte was doing what Novalis would in principle agree with, namely inferring ontology 
from phenomenology, then what went awry — why did, or more properly how could, 
Fichte's inference effectively get his own phenomenology "wrong"?  That Fichte's self-
experience would still be a mistake, or in other words, that the finite subject's experience 
of itself as "Ausgangspunkt" would be both phenomenologically undeniable and a 
misperception of the Absolute as a human subject, leads Novalis to his next major point 
in the Fichte Studien, and to his own ex negativo deduction of the relationship between 
consciousness and the absolute being that conditions it.  Novalis' major claim is that the 
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168 This is Manfred Frank's term.  See, for example, p. 405 of Unendliche Annäherung (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1997). ! "'$!
revelation of the divine Absolute in and as our perspectival consciousness necessarily 
falsifies the Absolute.  The phenomenal realm, the realm of empirical consciousness, is 
an appearance of the divine in both senses of "appearance": "revelation" and "illusion."  
Insofar as the Absolute appears or becomes finite, it disguises itself, becoming what, in 
itself, it is not, namely finite rather than infinite, immanent rather than transcendent, 
empirical rather than immaterial.  By offering this reading of Novalis' deduction, this 
dissertation distinguishes itself once again from the two past and present waves of 
Novalis scholarship: because Novalis' is an inference from empirical experience to an 
unobjectifiable condition of that experience, Novalis' deduction of the absolute is indeed 
a "negative" approach to it (contra the first wave), but this negative approach is 
nonetheless a positive ontological commitment to the Absolute, rather than the proposal 
of a merely regulative notion of the Absolute in the sense of a merely necessary idea for 
our consciousness and that is itself an ontological "absurdity" (contra the second wave).   
  Novalis' ex negativo deduction is one of the more difficult aspects of his Fichte 
Studien.  It is helpful to approach the issue "backwards," first detailing how Novalis 
believes the organic activity of the Absolute gives rise to what is really the illusion of 
perspectival human consciousness, and next detailing Novalis' defense of the 
philosophical right to make this claim — a defense he makes alongside his metacritique 
of Fichte and often using a polysemy that was once again missed by readers like Manfred 
Frank with significant interpretive consequences. 
  According to Novalis, the self-experience of human consciousness as a 
perspective, or a subject's experience of itself over and against a world of objects given to 
it as outside of it, is itself a function of the divine Absolute as a creative self-reflection ! "'%!
(i.e., a function of its "organicism" or "panentheism").  One of the most direct and stand-
alone statements supporting this claim that the human perspective is an accident of the 
organic self-finitization of the divine is fragment #25 (just after it, in fragment #26, 
Novalis writes in summary-like fashion: "Untersuchung der absoluten Urhandlung"): 
"Nachzuholen möchte noch seyn — daß die Urhandlung mit sich selbst in 
Wechselwirkung steht.  Ihre relativ erste Handlung, ihre relative Konstituirung, ist 
ursprünglich die zweyte, ihre relativ 2te Handlung, das Fortschreiten zum Was, 
ursprünglich die erste Handlung.  Leztere ist ursprünglich absolute, Erstere relativ absolut 
— aber für sie allein muß es umgekehrt seyn.  Der relative Gesichtspunct dreht immer die 
Sache um — Er ist ein Schreiten vom Beschränkt Unbeschränkten zum Unbeschränkt 
Beschränkten, oder vom scheinbar Unbeschränkten/weil es sich selbst beschränkt und 
also keinen Zwang, keine Schranke spürt/zum Scheinbar Anhängigen/nemlich von 
diesem durch sich selbst Beschränkten/Das Abhängige ist nemlich mittelbar durch sich 
selbst abhängig — Das Mittel ist jene Beschränkung durch sich selbst.  In diesem Felde 
ist Täuschung der Einbildungskraft, oder der Reflexion unvermeidlich — in der 
Darstellung — denn man will Nichtreflexion durch Reflexion darstellen und kommt eben 
dadurch nie zur Nichtreflexion hin — man beeifert sich zu demonstriren, daß Schwarz 
Weiß sey./ Was ihm die Beschränkung durch sich selbst gleichsam zur Natur macht, das 
Absolute Ich, von diesem derivirt sich beydes, das Abhängige und durch sich selbst 
Beschränkte — Es ist das Eigentliche Unabhängige und Unbeschränkte." 
 
This fragment was excerpted earlier to demonstrate that Novalis believes that finite being 
is the product of ongoing self-finitization (Beschränkung) by the Absolute (das 
Unbeschränkte).  The "Urhandlung," or the original act of the Absolute by which being 
and consciousness of being come into being, has two sides, the "erste Handlung" and 
"zweite Handlung," which are the infinite-becoming-finite ("das Forschreiten zum Was") 
and the infinite-become-finite ("ihre relative Konstituirung"); Novalis means that all 
existence is an activity perpetuated by the continual movement of the divine from 
transcendence to immanence, from Logos to existence.   
  Now we can additionally see in fragment #25 Novalis' larger argument for why 
that very ongoing activity of self-instantiation by the Absolute also conditions the self-
experience of human consciousness as an Ausgangspunkt on the world (a perspective that ! "'&!
would then be liable to make Fichte's false inference to the Absolute as Tathandlung).  
Thanks to the fact that being is produced by the constant self-finitization of the infinite by 
means of creative self-reflection, there is nothing in existence that isn't a "reflection" of 
the infinite in the sense of a materialized infinite or a "Beschränkt Unbeschränkte."   For 
the "limited unlimited," for our finite being, the divine self-limiting form that is also our 
own capacity for understanding is only ever attached to the Absolute's self-limited matter, 
which is also our sensibility.  Consciousness only arises from that ultimate proximity of 
form and matter conditioned by the organic process of God's becoming finite, and that 
means that it (consciousness) is not immediacy — it is not creative form — but rather the 
product of immediacy.  On the one hand, our origin in the self-limitation of the unlimited 
Absolute explains why the human perspective can be a representational consciousness at 
all, or a subject standing over and against an object, capable of recognizing itself in an 
object at the same time that it stands opposed to it so that it has consciousness of an 
object.  It can, because God's creative intellect is a thinking-as-existence that continually 
ties form to matter in our living being.  And on the other hand, the Absolute's original 
self-limitation also explains why the illusory or falsified perception, from the perspective 
of that finite being, is that it is the point of orientation of being (i.e., as if its finite ego, 
rather than the higher divine ego, were the ground of the appearance of being).  
Reflection in the I is God's reflection, but only insofar as God has become finite, i.e., 
reflection attached to God's self-instantiation in sensation; so when the formal or 
reflective half of the finite ego recognizes itself in the feeling given to it, it reflects an 
infinite creativity, inverting that infinitude and thereby attributing it to itself, so that to the 
finite perspective, infinite creativity seems to come from inside it rather than to be its ! "''!
higher condition.  "In diesem Felde ist Täuschung der Einbildungskraft, oder der 
Reflexion unvermeidlich — in der Darstellung — denn man will Nichtreflexion durch 
Reflexion darstellen und kommt eben dadurch nie zur Nichtreflexion hin."  The reflection 
of infinite self-production results in the appearance to the ego that it is the ground of 
appearance.   
  Fragment #17 is Novalis' other, more succinct formulation of this point: 
"Im Bewußtseyn muß es scheinen, als gienge es vom Beschränkten zum Unbeschränkten, 
weil das Bewußtseyn von sich, als dem Beschränkten ausgehn muß — und diese 
geschieht durchs Gefühl — ohnerachtet das Gefühl, abstract genommen, ein Schreiten 
des Unbeschränkten zum Beschränkten ist — diese umgekehrte Erscheinung ist natürlich.  
Sobald das Absolute, wie ich das Ursprünglich Idealreale oder realideale nennen will, als 
Accidens, oder halb erscheint, so muß es verkehrt erscheinen — das Unbeschränkte wird 
beschränkt et vice versa." 
 
To our human consciousness, it seems that the universe is an unlimited physical space 
and that we are self-given perspectives on it, limited (perhaps unfortunately) by our 
sensory or embodied nature to the merely stepwise empirical exploration of the universe.  
But this appearance, this phenomenology of Dasein, is a necessary inversion of what 
happens at the level of the Absolute to condition our consciousness.  The Absolute is 
infinite mind, infinite Logos or form, whose thought of itself creates itself, i.e., makes 
itself finite, in the ultimate proximity of form and matter in being (and in the "human 
being" specifically, the ultimate proximity of reflection and feeling).  So, "in itself," the 
infinite is not existing or actualized (it is not the physical universe), and "in itself" (i.e., as 
if in abstraction from feeling), the human mind is simply nothing at all: its Dasein, its 
existence as a perspectivality, is not limited by feeling but contingent on feeling, which is 
to say, contingent on a higher being that produces consciousness as an accident of its self-
reflection.  So what we experience is indeed, fundamentally, the Absolute's experience of ! "'(!
itself, but we experience that ontology in mirror image: God's infinitely creative mind is 
representational consciousness in us.  "Diese umgekehrte Erscheinung ist natürlich.  
Sobald das Absolute, wie ich das Ursprünglich Idealreale oder realideale nennen will, als 
Accidens, oder halb erscheint, so muß es verkehrt erscheinen — das Unbeschränkte wird 
beschränkt et vice versa."  Similarly, Novalis writes later in the Fichte Studien: The 
human being "muß Gott völlig correspondieren nur auf eine umgekehrte Art.  Sie ist ein 
Bild des Malers von sich selbst.'" (#188)  Human beings are God's self-portraits, the 
products of his self-reflection, and so in them the capacities of understanding and 
sensibility exist through him but only as a product, not a simultaneity, with his creativity.  
In 1798 and in the Vorarbeiten fragments — that is, in a period scholars typically call 
"organicist" in distinction from the supposedly non-organicist Fichte Studien — Novalis 
likewise writes: "Gott will Götter." (#248)  Creation is God's will, and it is his will that 
humankind be finite instantiations of himself that, for their finitude, merely receive rather 
than create the contents of their consciousness. 
  Note the important simultaneity of three notions of "appearance" in Novalis' 
theory of the Absolute.  As soon as the Absolute creates itself, i.e., substantiates its own 
form and thereby comes into being, so too does consciousness simultaneously arise as the 
reference to being, the self-awareness of being made possible by the union of matter and 
form in that absolute self-creation: reflection of feeling, the I, is a givenness of absolute 
being to itself, whereby it appears.  So consciousness is 1) the "revelation" of the 
Absolute — the coming-to-appearance that is the simultaneity of consciousness and the 
Absolute's coming-into-being — and also 2) the way the Absolute "seems," or appears to 
a standpoint, namely the perspective of self-conscious consciousness created by the ! "')!
Absolute's self-creation, which inversion of creative thinking into representational 
thinking is also its appearance as 3) "illusion," or falsification.  We have already seen 
how Novalis brilliantly summarizes this absolute conditioning of appearance that is 
simultaneously the division of appearance from being with the polysemy of his famous 
fragment #2, which states "Das Bewußtseyn ist ein Seyn außer dem Seyn im Seyn."  The 
immediacy of the Absolute with itself in the act of self-creation — the ultimate proximity 
of form and matter in the causa sui activity of substantiating form — becomes, as soon as 
the form is actually substantiated and the Absolute is revealed in the finite guise of 
reflected feeling, a standpoint of a self over and against a world of objects and only 
capable of recognizing itself in a given object.  In standing against itself, the Absolute 
becomes, in its appearance in consciousness, the polar opposite, even the inversion, of its 
creative intellect.  "Kein Seyn, kein Schein — Kein Schein, kein Seyn — Sie sind die 
Gegensfären der absoluten Gemeinsfäre — die beyden Hälften einer Kugel" (#237)  On 
the one hand, it is only by means of this standing-against that anything can appear to a 
standpoint; and yet on the other hand, precisely for its becoming a standing-against itself, 
or a re-presentation of itself in and as consciousness, the pure and self-creative force of 
the Absolute falsifies its true being in finite appearance.  In the very moment of creating 
itself and creating our consciousness, the Absolute is lost to consciousness as the 
condition always already beyond the point of origin of the empirical sphere.  Our 
consciousness is the "inside-out" of the being of the Absolute: a reflection of feeling, a 
formal standpoint over and against a given material, that is conditioned by the opposite, 
an absolutely creative self-reflection, a form that instantiates itself. ! "'*!
   Having detailed what Novalis means by his thesis that the organic Absolute 
reveals itself as the illusion of the human perspective, we can turn now to Novalis' 
defense of the philosophical right to make this claim.  It might seem that he contravenes 
the Kantian limitation of knowledge to a valid experience (a limitation that he too cares 
to uphold) by speaking at all about the ontology of the Absolute.  But the clue to 
understanding how Novalis claims to describe the Absolute without also permitting that 
consciousness leave its empirical sphere is once again his appeal to the bridge from 
phenomenology to ontology.  We find Novalis' defense of his deduction of the Absolute 
alongside his criticism of Fichte: indeed, the very mechanism of Fichte's deductive 
mistake is, for Novalis, also the key to the correct deduction of the true absolute being 
that underlies consciousness.  Novalis' metacritique of Fichte is simultaneously — a 
simultaneity once again marked by polysemy — an ex negativo deduction of the divine 
rather than human ego.  Thus Novalis does not see himself as contravening Kantian 
restrictions by claiming to know the Absolute as object, but rather sees his argument as 
claiming no more about the Absolute than what is validly inferable as the condition of the 
standpoint of the sphere of empirical consciousness, and more specifically, the condition 
of the sphere of empirical consciousness while it self-reflects in search of its own 
condition.   
  According to Novalis, as we have already seen, we human beings find ourselves 
always already in a sphere of empirical consciousness, which is the limitation of the self-
experience to sensation.  We could only be this limited Dasein if thinking and feeling 
become themselves upon their synthetic union with each other, which is to claim, 
transcendentally, that our sphere of consciousness is an organic product of a higher ! "(+!
reflection.  That our empirical consciousness is a byproduct of the Absolute self-
reflection means that thinking and feeling are related by its absolute self-relation.  Now, 
another way of putting this same claim, without heightening its ontological commitment, 
is that the only consciousness that is indeed the revelation of the Absolute is that 
consciousness which is the product of the true interdependence of feeling and reflection.  
This reverse formulation of Novalis' move from phenomenology to ontology lets us see 
how Fichte's mistake could become the key to his correction for Novalis.  In each of 
Fichte's attempted deductions, Novalis shows, Fichte thought he was reflecting upon the 
condition from the standpoint of that interdependence, but he was in fact mistaking the 
dependence of the human I on feeling for its own original independence, and more 
specifically, attributing the feeling-half on which reflection is actually dependent to itself 
as an independence, thereby finding itself.  Novalis' key insight is that this "mistake" is 
precisely the mechanism of "appearance" in the dual sense of the revelation of Absolute 
and the emergence of the phenomenal realm as the perspective of Dasein.  Reflection in 
the I raises its object (feeling) to the status of empirical consciousness by finding itself in 
the object, which finding or recognition is only possible because both reflection and 
feeling are contained in a higher self-reflecting being.  And by finding itself, reflection in 
the I also systematically inverts the interdependence of thinking and feeling — reflects 
the higher reflection, in other words — giving rise to the phenomenology within the 
sphere of empirical consciousness that the subject is the ground or that from which the 
appearance of being springs.  Novalis summarizes this simultaneous critique of Fichte 
and alternative deduction in his polysemous fragment #14: 
"Was die Reflexion findet, scheint schon da zu seyn — Eigenschaft eines freyen Actus — 
Sie findet die Kategorien, die schon da zu seyn scheinen — i.e. deren Möglichkeit ! "("!
(Form) und insoferne Nothwendigkeit (Form) im Ich und durch das Ich ist, — deren 
Wircklichkeit (Stoff) nur in der Reflexion ist."  (emphasis by Novalis) 
 
Two things are happening at once in this statement.  By emphasizing that the 
consciousness of the object is only actualized ("deren Wirklichkeit") in the moment of 
synthesis of sensations ("nur in der Reflexion ist"), Novalis iterates that consciousness is 
an "accident" (elsewhere he is clearer that it is an accident of a higher being's becoming-
being).  But at the same time, precisely because reflection, in the sense of the conscious 
image of an object, only emerges upon the higher synthesis, the illusion from the 
standpoint of the I is that it is the being that actively does the finding of the object, as if it 
were a self-sufficient source of appearance.  Novalis suggests here that this is a natural 
mistake, given that the higher synthesis makes the "I" too only appear with this 
appearance of the object as there.  So in one and the same breath, Novalis show Fichte's 
ego-Ausgangspunkt to be an illusion and also claims that this illusion is the necessary 
appearance of the (divine) Absolute in falsified guise.  We find this same polysemy in the 
very first lines of the first fragment, in Novalis' use of the term "Scheinsatz":   
"Das Wesen der Identität läßt sich nur in einen Scheinsatz aufstellen.  Wir verlassen das 
Identische um es darzustellen... dis geschieht nur scheinbar — und wir werden von der 
Einbildungskraft dahin gebracht es zu glauben — es geschieht, was schon Ist..."
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The illusion that Fichte' self-reflection reveals the Tathandlung arises from our 
constitutive reflection's making us believe that "what occurs, already is," or that the 
subject-object simultaneity of Dasein, which is in fact a product of the Absolute's self-
reflection (a "Geschehen" or "occurrence" in Jacobi's sense of a revelation of divine 
creativity), is instead "already there" as the self-giving ego.  The divine Absolute appears 
as the illusion of our finite perspectivality.  Thus "A is A" is a "Scheinsatz" in the double 
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sense of a false proposition (a merely formal or logical account of identity that obscures 
the ontological dependence of all form on a matter not presentable in formal terms), and 
the very way the Absolute reveals itself (the falsifying activity of reflection in the I is the 
mechanism of Absolute self-revelation). 
  Novalis also explores how natural it is to mistake the I for the ground of the 
appearance of being in fragment #3:  
 
"Wenn nun der allgemeine Gehalt nur im Ich wäre, so könnte man das bestimmte Seyn 
nicht dem Nur Seyn entgegensetzen?  Der Glauben zwingt uns auch nur diese 
Scheingegensetzung vorzunehmen, zu der wir allerdings im thetischen Vermögen die 
Kraft besitzen. /So wechselt das Denken und das Fühlen die Rolle des Subjectiven und 
Objectiven./"  (Emphasis by Novalis.) 
 
Recall that it was Jacobi's insight into the simultaneity of the experience of the subject 
and the object that inspired Fichte's (and Novalis') notion of the right to ontology from 
phenomenology: since we experience them at the same time, Jacobi surmised, our 
consciousness must be an immediacy with being, or our soul's unmediated imaging of the 
object, that led Jacobi to equate all of consciousness with "feeling" and the epistemic 
status of consciousness with "belief."  But Novalis' point here is that belief, too, because 
it is still the notion of the emergence the conscious sphere upon the soul's finding itself 
organically in the body, leads the subject all too easily to the false conclusion that the 
source of the appearance of objects is the soul alone, or as Novalis puts it, "so wechselt 
das Denken und das Fühlen die Rolle des Subjectiven und Objectiven": thinking is the 
seeming-to-itself that it is the ground of "objectivity" or being, rather than what it really 
is, the "subjectivity" or mental internalization of the object merely given in feeling.  
Incidentally, this fragment #3 is excellent evidence in favor of our, rather than Manfred 
Frank's, reading of Novalis' appropriation of Jacobi, with significant implications for the ! "($!
ontological role of the Absolute in the Fichte Studien.  Frank claimed that Jacobi's notion 
of sensuous immediacy with being became, for Novalis in his notion of "feeling" within 
Kantian judgment, a limit to our possible knowledge of being: the reflection of feeling 
that is consciousness is the deferral of immediacy with being, and also a manner of 
thinking about objects that necessitates a merely regulative notion of their higher 
condition in an "Absolute."  In our contrasting reading, which is substantiated by this 
fragment #3, Novalis in fact sees Jacobi as failing to understand that even his theory of 
our conscious immediacy with being still committed him to the nature of consciousess as 
a product of a higher self-reflection: it's only upon the soul's reflection of the body that 
subject-object simultaneity arises, and that makes the relationship between soul and body 
a function of neither soul nor body alone, but rather that which could bring their relation 
into being as an accident of its own coming into being.  As we saw in Chapter Two, 
Herder too saw this problem in Jacobi, and his response was the same as Novalis' in our 
interpretation of the Fichte Studien: the ground of being must be an organic or 
panentheistic God, because it is the only intellect capable of bringing itself into existence; 
our consciousness is then the byproduct of this divine and self-creative self-reflection.  
  By arguing that what seems at first immediate (the subject's experience of itself as 
a self-sufficient standpoint on the world) must be shown by another reflection to be 
always already reflected (i.e., the product of an even higher reflection over which the ego 
has no control), Novalis is indeed engaging in a "dialectical method" of sorts.  But it is 
important to distinguish Novalis' dialectic from the Hegelian dialectic that Theodor 
Haering attributes to him, because that difference explains how Novalis' position in the 
Fichte Studien can still be an epistemology in support of nonclosure.  Unlike Hegel, ! "(%!
Novalis performs an ex negativo approach to the Absolute, a thinking-about-thinking that 
can never become the convergence (and so closure) of human and divine thinking, even 
as it can know that its thought-about-thought is only possible because of a higher divine 
thinking that conditions it.   
"Wir müssen das gleichsam Objective, zum gleichsam subjectiven machen, das Seyn in 
eine Form des Denkens bringen, um es untersuchen zu können.  Wie sorgfältig man aber 
dann von dem nothwendigen Zusatz, von der gegebnen Form, abstrahiren muß, um die 
ursprüngliche Form des Seyns zu finden und mit dieser das mögliche Substrat alles 
Stoffs, dies ist leicht einzusehen (#12) ... Nur im Gefühle gleichsam kann die Reflexion 
ihre reine Form aufstellen — neues Datum des überall herrschenden 
Wechselverhältnisses zwischen den Entgegengesezten, oder der Wahrheit, daß alles 
durch Reflexion Dargestellte nach den Regeln der Reflexion dargestellt ist und von 
diesen abstrahirt werden muß um das Entgegengezte zu entdecken... Die Synthesis dieser 
These und Antithese [i.e. Reflexion und Gefühl] — muß Eins, Gränze und Sfäre von 
beyden, absolute Sfäre seyn, denn es ist Synthesis; wir sind aber im bestimmten Stoff, 
also es muß, es kann nicht anders als — Mensch oder Ich seyn..." (#19) 
 
In short, "abstracting the additive" of reflection, in the midst of the very process of self-
reflection, means understanding philosophically that our self-givenness is not put 
together from reflection alone, but from the interdependence of feeling and reflection, 
which form an "absolute" sphere, a boundary negatively marking the contours of the 
Absolute from within the empirical I.  Novalis engages in this single dialectical move in 
order to point to the divine Absolute outside of the sphere of human thought; he does not 
offer a theory of concepts as themselves living or organic entities that imply their own 
processual sublation to divine self-consciousness.  When I seek the condition of my self-
experience, I engage the ground of my appearance while I look at myself in order to find 
that very ground.  So, when I find myself — when I, the knower, look everywhere and 
notice myself as that which is looking — I must understand that this appearance, too, is 
conditioned by an even higher reflection.  I do find myself when I reflect upon myself: 
this self-discovery is an undeniable phenomenological fact of empirical consciousness, ! "(&!
and because it remains in the sphere of the empirically conscious I, it is a valid claim in 
"Kantian" terms.  But the reflective condition of that self-discovery is necessarily higher 
than myself, and, for being higher, can be known to be God, even as I cannot take God 
himself as an object of my thinking.  In his later, famous Blüthenstaub fragment #16, 
Novalis writes:  
 
"Ist denn das Weltall nicht in uns?  Die Tiefen unsers Geistes kennen wir nicht. — Nach 
Innen geht der geheimsnißvolle Weg.  In uns, oder nirgends ist die Ewigkeit mit ihren 
Welten, die Vergangenheit und Zukunft.  Die Außenwelt ist die Schattenwelt, sie wirft 
ihren Schatten in das Lichtreich..." 
 
This later-stage fragment validates the same process outlined in Fichte Studien fragments 
#12 and #19.  Self-experience is a deep phenomenon; and it is not what it initially seems. 
But it is also all that we need to understand our ultimate dependence on God (in 
Blüthenstaub #6, Novalis writes, "Ganz begreifen werden wir uns nie, aber wir werden 
und können weit mehr, als begreifen").  Reflection upon self-experience reveals an 
infinitude that comes, not to the I from the outside, but from "beneath" the I as the 
condition of its encountering space and time everywhere.  The I is thus not an 
independent standpoint on the world, but a Jacobian "Geschehen" (FS fragment #1): an 
opening, revelation, and dependent byproduct of a hidden and bottomless creativity that 
is the organismic God.   
  Returning to the iconic statement at the beginning of the Fichte Studien, "das 
Bewußtseyn ist ein Seyn außer dem Seyn im Seyn," we can see now that the two 
possibilities for parsing this statement do more that just indicate the thrownness of our 
empirical sphere from the Absolute; they offer a performative miniature of Novalis' ex 
negativo argument for the Absolute in the Fichte Studien as a whole.  Earlier we saw that, ! "('!
on one level, consciousness is a [being outside of] [being within being], or the private 
experience of subjectivity over and against objectivity; on the other level, this enclosed 
sphere of consciousness is possible as such because consciousness is a [being outside of 
being] [within being], or in other words, its sphere is enabled by a higher being.  Now we 
can additionally appreciate that the impossibility of presenting this twofold point in 
anything but a polysemy — requiring a "Gestalt shift," if you will, between one 
interpretation and then the other, but never granting both simultaneously — captures the 
impossibility of anything but the solely negative approach of the Absolute.  To presence 
the Absolute "in thought" would mean, for Novalis, that this very phrase must leap off 
the page and itself become productive being, which it clearly cannot; and yet, at the same 
time, the phrase is indeed God's "appearance," or phenomenal manner of revealing 
himself, for the infinite God could only ever appear by becoming finite, which is to say, 
by disguising himself as representational rather than creative consciousness.  Novalis' 
dialectic, for being a one-time correction that is only a knowledge of our dependence on 
the Absolute, is quite different from Hegel's dialectical movement to closure.   
  Now that our interpretation of Novalis' inference to the divine Absolute has been 
detailed, our stance on other readings (see Chapter One) can fruitfully be reviewed.  
Novalis does not allow even the possibility of sublative passage beyond the 
representational division from the Absolute, and so contemporary scholarship is right to 
disagree with this aspect of Theodor Haering's Hegelian reading of Novalis.  Walter 
Benjamin arguably comes closest to Novalis' true position with the notion of the 
"network effect" of Absolute self-reflection, which stymies the finite perspective that 
attempts to know its whole from within it as mere part; however, it must indeed be said, ! "((!
with Winfried Menninghaus, that Benjamin's reading does little to substantiate this claim 
textually, and more importantly, his thesis that Novalis comes to the Absolute from the 
insight that infinite reflections need not be regressive but could also "fill a network" is 
simply wrong.  Geza von Molnár grasped a key idea with his reading of Novalis' "I" as a 
"balance" of the self and not-self; but, because he never understood the influence of 
Jacobi in that claim (that insight was Manfred Frank's), von Molnár's reading never 
grasped the phenomenological importance of this balance, especially its bridge to 
ontology.  So, when von Molnár reads Novalis' statement that the "Muttersfäre" could be 
called "God and I," he assumes this choice is an antinomy and so an impasse to any 
knowledge of the Absolute, whereas in our reading, Novalis was in fact speaking with 
Herder, who said God is the only being who can properly say "I," in the sense of the 
creative subject of his thoughts.  Frederick Beiser is certainly correct that the organicism 
of Novalis' philosophy must be recognized again.  But not only did Beiser miss an 
opportunity to support his own position with a sustained argument for organicism in the 
Fichte Studien, he also missed that Novalis' organicism was in fact the result of his 
grappling with Kant and post-Kantian discourse, rather than first and foremost the 
influence of neo-Platonists such Jakob Böhme.  Manfred Frank's reading comes closest to 
the achievement of full historical contextualization of Novalis' thought, especially with 
the insight that Novalis wished to reconcile Kant and Jacobi in his Fichte Studien.  But 
Novalis was actually much closer to Fichte — and especially to Herder — in that 
reconciliation than Frank acknowledges: Novalis was not influenced by Jacobi to believe 
that Kantian sensation must be immediacy with being in the sense of a Parmenidean 
unity, the reflection of which produces the illusion of subject-object difference that can ! "()!
never reclaim immediacy philosophically; rather, like Fichte and Herder, Novalis saw 
Jacobi as committing himself in spite of himself to an underlying, constitutive act of 
reflection, so that the phenomenology of subject-object identity in the sphere of 
consciousness actually entitles the finite knower to the inference of the inherence of 
consciousness in a higher, self-reflecting being.  The "illusory" quality of consciousness 
is a direct function of that inherence; Novalis' "ordo inversus" is not Frank's "return to 
Kantianism" but rather Herder's inverted, mirror image of the organically productive 
God.  Finally, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy make the very important point that Novalis' 
interest in Kantian aesthetics was in its claim to make sensible, in our nondiscursive 
pleasure in beauty, the impossibility of the philosophical presentation of the Absolute; 
but they missed the opportunity to relate that pleasure to Novalis' inference from 
phenomenology to the organic ontology of the Absolute. 
   
IV.  The Nonclosure of Novalis' Organicism in the Fichte Studien 
 
  In the introduction to this dissertation, we defined "nonclosure" as the 
hypothetical quality of any given claim to empirical knowledge, because the absolute 
ground of knowledge cannot be taken as object of consciousness and so be made to 
secure the finality of claims by means of their systematic deduction from that ground.  
The above discussion of Novalis' restriction of the knowledge of the Absolute to 
inference alone, or the ex negativo approach from actual consciousness to a God 
unavailable as a cognitive object himself, has already gone a long way towards detailing 
how Novalis' organicism is in fact also a philosophy of "nonclosure" (and thus that any ! "(*!
scholarly tendency to see "organicism" and "nonclosure" as mutually exclusive is a false 
dilemma).  The remaining step in our discussion of nonclosure is to describe how, 
precisely, the claims of empirical science remain merely hypothetical in their epistemic 
status, according to Novalis.  If Novalis believes we can know that subjective knowledge 
of objects is secured by the inherence of consciousness in Absolute self-reflection, then 
why must empirical science remain an endless endeavor?  The answer will agree with 
Frank's reading of Novalis' coherence theory of truth, but with a basis in, not a rejection 
of, organicist ontology. 
  In these concluding remarks, it is helpful to return to the very beginning: the 
Kantian context of the problem of nonclosure.  Kant defended our right to empirical 
science by reflecting upon the conditions of a minimal standpoint that even the skeptic 
would not deny — the existence of self-conscious consciousness — the conditions of 
which would then trace the boundaries of valid knowledge.  Those conditions are 
sensibility and understanding, or more specifically, spatio-temporal sensuous content and 
the a priori categories of the understanding that raise that material to apperceptive 
consciousness by recognizing meaningful order in it.  All knowledge that is the synthetic 
product of these two conditions remains within the boundary of the knowable and is 
therefore valid.  The problem with Kant's defense is that what performs the very 
validating of knowledge — the inference to the condition of apperceptive consciousness 
— cannot itself be validated by the terms of Kant's own system.  Inference carves the 
"inside the system" (valid knowledge is that which remains within the conditions) from 
the "outside the system" (invalid knowledge is the operation of concepts apart from 
sensation); but by what right — by what "Archimedean" or super-systemic perspective — ! ")+!
does the inference draw that very boundary?  On Kant's own terms, I can only know what 
follows from the synthesis of sensibility and understanding; but then I also cannot know 
that synthesis occurs in my case, because the condition of my consciousness cannot 
become the object of my consciousness.  In the eyes of some of his contemporaries, 
Kant's system of the first Critique and the empirical claims it defends remain "nonclosed" 
or hypothetical: only if a metacritical framework for the transcendental inference can be 
found can the critical system be secured.   
  Fichte believed that this problem was solvable, and meanwhile that the "Kantian" 
restriction of knowledge to empirical experience could be retained.  What Kantianism 
needs is systematic closure, and more specifically, a self-evident foundation from which 
Kant's synthetic judgment can be logically derived such that the indubitability of the 
ground can confer to the critical system and so bolster it with metacritical validity.  He 
believed, furthermore, that Kant had effectively already suggested what that foundation 
must be, in his requirement of the "I think" that must accompany all consciousness: 
Fichte says that the human ego as a Tathandlung, or reflection that can take itself as 
object, is the foundation of all knowledge, the self-evident point of orientation in all acts 
of knowing.  The I's self-positing self-reflection, "I am I," is the fulcrum, the discursive 
act of self-knowing, that also that knits together the dualistic conditions of Kant's 
discursive judgment.  Fichte essentially argues that the "Archimedian point" that 
metacritically validates Kant's system is the private experience of the perspectival quality 
of our own consciousness: the "subject" is the fundamental being that enables the 
awareness of being outside it, and it is knowable as such because, phenomenologically, 
we cannot deny that all empirical knowing orients from its observing perspective. ! ")"!
  One of the centerpieces of Manfred Frank's reading of Novalis' Fichte Studien, 
and surely an accurate assessment of this text, is that Novalis rejects Fichte's 
foundationalism.  Frank provides a very thorough contextualization of Novalis' response 
to Fichte's systematic ambitions in the anti-systematic philosophy of the Niethammer 
circle, arguing convincingly for Novalis' anti-foundationalism and nonclosure.
170  No 
foundationalism, which by definition claims to start from a self-evident propositional 
statement of the ground and then logically deduce the system of knowledge from that 
foundational proposition, could uphold the Kantian division between concept and percept 
that is necessary for consciousness even to be a re-presentation of being.  That is, if one 
agrees with Kant (as Novalis does) that the conditions of subjective consciousness of 
objects are a priori categories in synthesis with a posteriori sensations, then we simply 
cannot claim that any proposition could be the synthesis — i.e., that its propositionality 
could both presence the absolute ground of consciousness and confer its self-evidence 
deductively to a system.  Reflection divides itself from its object, referring to it, but not 
presencing it ("wir müssen das Identische verlassen, um es darzustellen" as Novalis says 
in fragment #1).  So Kantian philosophy cannot be a foundationalism, and empirical 
science cannot be a set of finally knowable claims.  In place of foundationalism stands 
Novalis' notion of philosophy's infinite striving after the Absolute — infinite, because 
impossible: "For Novalis, the formula of philosophy as a 'longing for the infinite' is thus 
an indication of philosophy's intrinsic openness (or the non-final nature of its claims)."
171  
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170 Of course, Frank himself does not use the term "nonclosure," which we borrow instead from Alice 
Kuzniar's literary study (Delayed Endings: Nonclosure in Novalis and Hölderlin, (Athens : University of 
Georgia Press, c1987)).  We use her term rather than Frank's anti-foundationalism, because of its ability to 
capture not only the stance against systematic closure, but also the endless striving after the Absolute that 
follows from the absence of that possible closure. 
171 Frank 174 ! ")#!
And in place of epistemic finality in science stands Novalis' coherence theory of truth, in 
which the best we can achieve at any given time is a "maximally well connected" set of 
empirical propositions:   
"Novalis... calls this futile 'searching for one principle' an 'absolute postulate' — like a 
'squaring of the circle,' the 'perpetuum mobile,' or the 'philosopher's stone.'  And from the 
impossibility of ultimately justifying the truth of our conviction he draws the conclusion 
that truth is to be replaced with probability.  Probable is what 'is maximally well 
connected,' that is, what has been made as coherent as possible without there being an 
ultimate justification to support the harmony of our fallible assumptions regarding the 
world."
172 
 
For Novalis in Frank's reading of him, coherence can never know itself to be finally 
achieved, and so science must be an endless process.  The nonclosure of philosophy leads 
directly to the nonclosure of empirical science. 
  This dissertation agrees with and defers to the terms of Frank's position as stated 
above.  But our contention is that, whereas Frank understood Novalis' anti-
foundationalism also as the ontological rejection of the Absolute, which gives Novalis' 
coherence theory of truth a very contemporary-sounding ring, in fact Novalis' anti-
systematicity and endless striving of empirical science are compatible with what he 
understands the panentheistic or organismic divine Absolute to be.  Once again, our 
reading carves a middle path between scholars' false dilemma of nonclosure versus 
organicism.  The impossibility of grasping the Absolute in propositional terms, and the 
impossibility of conferring metacritical validity to the critical system (and therefore to 
empirical science) by means of logical deduction from that propositional ground, have as 
much to do with the intrinsic nature of the panentheistic God as it does the inability of a 
Kantian consciousness to overcome the reflection that separates it from the Absolute.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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  The point is that "identity" for Novalis means the "immediacy" of subject and 
object in the sense of productive or creative intellect, an absolute freedom, a form that is 
immediate with its matter because it instantiates itself.  Identity for Novalis is not, as 
Frank reads it, a Parmenidean being (or as Hegel would say, a "night in which all cows 
are black").  Frank is indeed right that our representational consciousness cannot hope to 
stand at the Archimedian point, but for Novalis that limitation is due to the fact that our 
consciousness is the receptive, instantiated end of the organismic God's infinite creativity, 
and so cannot rise above its created finitude to presence the absolute freedom that brings 
it and everything into being.  The Fichte Studien argue that human apperceptive 
consciousness is the appearance or revelation of the noumenal realm, and what that 
means is that perceptions or observations of the world are themselves also finitizations, or 
fragments, of God's own Logos — and because they are finite, they are also only partially 
true, only approximations.  The only presencing of God's original, creative form available 
to us is the interconnectedness of our observations, or in other words, the coherent 
theories or laws that we fashion out of the stuff of our observations.  But because 
scientific theorizing proceeds from a finite and receptive standpoint, its process of 
making observations cohere in laws can never know itself to be complete.  Private 
empirical experience is the "court of final appeal," so to speak — the only and 
nonreducible way that we objectify the Absolute — but that also means that our 
knowledge of the Absolute must remain forever inadequate.  So, even though Novalis has 
just engaged in 500 handwritten pages of "philosophy" in the general sense of "thinking 
about thinking," the proof of the existence of the Absolute is not in the philosophy, but in 
something that can never be captured propositionally — the revelation of lived ! ")%!
experience, the private world of our own subjective experience, the phenomenon — and 
which itself will never be anything more than a finite, fragmentary, inadequate 
presentation. 
  Much like Schelling would argue at the end of his philosophical career, Novalis in 
the Fichte Studien calls the Absolute, considered in itself or apart from its instantiation in 
existence, a "freedom" — "der absolute Grund alles Begründens, die Freyheit" (#566) — 
in order to characterize its capacity both to become anything and to be fundamentally 
falsified by any fixation.  When God instantiates himself in being, his original nature as a 
transcendent and infinite capacity becomes change, oscillation, or life ("[die Sfäre] 
zwischen Seyn und Nichtseyn — das Schweben zwischen den beyden — Ein 
Unaussprechliches, und hier haben wir den Begriff von Leben," #3).  Being, everything 
that exists, is always also being destroyed in the endlessly churning attempt to realize 
infinite productivity; that surging, that ontological unity of identity and difference, 
enables the subject-object relation of our consciousness.  "Alles Seyn, Seyn überhaupt ist 
nichts als Freyseyn — Schweben zwischen Extremen, die nothwendig zu verinigen und 
nothwendig zu trennen sind.  Aus diesem Lichtpunct des Schwebens strömt alle Realität 
aus — in ihm ist alles enthalten — Object und Subject sind durch ihn, nicht er durch sie." 
(#555)  So, though our mental life, which is also the sphere in which the observations of 
empirical science are made, is indeed one mode (the internal appearance) of the Absolute, 
its quality as a "beschränkt Unbeschränkte" (#17) means that any observation only 
fragmentarily approximates the infinite freedom that conditions it.  Novalis held this 
organicist position in both his early Fichte Studien and later philosophical fragment 
phases.  For example, in his later Vermischte Bemerkungen fragment #5, Novalis would ! ")&!
likewise say, "Der Geist führt einen ewigen Selbstbeweis."  And most famously: "Wir 
suchen überall das Unbedingte, und finden immer nur Dinge." (Vermischte Bemerkungen 
#1)  That is, the only appearance of that which "things" itself is the world of things, and 
not the absolutely creative freedom that underlies all things. 
  In light of this nature of the absolute ground in itself as an infinite creativity or 
freedom, the foundationalist attempt to capture the ground in a proposition and to relate 
all empirical claims deductively to that ground so as to know them with certainty is 
clearly misguided.  Again, any determination is, as a fixation, necessarily also a 
falsification: "Warum Universalphilosophie kein positives System seyn kann — Sie kann 
nichts, als die Form der vollständigen Thätigkeit des Geistes bey einer Bestimmung 
enthalten." (#650)  Instead of seeking the validation of empirical knowledge claims by 
means of the deductive connection of knowledge to its ground, Novalis suggests that 
scientists can only seek greater and greater levels of coherence between their beliefs, just 
as Frank argues.  But our inflection of Novalis' theory is different from Frank's reading.  
Greater and greater — endlessly greater — coherence between empirical observations is 
the only possible approximation of the Absolute, because only aggregation across all 
finite observations could approximate the infinite Logos, which exists outside space and 
time, and which these observations realize in space and time.  The proof of that 
coherence (the "science of science," to borrow Fichte's phrase) is not a law or a 
reflection, but rather — in keeping with the theory of the phenomenal appearance of the 
Absolute that this dissertation has propounded all along — can only be the sensation of 
unifying reflection, which Novalis describes as the feeling of freedom and at one point, 
even the pleasure of beauty, suggesting Kant's aesthetic solution in the third Critique.  ! ")'!
This phenomenal, private experience of proof is not conclusive, deductive proof, but 
rather a divine encouragement, if you will, that the finite observer can proceed in good 
faith.  It is worthwhile to quote the relevant fragment from the Fichte Studien at length: 
"Filosofiren muß eine eigne Art von Denken seyn.  Was thu ich, indem ich filosofire?  
ich denke über einen Grund nach.  Dem Filosofiren liegt also ein Streben nach dem 
Denken eines Grundes zum Grunde.  Grund ist aber nicht Ursache im eigentlichen Sinne 
— sondern innre Beschaffenheit — Zusammenhang mit dem Ganzen.  Alles Filosofiren 
muß also bey einem absoluten Grunde endigen.  Wenn dieser nun nicht gegeben wäre, 
wenn dieser Begriff eine Unmöglichkeit enthielte — so wäre der Trieb zu Filosophiren 
eine unendliche Thätigkeit — und darum ohne Ende, weil ein ewiges Bedürfniß nach 
einem absoluten Grunde vorhanden wäre, das doch nur relativ gestillt werden könnte — 
und darum nie aufhören würde... Abstraction von dem absoluten Grunde, und 
Geltendmachung des eigentlichen absoluten Grundes der Freyheit durch Verknüpfung 
(Verganzung) des Zu Erklärenden/zu einem Ganzen.  Je mannichfaltiger die Glieder 
dieses Ganzen sing desto lebhafter wird die absolute Freyheit empfunden — je 
verknüpfter, je Ganzer er ist, je wircksamer, anschaulicher, erklärter, ist der absolute 
Grund alles Begründens, die Freyheit, darinn." (#566) 
 
After Kant, the goal of much of Novalis' generation was to secure critique with 
metacritique, or as Novalis puts it above, to ground philosophy by thinking about 
thinking.  But Novalis is clear that the thinking about thinking is not even what could 
secure knowledge conclusively.  The ground is that which gives rise to all parts of being 
and their relation; it is, organically, what gives the parts their interdependent roles and 
what makes them hang together.  As such, its scientific description would have to be the 
result of a process of connecting observations to each other — a process that, for us, 
never ends: "Die Welt wird dem Lebenden immer unendlicher — drum kann nie ein 
Ende der Verknüpfung des Mannichfaltigen... kommen." (#565)  But as we have seen, 
consciousness already has all the security it needs in order to trust or to believe that its 
search for knowledge can indeed continue in good faith (and is not, for example, a 
solipsism, or a Humean, merely psychological exercise); it can trust that the endless 
approximation towards the Absolute is in fact asymptotic, an endless nearing: "Gott im ! ")(!
Geist und in der Wahrheit anbeten — theoretisches unendliches Streben zu Gott — 
practisches Streben zu Gott" (#54).  The security consciousness has is the very sphere of 
empirical experience, Dasein, the opening of being to itself; consciousness has being as a 
being-there-for-itself.  Above, Novalis states that the indication that empirical science is 
approaching truth is the enlivening satisfaction of ever more coherent observations.  And 
in the very first fragment, Novalis even suggests that this experience of identity is 
aesthetic, the pleasure of beauty: "Wir verlassen das Identische um es darzustellen... wir 
stellen es durch... [ein] Zeichen [vor]... dieses gleichförmig bestimmende muß eigentlich 
durchaus unmittelbar das mitgetheilte Zeichen durch eben die Bewegungen bestimmen, 
wie Ich — Frey und do so wie ich.  Geschmack und Genie."  Later in the Fichte Studien, 
Novalis says slightly more clearly: "Man kann so gewiß seine Filosofie wahr nennen — 
so gewiß man es schön nennt." (#234)  Truth is indicated in the particular pleasure of 
beauty: the way things hang together to form a pleasing whole.  This pleasure can be this 
indication of truth, because, as a pleasure in the hanging-together of thoughts, it is a 
phenomenal expression of the interdependence of feeling and reflection, and therefore the 
closest we finite beings come to cognizing with the absolute Logos: it is pleasure in the 
creative principle, the freedom, that conditions all. 
  Manfred Frank called Novalis' Fichte Studien a "return to Kant," a formulation 
with which we have disagreed throughout this dissertation because it reduces Novalis' 
ontological commitment to a merely regulative stance, and ignores another intellectual 
option, which is that the phenomenology of the Kantian judgment could have 
implications for the Kantian noumenal realm.  But in a certain sense, we must concede 
that Frank is right.  Whereas Fichte's closure attempted to remove the Ding an sich by ! "))!
arguing it away, or more precisely, making it an integral part of argumentation itself and 
so not an unknowable element outside of thought, Novalis appreciates the fundamentally 
Kantian insight that the Ding an sich must be retained, if the sphere of consciousness is to 
be maintained: there must be a fundamental difference between subject and object, if 
consciousness is even to be possible as a re-presentation.  But so too must there be a 
fundamental ontological sameness between subject and object, the only expression of 
which identity would be precisely our sphere of consciousness.  And so here we part 
ways with Frank.  Novalis' "return to Kant" in fact occurs as a romanticizing of Kant.  
The transcendental is also the transcendent, the phenomenal also the revelation of the 
noumenal, and the human being a part of God's organic whole.  "Das Allgemeine jedes 
Augenblicks bleibt, denn es ist im Ganzen.  In jedem Augenblicke, in jeder Erscheinung 
wirckt das Ganze — die Menschheit, das Ewige ist allgegenwärtig — denn sie kennt 
weder Zeit noch Raum — wir sind, wir leben, wir denken in Gott, denn dis ist die 
personificirte Gattung.  Es ist nicht in unserm Sinn ein Allgemeines, ein Besonders.  
Kannst du sagen es ist hie, oder dort?  Es ist alles, es ist überall; In ihm leben, weben und 
werden wir seyn.  Alles Ächte dauert ewig — alle Wahrheit — alles Persönliche." 
(Fichte Studien #462) 
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